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Summary 
Dysfunctional international organizations are anomalies in world politics. Neither rationalist 
nor constructivist attempts to explain their existence, persistence and growth have provided 
viable results, so far. 
However, beyond enhancing efficiency and effectiveness of international cooperation, less 
obvious functions of international organizations exist. Drawing on a primarily realist 
perspective, this study argues that states can use international organizations to obscure 
unwillingness to cooperate or solving common problems and diffuse responsibility or shift 
blame when commonly agreed upon solution do not work out as expected. In such situations, 
dysfunctions of international organizations might even be welcomed by states, because they 
provide obvious reasons for failure and make blame-shifting strategies more credible. 
This argument is explored in a case study of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 
(UNODC) – a dysfunctional yet growing international organization. The case study argues 
that states have only a limited interest in cooperating on drug control matters at the 
international level. Co-existence rather than cooperation is the major aim states pursue. 
Because states do not want to leave the achieved state of co-existence, they are not interested 
in a strong and functioning international organization in the field.  
The growth of the organization can be almost exclusively attributed to the technical assistance 
projects of the UNODC. However, a closer look at a recent high-profile assistance project 
shows that even in the operative realm states are not interested in the success of the 
organizations. Much more, they use the UNODCs technical capabilities to obscure their 
unwillingness to cooperate substantially on drug control matters when their interests are only 
marginally affected. 
The study concludes that in the case of the UNODC blame-shifting by states is one of the 
main reasons for the UNODC’s budget growth despite its dysfunctions. Although it remains 
unclear to what extent this insight can be generalized to all dysfunctional international 
organizations, the mechanisms identified seem to provide viable explanations for other 
dysfunctional organizations operating under similar circumstances.   
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1 Introduction 
 
In 1910, there were 37 intergovernmental organizations. Today, more than 250 of them 
populate world politics1.  
 
Despite this unprecedented growth, scholars of International Relations have not much to say 
about the role of these organizations and the bureaucracies operating them in world politics. 
What international organizations (IOs) are, what they do and how they affect world politics 
have been questions virtually absent in the study of international relations since the early 
1970s, when a comparative study of eight IOs concluded that IOs only mattered in world 
politics when their “work has little salience for the major states” and that record of the idea 
that they could form a “series of autonomous, functionally defined centers of power” was “not 
very promising” (Cox and Jacobson 1973: 428).  
 
Institutions are of great concern to International Relations theory, but the study of formal IOs 
has never gained leverage. In the worldviews of most theoretical approaches to international 
politics, IOs did not play a significant role. Realists and neo-realists have been concerned with 
long established institutions such as the balance of power or war. Formal IOs and 
international bureaucracies are treated as epiphenomenal to the order states create through 
these institutions (Mearsheimer 1994/1995). Neoliberal theorizing has concentrated on how 
states can gain from institutionalized international cooperation. The question is how “sets of 
principles, norms, rules and procedures” (Krasner 1983a) do change expectations among 
states and revers ‘market failure’ in international politics (Keohane and Martin 1995). Some 
constructivists have been interested in IOs as structures which provide favourable conditions 
for state socialization (Checkel 2007b, Johnston 2003, Stone 2004). Scholars concerned with 
transgovernmental relations considered IOs as an antiquated form of state cooperation bound 
to disappear in insignificance if they do not radically change (Slaughter 2004).  
 
However, the study of IOs has returned to IR in two forms. First, by those concerned with 
‘global governance’, IOs have become seen as the core of an emerging governance 
                                                          
1 What IOs are is controversial. The Yearbook of IOs offers at least five answers to the question “How many 
international organizations are there?” (see, for example, UIA 2005). The numbers shown here are conservative 
estimates. They include four types of international governmental organizations denominated as ‘federations of 
IOs’, ‘universal membership organizations’, ‘intercontinental membership organization’ and ‘regionally oriented 
membership organizations’. If ‘subsidiary and internal bodies’ of IOs are also counted as IOs in their own right 
the number increases to 617 for the year 2010 (UIA 2010).  
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architecture which does not solely rely on states (see, for example Muldoon 2004: 10) and are 
an important remedy for the gaps still yawning in this architecture (see, for example Weiss 
and Thakur 2010). 
Second, in the light of blatant and often scandalized failures of IOs – such as the UN’s failure 
to react appropriately on the genocide in Rwanda or the IMFs and the World Bank’s 
performance in alleviating poverty on the African continent –a range of scholars have raised 
the question how IOs can become dysfunctional and why states are not acting as decisively as 
one could expect against these dysfunctions.  
The first reason for studying IOs has been dismissed forcefully by orthodox scholars. Drezner 
(2007: 63), for example, argues that “governance processes need to be separated from 
governance outcomes” at an analytical level in order to understand what impact international 
and other non-state organizations can have on what is decided in international politics. His 
conclusion is, that it is still the great powers who make the ‘rules of the game’ in international 
politics. The talk about IOs making a difference is not entirely wrong, but in Drezners (2007: 
85-87) perspective, attempts to influence decision-making processes by IOs only matter when 
powerful states let this happen. Outcomes of political processes depend on what powerful 
states want rather than on who is involved in the process.  
 
The second perspective on IOs, however, presents a thornier problem to IR theory. Even to 
those theories committed to a strictly state-centric perspective on world politics dysfunction 
matters. After all, states create IOs because they expect them to solve problems they cannot 
solve alone or in decentralized forms of cooperation (Abbott and Snidal 1998). In a world of 
rationally acting states, the persistence of dysfunctional IOs needs to be explained. 
In the past decade, IR scholars have identified a range of organizations which do not act in the 
way states have expected them to. In some cases this results in a reduced problem solving 
capacity of these organizations. The International Monetary Fund, the Office of the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the United Nations Secretariat’s Department of 
Peace Keeping Operation (Barnett and Finnemore 2004) or the World Bank (Weaver 2008)) 
have been declared to be dysfunctional IOs. The observation that IOs produce 
counterproductive results, pursue their mandates selectively or violate norms they have 
created themselves or to which they have committed themselves publicly is not restricted to 
scholarly analysis of IOs. Indeed, for a long time media and watchdogs have been pointing at 
the fact that IOs are often not doing what they should do in order to solve the problems they 
have been created to solve. 
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So far, theoretical accounts to dysfunctional IOs have not been able to convincingly explain 
why they persist and sometimes even grow. Existing explanations, mostly arguing from a 
sociological perspective on organizations, are helpful to explain why IOs become 
dysfunctional. In these perspectives, organizational culture drives the behaviour of IOs with 
the effect that organizations have a tendency of institutionalizing behaviour which is good for 
the protection of the internal culture but disadvantageous for the problems the organization 
has to deal with. States accept what dysfunctional IOs do to be rights thing to do because IOs 
have the authority and constitutive power. This authority and power make IOs “central actors 
on the stage of world politics” (Barnett and Finnemore 2004: 156) and provides them with the 
ability to change the perceptions of states about what solutions are appropriate for problems. 
Because they are authoritative and powerful IOs have the ability to socialize and persuade 
states. 
However, sociological theories of organizational dysfunction struggle to convincingly explain 
why states support such organizations and enable their growth despite their obvious 
dysfunction. The theoretical explanation put forward – the authority and constitutive power of 
IOs and their effects on perceptions and preferences of states – is theoretically 
underdeveloped and empirically difficult to prove even when an interpretative methodology is 
applied. 
At the core of the shortcomings of existing explanations of dysfunctional IOs is their neglect 
of state interests. Existing explanations ignore the possibility that state could be central for the 
creation, persistence and growth of dysfunctional IOs not despite but because of their 
dysfunctional behaviour. In these explanations, states are largely passive bystanders in world 
politics operating in a normative structure created among others by (dysfunctional) IOs.  
This study explores the argument that states can have an interest in IOs behaving 
dysfunctional. They serve states when the tasks they perform are only of limited interest to 
states.  
 
Once mandated, dysfunctional IOs come under pressure to act, despite the lacking 
commitment of states to really engage in the solution of a problem be it through international 
cooperation or be it through the investment into the operative capacities of IOs. Because 
dysfunctional IOs are often weak political actors, they have no meaningful capacities to blame 
states for the failures they produce.  
This makes dysfunctional IOs valuable agents of states in world politics. They do what I call 
the “dirty work” for state by sorting out state preferences in their operative work. They deal 
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with the impediments of problem management on the ground and – on this basis – succeed or 
fail to implement projects states have designed to manage problems by which they are only 
marginally concerned. In the case of failure, dysfunctional IOs provide states with the 
opportunity to blame someone else for the consequences of their lacking commitment.  
 
Dysfunctional IOs have functions for states. States use them to separate talk from action. The 
fact that dysfunctional IOs often are hypocritical actors which themselves seek to separate talk 
from action is what makes them interesting for state. They provide states with opportunities to 
act, where they otherwise would not take action at all.  
Dysfunctional IOs are places for states to dump the problems they are not concerned with but 
which nevertheless exist in world politics. Their function is to make even symbolical actions 
of states more meaningful and if they fail to do so, to take the blame.  
Dysfunctional IOs are convenient agents for states. This is why their dysfunctions are 
accepted by states despite their failure to increase efficiency in international cooperation. This 
is why they are supported by states despite the fact that they contradict important norms in 
international politics. This is why they grow despite some of them are more often than not 
failing to accomplish the missions they are assigned to. Because they can be kept in this 
convenient role by states, they persist and grow.  
 
The processes described above are complex. This study concentrates on a single case to 
exemplify the relationships between state interests and dysfunctional behaviour of IOs. It is 
concerned with revealing the mechanisms which link state interests and dysfunctional 
behaviour of IOs2. Doing so enables this study to show how the lack of interests of states in 
international cooperation renders an IO dysfunctional and how this dysfunctional behaviour 
can nevertheless result in growth of the organization without states getting significantly 
socialized or persuaded into the adherence. 
In-depth case studies are particularly insightful when attributes of the case defy conventional 
and existing theoretical explanations for similar cases (Rueschenmeyer 2003). In the case of 
the UNODC, existing explanations are only of limited value to understand the development of 
the organization in the past two decades. The UNODC is dysfunctional. It has grown over the 
past years. But it has had no visible effect on the preferences or perceptions of states. Without 
this, however, the persistence and growth of the organization can hardly be explained as a 
                                                          
2 On the methodological advantages of case studies as a tool to reveal causal mechanisms rather than causal 
effects, see Gerring (2007: 43-48) and George and Bennet (2005).  
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function of its constitutive powers. The remainder of this introduction outlines the puzzling 
characteristics of the UNODC.  
 
What Are Dysfunctional International Organizations? 
Dysfunction is the core concept of this study. Defining dysfunction, however, is not an easy 
task since there is no measurement of such a thing as dysfunction. Claiming that an IO is 
dysfunctional is inherently an interpretative task (Barnett and Finnemore 1999, Barnett and 
Finnemore 2004: 35-36). Therefore, the main question in defining dysfunction is against 
which background the behavior of an IO should be judged in order to make a reasonably 
founded claim that it is dysfunctional. 
Barnett and Finnemore (2004: 35) argue that the dysfunction of IOs is a matter of degree and 
perspective and that these two dimensions of dysfunction cannot be identified 
straightforwardly. Setting the standard for dysfunctional behaviour high is counterproductive 
because in every organization dysfunction can be observed. IOs are created and run by human 
beings. They are social entities, not only structures which reduce transaction costs, produce 
information and provide services for states. And because this is the case, IOs can never work 
perfectly. Some degree of dysfunction is inevitable but acceptable and declaring every 
organization not running perfectly as dysfunctional would not provide a definition on which a 
theory can be created and developed. Setting it low comes with similar problems. 
Understanding all behaviour of IOs as acceptable because it emerges from the social 
relationships which hold organizations together does not allow assuming a meaningful 
perspective on variations in the behaviour of IOs. 
One way to make the definition less dependent on the observer’s judgment is to judge the 
behaviour of IOs against the expectations of their founders – rational states. According to 
Abbott and Snidal (1998), rational states create IOs because they perform functions unilateral 
action or decentralized forms of cooperation among states cannot achieve. IOs centralize 
information about problems and the behaviour of states – thereby reducing transaction cost – 
and as partly autonomous actors they act as enforcers of agreements among states. In this 
sense, a functional IO enhances the “efficiency of collective activities” and affects “the 
understandings, environment and interests of states”. Furthermore, because IOs are neutral 
actors, they should operate with impartiality in “managing interstate disputes and conflicts” 
(Abott and Snidal 1998: 5). Performing such tasks successfully is the baseline for a functional 
IO. Those which make international cooperation less efficient and lack the neutrality to settle 
disputes among states are dysfunctional.  
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Above this baseline, several degrees of dysfunction can be identified, however. Here, the 
issue of perspective is more salient. One form of dysfunction is what Barnett and Finnemore 
(2004: 34-41) have termed the ‘pathologies’ of IOs. Pathological behaviour of IOs is defined 
as behaviour that “violates the self-understood core goals of the organization” (Barnett and 
Finnemore 2004: 38) and which “significantly exceeds the inevitable minimum of noise and 
leads the organization to act in ways that are inconsistent with its social purpose” (Barnett and 
Finnemore 2004: 35). Contrary to the baseline of dysfunction established above, these are 
clearly interpretative standards of dysfunction because ‘self-understood goals’ and ‘social 
purpose’ do need further explanation in order to become meaningful categories for the 
definition of dysfunction.  
A second form of dysfunction has been identified as what Brunsson (1989) calls 
‘organizational hypocrisy’. Similar to what Barnett and Finnemore observe as dysfunctional 
behaviour of IOs, organizational hypocrisy can be seen in the discrepancy between what an 
IO says it does and what it is actually doing. Therefore, organizational hypocrisy is about the 
separation of talk and action in IOs. According to Weaver (2008: 19), organizational 
hypocrisy becomes manifest as the “selective pursuit of mandates, (…) weak compliance with 
rules, and (…) half-hearted or thwarted efforts to carry out new agendas”. 
 
Pathologies of IOs and organizational hypocrisy are helpful concepts to develop a nuanced 
understanding of dysfunctional behaviour of IOs. They provide guidelines that help 
identifying dysfunctional behaviour of IOs which does not necessarily result in obvious 
failure of the organizations as such, but only in parts of what organizations are expected to 
achieve. 
In this sense, dysfunction is indeed a matter of perspective. The behaviours described by 
Barnett and Finnemore (2004) and Weaver (2008) can make perfect sense for those within the 
organization. Pathologies and organizational hypocrisy often serve the survival of the 
organization (Weaver 2008: 4-5). Consequently, defining dysfunction, apart from the obvious 
failure to fulfil the basic expectations of states, necessarily means to take a position. 
 
Elusiveness Instead of Authority: The UNODC as a Dysfunctional International Organization 
The UNODC’s major dysfunction is its elusiveness. In its ‘Operational Guidelines’ (UNODC 
2003: 12) the organization states that “a comparative advantage of the Office is its very DNA 
as a multilateral entity, namely as an honest broker representing the interest of no single 
Member State”. 
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Despite its technical mandate, design and self-understanding the UNODC has found avenues 
to attempt to become an actor in the politics of international drug control. It participates in the 
normative dispute states are leading in international drug control. It often does so indirectly 
through its publications and especially in its most prominent document – the World Drug 
Report (WDR). Indeed, this publication was established to provide states with knowledge 
about illicit drug markets. The initial idea was that the WDR functions as a statistical 
compendium of what is known about the dynamics of transnational drug markets and the 
effectiveness of interventions therein. However, by interpreting statistical data, introducing 
thematic chapters and in the forewords of the reports, executive directors and staff of the 
organization have introduced their own perspective on international drug control making it 
also a political document. 
In many ways, the UNODC does not resemble an impartial actor in world politics. As one 
advocacy network has put it: 
 
“The UNODC performs at its strongest when it is providing objective analysis and expertise 
to member states, and facilitating policy debate between conflicting positions. However, all 
too often, the Office has operated as a political actor in its own right, siding particular 
member states, or simply defending the effectiveness of existing policies and programmes.”3 
 
The organization’s support for the prohibition of narcotic drugs as the core norm of 
international drug control is part of the dysfunction of the organization. Prohibition has not 
only proved to be ineffective, its consequences are counterproductive for the aims states want 
to achieve by controlling drugs. It has created lucrative black markets but has so far had no 
measureable effect on the levels of production, trade and consumption of controlled 
substances. 
 
I will argue that this kind of dysfunction has changed over time. What the UNODC says about 
prohibition and its effects has come closer to what can actually be observed on illicit black 
markets in recent years. However, the UNODC has remained firmly supportive of an 
interpretation of the international drug conventions4 that aims at solving the ‘world drug 
                                                          
3 International Drug Policy Consortium, Introduction to the UNODC. See:  
http://www.idpc.net/policy-advocacy/global-advocacy/global-system-drug-control/unodc/read-more [retrieved 
November 14, 2011]. 
4 The international legal framework which builds the basis of the international drug control system consists of 
three international conventions: The Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961 as amended by the 1972 
Protocol amending the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, (hereafter, 1961 Single Convention), the 
Convention on Psychotropic Substances of 1971 (hereafter, 1971 Psychotropic Substances Convention) and the 
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problem’ by restricting the use of drugs for designated purposes only and which attempts to 
achieve this goal by criminalizing substances and controlling the supply-side of illicit drug 
markets.  
 
There are alternatives to prohibition-based drug control. Indeed, these alternatives have 
become more important in the domestic drug control policies of many Western European 
states and in recent years also in some states outside this region. These alternatives are 
commonly summarized under the headings of ‘harm reduction’ and ‘decriminalization’. Harm 
reduction and decriminalization are measures in drug control which do not directly aim at 
creating abstinence or a ‘drug free society’. Much more, these measures are aimed at reducing 
the effects of drug consumption on public health. 
The UNODC has not ignored that such alternatives to prohibition have been developed in the 
past two decades. But in its publications, the organization has remained elusive about its own 
position concerning such measures and has so far failed to fully endorse the scientific 
knowledge which points at the positive effects of harm reduction. Although in some instances, 
the UNODC has made clear statements in favour of harm reduction, over the past years it is 
difficult to identify something like a position of the organization on the issue of alternatives to 
prohibition. For an IOs which calls itself as a “global leader in the fight against illicit drugs”5 
remaining elusive on one of the major topics in international drug control in the past two 
decades is dysfunctional. Such behaviour does not provide the guidance and leadership 
functionalists and constructivists expect from IOs.  
 
Combined with a relative neglect of alternatives to prohibition, the UNODC’s commitment to 
a prohibitionist understanding of how control over narcotic drugs can be achieved, the 
organization engages in self-defeating behaviour. Although it has become obvious that 
prohibition does not achieve its aims – and although this is widely accepted within the  
organization – in public the organization perpetuates the myth that the international drug 
conventions based on prohibition are the single most important tool to achieve the aim to 
“minimize and eventually eliminate the availability and use of illicit drugs in order to ensure 
the health and welfare of humankind”6.  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988 
(hereafter, 1988 Trafficking Convention). 
5 See, UNODC webpage: http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/about-unodc/index.html?ref=menutop [retrieved 
November 14, 2011]. 
6 Commission on Narcotic Drugs: Report on the fifty-second session; E/CN.7/2009/12, p.38. 
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The public commitment of the UNODC to prohibition and its neglect of alternatives is a 
pathology which places the UNODC just above the base-line of an IO which does not fulfil 
the functional expectations of states. In a conflict-ridden issue-area such as international drug 
control, an IO that takes sides in the normative discourse under the veil of evidence-based 
expertise and impartiality does neither contribute to the management of disputes among states, 
nor is such an organization helpful in the development of international norms or making 
collective activities efficient or effective. It is impossible to determine if some states would be 
better off if regulation of drug control matters would take place in a decentralized setting. 
However, in any case, the UNODC’s contribution to the management of the political conflicts 
in international drug control is rather limited. Its firm commitment to the prohibition norm has 
not affected states in their positions towards alternatives to a prohibitive approach to 
international drug control.  
If one takes the UNODC’s claim seriously that providing the “knowledge and understanding 
of drugs (…) issues and expand the evidence base for policy and operational decisions”7 is 
part of the UNODC’s mandate, than – as will be shown in greater detail in chapter four of this 
study – it can indeed be said that the organization is pursuing its mandate only selectively and 
‘half-hearted’. 
 
The Growth of the UNODC 
The UNODC has been created as a technical organization. According to its mandate, it 
performs functions which Abbott and Snidal (1998) have identified as being essential for the 
enabling cooperation among states. Besides its function as an international secretariat for the 
Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND), which is the central policy making body for 
international drug control, and the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB), which 
oversees the legal market for narcotic drugs, the UNODC performs genuine tasks. It collects 
data from states about the illicit production, trafficking and consumption of all sorts of 
controlled substances, provides states with guidelines and best practice in implementing the 
international drug control conventions and performs field missions in order to improve the 
capacities of states to make international drug control work. Currently, the UNODC is 
running 9 country offices, 27 project offices, 8 regional offices and two liaison offices and is 
involved in projects on most continents of the world. Staff of the organization currently 
compromises approximately 500 employees worldwide. 
                                                          
7 As stated on the UNODC’s webpage: http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/about-unodc/index.html?ref=menutop 
[retrieved November 14, 2011]. 
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The mandates of the UNODC had been largely defined by its historical predecessors – the 
Division of Narcotic Drugs, the Secretariat of the INCB and the United Nations Fund for 
Drug Abuse Control (UNFDAC) – which were merged under the umbrella of the United 
Nations Drug Control Programme (UNDCP) by General Assembly Resolution 45/179 in 
1990. ‘Crime’ in the organization’s name refers to the fact that in 2002 the United Nations 
Crime Fund was merged into the UNDCP and with that the Programme also became the 
Secretariat of the Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice (CCPCJ) and 
provides analytical functions for this commission, too. However, in terms of funding as well 
as within the organization, the ‘drug component’ is still dominating. For example, in 2010, 
from the overall budget of USD 242.9 million, 63.3% or USD 153.7 million had been 
administrated to the drug programme of the organization8.  
The organization still remains divided between its drug programme and its crime programme. 
Although the ‘drug fund’ and the ‘crime fund’ are included under the same organization, they 
have largely remained separate from each other. It is therefore possible to look at the UNODC 
as an actor in international drug control without considering its ‘crime programme’.  
 
The budget of the organization arises from three different sources: the UN regular budget, 
general purpose funds (e.g. unearmarked voluntary contributions from states), and special 
purpose funds (e.g. earmarked voluntary contributions from states). The organization’s overall 
budget between 2003 and 2009 has amounted to USD 184.3 million on average. Since 2003, 
the UNODC’s budget has been increasing with the exception of the year 2009, when special 
purpose funds dropped significantly. However, on average, the UNODC’s budget has been 
growing by 15% per year on average over the past eight years.  
Contributions to the budget from regular UN budget and unearmarked contributions together 
amount to roughly 20% of the organization’s budget on average. Between 2003 and 2008 the 
share of unearmarked and regular budget contribution to the overall budget have decreased 
from 32.6% in 2003 to 12% in 2008. In 2009 and 2010, the share of unearmarked and regular 
funds has been 14% (see table 1).  
Most of the UNODC’s budget is arising from earmarked contributions. This means that states 
‘donate’ this money to the UNODC for the provision of designated projects. Between 2003 
and 2010, earmarked contributions to the organization averaged at USD 151.7 million, 
ranging from USD 63.7 million in 2003 to USD 246.9 million in 2008.  
                                                          
8 see, UNODC website: http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/donors/index.html?ref=menuside [retrieved November 
14, 2011]. 
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The relatively high share of earmarked contributions to the organization suggests that states 
are first and foremost interested in the UNODC as an IO which performs more or less clearly 
defined projects for states. According to the UNODC, the dependency of the organizations on 
voluntary contributions pledged on an annual basis is problematic. In its 2010 Annual Report, 
the organization described its funding mechanism as “inadequate” and “unsustainable” in the 
light of “ever-rising expectations” by states (UNODC 2011b: 66). However, states do not 
seem to be willing to change the funding structure of the organization. Despite the fact that 
the General Assembly has expressed general concerns about the financial situation of the 
organization in the light of the budgetary decrease in 2009 (UNODC 2011b: 67), it is 
unrealistic to expect a change in the funding mechanism of the organization. For the 
foreseeable future, the UNODC will have to depend largely on voluntary contributions from 
states.  
The donor basis of the UNODC has changed over the past decade. In the 1990s and at the 
beginning of the 2000s – when the UNODC’s overall biannual budget was around USD 100 
million (UNODC 2003: 4) – the UNDCP and shortly after the merger, the UNODC were 
mainly financed by voluntary contributions of the U.S., which was the most important single 
contributor to the UNODC between 1997 and 2003, contributing up to one third of its budget 
(Fazey 2003). 
In recent years, other donors have gained importance. Today, the UNODC is receiving more 
funding from states which do not have an interest in the promotion of a strongly prohibitionist 
international drug control. A comparison of the donor structure for the years 2006-2009, for 
which comparable and sufficiently disaggregated data are available, reveals three dynamics in 
the funding structure of the organization. First, funding for the organization originates from a 
relatively small basis. Twenty-four states have contributed between 73% and 81% of the 
UNODC’s overall budget. However, in each year between four and six states provided 50%9 
of the overall budget of the organization. Second, states which are known for their 
commitment to the prohibition norm in domestic and international politics10 and states which 
have openly committed themselves to alternative approaches to drug control11 are represented 
                                                          
9 In 2006 Brazil, the European Commission, Sweden, the U.S. and UK; in 2007 the European Commission, 
Canada, the U.S., Sweden, Colombia and Italy; in 2008 Colombia, the U.S., the European Commission and 
Brazil; in 2009 Colombia, the European Commission, Canada, Sweden and Germany provided roughly 50% of 
the UNODC’s budget.  
10 Japan, Russia, Sweden and the U.S. 
11 At the 52nd Session of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs, a group of twenty-six states made a statement in 
which they announced that the term “related support services” which was used in the political declaration of the 
Commission to describe various forms of treatment of drug abusers, will be interpreted by them as including 
measures commonly referred to as harm reduction measures (see, Commission on Narcotic Drugs: Report on the 
fifty-second session; E/CN.7/2009/12, p. 119). This was the first time that the term harm reduction was used in 
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in this group. The UNODC does not have a coherent donor basis with a common interest in 
prohibitive drug control.  
 
Table 1: UNODC Annual Budget 2003 – 2010 in Million USD 
 
Regular Budget General Purpose Special Purpose Total 
2003 13.2 17.6 63.7 94.5 
2004 16.1 15.8 76.9 108.8 
2005 16.1 15.2 104.9 136.2 
2006 17.7 14.4 126.1 158.2 
2007 17.7 14.7 163.8 196.2 
2008 20.5 13.3 246.9 280.7 
2009 20.5 11.1 204.2 235.8 
2010 21.3 16.1 226.8 264.2 
Source: UNODC website12 and Annual Reports of the UNODC (2007a, 2008b, 2009b, 2010a) 
 
Third, on the other hand, the budget share of those states known for their commitment to 
prohibition has been decreasing. The share of those states which prefer alternative policies 
and the European Commission13, which can also be counted to the actors in international 
politics who put an emphasis on alternatives in drug control, has been increasing. 
 
While no single state can be seen as responsible for the growth of the UNODC budget, those 
states which have openly committed to alternative approaches of drug control have become 
more important for the UNODC in the past years14. 
In sum, three observations about the development of the UNODC’s funding can be made. 
First, states invest more in international drug control. With the exception of the decrease of 
2009, the UNODC’s budget has been rising steadily. Second, the UNODC’s donor basis has 
expanded. At the turn of the century, the organization was mainly financed by the U.S. 
However, in the past years the U.S. has been replaced by a range of other donors. These 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
an official document of the Commission. Here, states which were included in this group are considered as having 
openly committed to alternative approaches to international drug control. The group included: Australia, Bolivia, 
Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Latvia, Liechtenstein, 
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Saint Lucia, Slovenia, 
Spain, Switzerland, and the UK. 
12 http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/donors/index.html?ref=menuside [retrieved November 14, 2011]. 
13 In the EU Drugs Strategy for 2005-2012 and the EU Action Plan on Drugs for 2005-2012, the EU has adopted 
a commitment to harm reduction measures as a common position. See, COM(2005) 45 final, Communication 
from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on a EU Drugs Action Plan (2005-2008), 
Brussels, February 14, 2005. 
14 Donations from Japan, Russia, Sweden and U.S. accounted for 18% (2006), 17% (2007), 15% (2008) and 14% 
(2009) of the overall budget. Donations from the group of twenty-six and the European Commission accounted 
for 31% (2006), 29% (2007), 23% (2008) and 33% (2009) of the overall budget.  
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donors have different interests in international drug control, as they are not representing a 
prohibitionist approach to drug control domestically as well as internationally.  
 
Table 2: Major Donors 2006 – 2009 in Million USD 
 
2006 2007 2008 2009 
Australia 5.4 5.6 1.8 5.4 
Austria 0.9 2.3 1.8 2.3 
Belgium 2.5 0.2 1.5 0.5 
Canada 2.8 16.7 15.5 19.3 
Denmark 1.8 2.8 1.5 2.3 
EC 15.8 21.7 26.6 26.4 
Finland 3.1 1.2 2.4 3.1 
France 2.7 3.4 3.6 3.6 
Germany 2.3 2.6 8.0 13.5 
Ireland 1.5 2.0 1.3 0.3 
Italy 6.3 9.7 8.5 1.2 
Japan 2.2 2.1 2.1 5.1 
Luxembourg 0.7 1.4 1.3 1.1 
Netherlands 5.3 9.3 9.6 12.6 
Norway 3.8 7.3 7.7 8.2 
Spain 1.4 2.1 1.4 0.7 
Sweden 13.2 15.1 12.6 15.3 
Switzerland 0.6 0.9 0.5 0.9 
Turkey 0.6 1.0 0.6 0.7 
UK 10.9 5.1 4.4 5.8 
USA 12.1 15.9 26.8 11.0 
Brazil 36.8 1.9 24.7 2.9 
Colombia 6.2 12.2 63.8 41.7 
Russia 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 
Total 138.9 143.0 228.4 184.4 
Share of Annual Budget 88% 73% 81% 78% 
Source: Annual Reports of the UNODC (2007a, 2008b, 2009b, 2010a) 
 
Third, states do not show any interest in changing the funding mechanism of the organization. 
Although the General Assembly has expressed concern regarding the decreasing share of 
regular budget and general purpose contributions, expecting a change in the funding 
mechanism in the foreseeable future is unrealistic. 
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Together, these observations provide a mixed picture of the UNODC’s relations to states. The 
funding mechanism and the lacking prospects of its change in the coming years suggest that 
states have an interest in the UNODC as an organization which provides technical functions. 
On the other hand, the expansion of the budget and the expansion of the donor basis suggest 
that more states with different interests are contributing to an organization which is in many 
ways committed to the international drug control conventions and their prohibitionist 
approach.  
This suggests that the interests of states are not exclusively in using the UNODC as a tool to 
promote prohibitionist approaches, as some authors have argued (Thoumi 2002, Fazey 2003). 
The UNODC, as suggested by recent developments in its funding structure, is not (anymore) a 
tool of powerful states promoting zero-tolerance and the war against drugs. 
It remains unclear to what extent changes in the funding structure of the UNODC have 
redefined the role and behaviour of the organization. According to the conventional argument 
often supported by critics of international drug control, the funding mechanism of the 
organization provides an inroad to the politicization of its role and behaviour. The UNODC 
has often been depicted as a conscript in the U.S.-led war on drugs because a relevant share of 
its funding has been provided by the U.S. (Bewley-Taylor 2004). However, changes in the 
funding structure of the organization have not made the UNODC a promoter of alternative 
approaches to drug control or just a more balanced organization. In public, the organization 
still backs prohibition and demonstrates its loyalty to the international drug conventions. 
Nevertheless, states in general and those with an interest in a less prohibitionist international 
drug control in particular have increased their contributions to the organization. States, 
especially those for whom current international drug control seems to be problematic, are 
maintaining and expanding a dysfunctional IO which seems not to serve its interests. This 
study attempts to explain why this is the case.  
 
The Lacking Constitutive Powers of the UNODC 
The best explanation for the persistence and growth of dysfunctional IOs has been put 
forward by constructivist scholars, so far. They argue that dysfunctional IOs survive because 
they are accepted as authorities in world politics. Their authority enables dysfunctional IOs to 
shape the normative structure in which states act and through that to alter the perceptions and 
preferences of states. The authority of IOs – including dysfunctional ones – makes states 
accepting their world view. In short, because IOs are authority in world politics, state are 
persuaded into accepting that what IOs do is the right thing to do.  
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This explanation, however, does hardly apply to international drug control. For the past two 
decades, conflict ovrt norms rather than convergence of perceptions and preferences has 
dominated international drug control. At the centre of these conflicts stands the question how 
much cooperation among states is actually necessary in order to achieve significant reduction 
of the production and consumption of illicit narcotic drugs. 
From a prohibitionist perspective, the need for cooperation is high not only when it comes to 
the fight against illicit production and trafficking but also concerning the reduction of demand 
for illicit drugs. In this respect, lenient enforcement of prohibition at the demand-end of illicit 
drug markets is as much part of the ‘world drug problem’ as the unwillingness and inability of 
state to control illicit production. The International Narcotics Control Board (INCB), one of 
the most dedicated proponent of a prohibitionist international drug control and the enforcer of 
the international drug control conventions, has repeatedly argued that the international drug 
control conventions included obligations for states to enforce prohibition not only in 
production and trafficking but also in policies towards drug users.  
There is, however, a range of states which reduced their efforts to crack down on drug. These 
states make use of so called harm reduction measures as a main pillar of their drug control 
policies. These measures do not primarily concentrate on abstinence-based treatment but on 
reducing the impact of drug addiction on the health of drug users. This means that harm 
reduction includes measures such as the distribution of needles or syringes and the 
establishment of drug substation programs or drug injection rooms. 
 
The conflict between those states pursuing a world-wide prohibition of drug use and those 
making use of harm reduction measures has largely concentrated on the question if the 
international drug conventions do allow for harm reduction measures or if states are actually 
obligated to persecute drug users in the way in which they persecute illicit production and 
illicit trafficking. Those arguing from a prohibitionist perspective in accordance with the 
INCB argue that the ‘spirit’ of the conventions obligates states to enforce drug prohibition and 
that, therefore, some of the harm reduction measures currently applied – such as the 
establishment of drug injection rooms – are in contradiction with the obligations of the 
international drug conventions. Those arguing from a harm reduction perspective, on the other 
hand, argue that the international drug conventions do provide them with a legal basis to 
introduce and maintain what prohibitionist see as lenient drug enforcement policies.  
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The conflict about of how much cooperation among states is enough has been present in 
international drug control for the past two decade and has been a defining feature of to issue-
area. 
The UNODC’s elusiveness has not done much to resolve this conflict. In the past two 
decades, differences in preferences and perception in international drug control have become 
more distinct. In international drug control, there seems to be no such thing as socialization or 
persuasion of states – at least not among the advanced industrial states which were the 
protagonists of this normative conflict and the main funders of the organization.  
 
Despite the fact that the UNODC is lacking the constitutive powers which could explain its 
persistence and growth, the UNODC’s funding basis has approximately doubled over the past 
decade. And exactly those states which have been the main opponents of the UNODC 
prohibitionist position have been those which have contributed to the growth of the 
organisation most. Existing theoretical approaches to dysfunctional international do not offer 
an explanation for this. If states are not socialized into believing that what the UNODC does 
is the right thing to do, how can it be explained that these states are not only maintaining their 
funding but that some of them are also increasing their donations to the organization? The 
authority and constitutive power of dysfunctional IOs seems not to be the only (and maybe 
not the best) way to explain why such organizations survive in international politics. What, if 
not the constitutive powers of IOs, does explain their persistence and growth? 
 
Outline 
The aim of this study is to make a contribution to the development of theories of 
dysfunctional IOs. Dysfunctional behaviour has become an issue of both practical and 
theoretical concern, but existing theories have important gaps. The UNODC is used in this 
study to exemplify why IOs persist and grow even when they lack authority and constitutive 
power. In order to explain why the UNODC has been growing over the past years, I propose 
to include state interests in the explanation and to analyse the normative and operative 
functions of dysfunctional IOs separately.  
Chapter two is concerned with existing theories that explain why IOs become dysfunctional 
and why states are willing to accept and enable the persistence and growth of such 
organizations. In this chapter I argue that existing theories put a strong emphasis on 
explaining why IOs become dysfunctional but provide only incomplete explanations for why 
they persist and grow. I conclude that the focus of these theories on treating IOs as 
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organizations obscures the fact that the persistence and growth of dysfunctional organizations 
is only possible when states are willing to accept the fact that the organization is not fulfilling 
its expectations. Dysfunctional IOs, the argument goes, can only survive if their dysfunction 
serves a function for states. 
Chapter three is concerned with the politics of international drug control. The chapter argues 
that states have only a limited interest in achieving international cooperation of drug issues. 
They might lead extensive debates about the norms which should guide international drug 
control, but in essence, international drug control is based on a strong social norm 
(prohibition) and a weak international legal framework (the international drug control 
conventions). This enables some states – the advanced industrial states – to achieve a state of 
co-existence rather than cooperation in international drug control. Those states not interested 
in fully prohibiting drugs in their domestic drug control policies are able to carve out some 
room of manoeuvre by exploiting loopholes in the existing legal framework. Those state 
interested in strong prohibition insist on a ‘zero-tolerance’ interpretation of the existing 
conventions. The normative discourse emerging from that does not aim at the development of 
existing norms but at maintaining a convenient state of co-existence from which both side in 
the normative discourse profit.  
Chapter four explores how the politics of co-existence in international drug control shape the 
role of the UNODC in world politics. The chapter argues that most states had no interest in 
allowing the UNODC a role in the normative discourse international drug control because the 
functions the organization could have provided were not of interest to states. Dispute, rather 
than dispute resolution was the aim of the normative debates in international drug control.  
Chapter five than turns to the function a dysfunctional UNODC provides for states. By the 
example of the UNODC’s engagement in building police capacities against drug trafficking in 
West Africa, the chapter argues that a seemingly dysfunctional IO can be a valuable agent of 
state interests in the operative realm. In the case of Guinea-Bissau, which is in the focus of the 
chapter, the UNODC failed to achieve the stated aims of its main project – the creation of a 
functioning, specialized police unit able to fight drug trafficking on the territory of the 
country. However, in the course of the project, UNODC staff on the ground was able to 
engage local authorities in negotiations about the allocation of project resources which, in the 
end, improved the policing situation in the country. No state had an immediate interest to 
engage in capacity building in Guinea-Bissau. By delegating the task to the UNODC at least a 
process of capacity building was initiated. Furthermore, by taking the blame for the ‘failure’ 
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of the project, the UNODC provides states with an opportunity to take action when they 
would otherwise have not. 
In conclusion, chapter six argues that the dysfunction of IOs is not only a matter of 
perspective of the outside observes, as Barnett and Finnemore (2004) have argued. More 
importantly, the dysfunctions of IOs are also functional for states when normative consensus 
about what should be done in an international policy field lacks and states act rather 
symbolically on problems than in an attempt to solve a problem. In this sense, the chapter 
argues, dysfunctional IOs are valuable tools in the organized hypocrisy of world politics.  
Drawing on this conclusion, the chapter than asks if reforming dysfunctional IOs by making 
them more transparent and accountable – as it has been suggested by a range of authors in the 
past decade – would actually bring positive change to world politics. I argue that what 
dysfunctional IOs do can only happen if transparency and accountability mechanisms are 
weak. Otherwise, states would not be able to make use of the operational capacities of IOs. 
The alternative to a dysfunctional IO would be not only normative but also operative 
paralysis.  
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2 Dysfunctional International Organizations in World Politics: Theoretical Perspectives 
 
Dysfunctional IOs are puzzling phenomena. Created by states to solve problems they cannot 
solve alone and under the close scrutiny of their governing bodies, it seems unlikely that IOs 
can engage in counterproductive, self-defeating and seemingly illogical behaviour. And it 
seems even more unlikely that such organizations persist and grow despite the fact that their 
dysfunctional behaviour does not contribute to and sometimes even inhibits the achievement 
of the social goals which are inscribed in their mandates. 
This chapter looks at existing explanations for why IOs become dysfunctional, why they 
persist and why they grow. It reconstructs existing explanations in order to assess their 
strengths and weaknesses. 
 
Existing theories of IOs provide helpful conceptual tools to explain why states support 
dysfunctional IOs. First, they provide an understanding of IOs as actors in world politics. 
They do not deny that IOs are created and controlled by states. But instead of emphasizing the 
constraints that states put on IOs, they emphasize how their autonomy allows them to become 
authoritative and powerful actors in world politics. In the perspective of these explanations 
IOs are not – and never were – the handmaidens of states because. The autonomy of IOs 
makes them actors in their own right in world politics.  
Second, they explain why IOs are actors that matter in world politics. IOs, the argument goes, 
are authoritative and powerful actors. Despite their lack of financial and other resources, they 
command resources that are important for the capabilities of states to solve problems. The 
most important of these resources are expertise on specific problems and impartiality. 
Because they are basing their actions on their expertise and because they take the measures to 
achieve the social goals inscribed in their mandates, the solutions IOs provide for problems of 
common concern are respected by other actors in world politics. This makes them authorities. 
Third, they explain how IOs influence the behaviour state of states. IOs command power 
resources which enable them to change the behaviour of states. They socialize state. With 
their expertise, they contribute to the constitution of the world in which states act. They might 
not command power resources that can force states to change their behaviour, but they 
constitute the world in which states act and through that they change the preferences of states. 
Fourth, these theories explain why IOs become dysfunctional. Because IOs are organizations, 
they develop their own routines in handling problems. These routines can develop into 
entrenched organizational cultures which are – because they enable the organization to 
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function efficiently – protected by the organization. Changes in expectations toward the 
organization or in problem constellations – indeed all changes in the ‘environment’ of the 
organization – are processed through this culture and as far as possible adapted to existing 
routines, rules and behavioural standards. Instead of adapting to changes in the outside world, 
organizations attempt to fit new problems into existing solutions. As a result they can become 
dysfunctional.  
The explanations of the autonomy, authority, power, and dysfunction together form a causal 
narrative which allows to plausibly claim why states do not abandon dysfunctional IOs. 
Behaviour that appears to be defying rational logic to the outside observer, seems to be 
consequential and ‘the right thing to do’ when viewed from the perspective of the 
organization. Because states are socialized by IOs, they accept what IOs do. Through 
socialization, the solutions IOs provide for their common problems become seen as 
appropriate by states. And because states consider the actions of dysfunctional IOs 
appropriate, they understand their behaviour as functional. In this explanation there is no need 
for states to abandon a dysfunctional IO. They are fulfilling the expectations states have in 
them. 
 
This causal narrative has proved to be helpful to make sense of a range of behaviours of IOs 
and states. Some of the most catastrophic failures of IOs to live up to their mandates and the 
norms to which they have committed themselves have been plausibly explained by the 
combination of autonomy, authority, power and dysfunction of IOs (see, for example Barnett 
and Finnemore 2004). 
However, this causal narrative has decisive weaknesses. First, the core assumption of existing 
theories is that IOs are authoritative actors because they are organized as bureaucracies. It is 
the bureaucratic nature of IOs which leads states to accept the norms, rules and policies they 
propose. The legal-rational character of IOs is understood as the source of the authority of all 
IOs. Because most IOs are set up as bureaucracies, existing theories cannot fully explain 
variations in kind and degree of authority. In order to understand how a specific IO acquired 
its identity as an authority and how it became the authority it is, looking at organizations alone 
is not enough. Without developing an understanding of how states and other actors in world 
politics contributed to the construction of the identity of an IO, the explanation remains 
incomplete. 
Second, existing explanations do not allow for a deeper understanding of the causal 
mechanisms which make IOs powerful actors. The claim that IOs have constitutive power – 
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that they have an influence on how states perceive problems and that these perceptions can 
alter the preferences of states – remains largely an assumption. Even if it can be shown that 
problem perceptions of IOs and states converge, this does not necessarily mean that they have 
a causal effect on how states perceive problems. Without spelling out the mechanism through 
which problem perceptions of IOs influence problem perceptions of states, there is no way to 
empirically test the assumption that constitutive power causally precede state perceptions and 
preferences.  
Empirical studies of the constitutive effects of IOs have concluded that their potential to 
socialize states is smaller than theories of dysfunctional IOs suggest. Changes in problem 
perceptions of state representatives appear to be minimal even in the long term. Empirically, it 
would be at best difficult to prove the constitutive powers of IOs. With this, one of the core 
arguments of existing explanations for why states support dysfunctional IOs is theoretically 
underdeveloped and empirically difficult to sustain.  
 
The five sections of this chapter develop the causal narrative of dysfunctional IOs, their 
autonomy, authority and power in greater detail. The first section is concerned with the 
autonomy of IOs, the second with their authority, the third with their power and the fourth 
with their dysfunction. The fifth section takes up the problematic aspects of these theories and 
argues that the weakness of existing theories in explaining the micro-mechanisms of 
socialization casts doubts on the existence of strong feed-back effects of IOs on states through 
their constitutive power. 
The chapter concludes that in order to develop a better understanding of the existence and 
growth of dysfunctional IOs, a new perspective on dysfunctional IOs which includes the 
material resources of states and their interests in working with dysfunctional IOs needs to be 
developed. 
 
The Autonomy of International Organizations 
Neorealist and neoliberal theories of international politics have not acknowledged the agency 
of IOs. Neither neorealism nor neoliberalism provides a conceptualization of them as actors in 
world politics (Kratochwil and Ruggie 1986, Rochester 1986, Gallarotti 1991). As agency is 
the main quality that ontologically distinguishes actors from structures, it can be said without 
doubt that the two theories most commonly used to analyse international politics have not 
fully captured the role organizational agency plays in world politics. As many authors have 
observed, this lack of a meaningful conceptualization of IOs as actors in their own right is 
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mainly due to the state-centrism of neorealist and neoliberal theories, which hold as one of 
their basic assumptions that states are the only actors in world politics that really make a 
difference. Neoliberalism might allow for other actors to play a role in political settings 
beyond the state, but when it comes to explaining political outcomes, even in a neoliberal 
perspective, all other actors than states play only a minor role. As I will argue in this chapter, 
this is especially true for IOs.  
 
The neglect of IOs as actors in their own right has been made most visible by a debate 
between neorealist and neoliberals about the meaning and value of international institutions in 
world politics after the end of the Cold War. While this debate showed that neorealism and 
neoliberalism profoundly differ in their understanding of international institutions and the 
assessment of their effect on world politics, it has also shown that both did not assign any 
particular meaning to IOs. In both the neorealist and the neoliberal perspective, world politics 
would look the same no matter if international governance arrangements were formalized in 
IOs or not. Therefore, IOs do not matter in world politics as organizations. 
Neorealist conceptions of international politics as power politics have rarely paid attention to 
institutional features of the international systems. For neorealists, institutions are 
epiphenomenal to the distribution of power in the international system and their existence can 
be explained by the interests of great powers. Institutions will exist as long as the great 
powers can use them to further their own interests and will be abandoned when they are 
working against the interests of the most powerful states in the international system. As great 
powers have the capabilities to create the rules of the international system, they will not 
tolerate international institutions that do not favour their own interests. International 
institutions and IOs play only a marginal role in a realist conception of international politics. 
This perspective has been most prominently expressed by Hoffmann (1973: 73) Waltz (1979: 
104-107; 209-210) and Mearsheimer (1994/1995). 
Neoliberals, on the other hand, strongly emphasize the importance of international institutions 
(Axelrod and Keohane 1984, Keohane and Martin 1995, see also Krasner 1983a, Krasner 
1983b). In the neoliberal perspective, international institutions are a key feature of 
international politics because they mitigate power relations and can bind the actions even of 
great powers. However, neoliberalism is not particularly concerned with formal institutions 
such as IOs. Institutions are understood as sets of principles, norms, rules and procedures 
around which the expectations of states converge (Krasner 1983a: 1). These institutions are 
explicit – in the form of international agreements – or implicit. But even in their explicit form, 
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international institutions are not necessarily connected to an IO. Some IOs might be created in 
order to facilitate the provision of public goods that emerge from states behaving according to 
institutional settings in international politics, but they are not a necessary condition for the 
functioning of an institution. What matters – in terms of changing state behaviour – is the 
existence of principles and norms, not the existence of an actor that in some way enforces 
behavioural change. In the neoliberal perspective, international institutions are self-enforcing 
and self-reinforcing because they enable states to overcome collective action problems by 
decreasing transaction costs and improving information. 
Institutions are part of the structure in which states operate and IOs are the visible – mostly 
administrative – component of these structures, but behavioural change emerges from the 
existence of a structure that guides states’ behaviour (Krasner 1983b: 359-367). As a result, 
IOs have no independent role in international politics in a neoliberal perspective.  
 
However, not all IR theorists have ignored the agency of IOs in world politics. Some have 
argued that the formal structure of IO contains important features that make them more than 
just structures. Most prominently, Abbott and Snidal (1998) have argued that IOs provide 
states with functions they could not achieve with other forms of cooperation. Because IOs 
centralize governance functions and execute them with a degree of independence from the 
interests of powerful states, they can be used by states to solve cooperation dilemmas states 
could not solve in other ways. As most evident examples serve IOs that are charged to 
monitor the implementation of international agreements. An IO which is credibly shielded 
from direct interference by states is a more credible monitoring agency than any state. 
Because it is impartial, over-reporting or under-reporting of implementation is much less 
likely than when monitoring would be left to the parties of an international agreement (Abbott 
and Snidal 1998: 20). Abbott and Snidal list a variety of similar functions in world politics 
that can be carried out more efficiently by IOs than by states. Centralization and independence 
make them valuable agents for states when it comes to overcoming cooperation problems in 
international politics. 
 
This does, however, not mean that Abbott and Snidal (1998) perceive IOs as fully 
autonomous actors in international politics. Although they do not deny that IOs have a degree 
of autonomy, they neither offer an explanation for why IOs are autonomous nor do they 
attempt to account for any behaviour that goes beyond what states assign IOs to do. In their 
perspective, IOs are the formal embodiment of structural features of international politics, but 
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they are not actors that can develop behaviours that are distinct from what states ask them to 
do. States remain in control and allow for agency only as long as IOs fulfil the tasks that solve 
their cooperation problems. In this functional perspective, IOs remain largely a feature of the 
institutional structure states build in order to achieve cooperation among them.  
Perspectives that emphasize the structural advantages of IOs when compared to other forms of 
international cooperation have been provided by other IR scholars such as Martin and 
Simmons (1998) or Haftel and Thompson (2006). What they have in common with the 
neorealist and the neoliberal understanding of international institutions is that they emphasize 
the structural dilemmas IOs solve rather than the actor qualities of the IOs as actors.  
No matter if seen as purely epiphenomenal or as administrative part of formal and informal 
international institutions, neorealist as well as neoliberal theory understands IOs as being not 
much more than - to use Mathiason’s (2007: 10) metaphor - the "people who run a valet 
parking". Those running the valet parking of a hotel neither own the hotel nor do they have 
any influence on what is going on in the hotel. The hotel would even function very much in 
the same way without them. But at the same time, a valet parking is something costumers 
wish for, because it makes it more convenient to use the hotel and takes away some of the 
responsibilities costumers otherwise would have to care for on their own. Similarly, IOs might 
not be necessary to make international politics possible, but states build and maintain them, 
because they provide services they would only achieve at higher costs otherwise. But like 
people running a valet parking, who might drive cars but have no real control over them, IOs 
lack a clear sense of agency in the conceptions of neorealism and neoliberalism.  
 
Some rationalist and constructivist scholars have challenged the view of neorealism and 
neoliberalism of IOs. 
Rationalists, by applying principal-agent theory to IOs, convincingly argue that the behaviour 
of IOs is not so much determined by what states except them to do then by the way in which 
the relationship between states and IOs is structured by power relations among states, cost of 
information, uncertainty and diverging interests of states and IOs. IOs are understood as 
entities in world politics that are given the permission to act - in a limited way – on their own 
terms and which use this permission to realize their own interests. Constructivists, on the 
other hand, understand IOs as entities in world politics that are also able to shape the 
relationship between them and states due to their ability to participate in the construction of 
the context in which states operate and which shape their preferences. Therefore, the 
constructivist perspective on the agency of IOs is less state-centric then the one of principal-
25 
 
agent theory. In explaining the effects IOs have on political outcomes rationalist and 
constructivist approaches take a fundamentally different causal perspective: principal-agent 
theory explains organizational action of IOs by looking at state actions, while constructivist 
theory explains organizational influence of IOs by looking at how they influence state actions. 
Apart from this very profound difference, however, rationalists and constructivists share a 
common understanding of many of the properties of IO or are at least complementary in the 
'blind spot' of the two perspectives (see also Weaver 2007). 
 
Rationalists have challenged the structural conceptions of IOs by introducing principal-agent 
theory into the field. The starting point of all principal-agent approaches is the observation 
that organizations created to perform a specific task often do not perform this task in the way 
their creators have imagined them. This holds true for private as well as for public agencies, 
and, indeed, the first applications of principal-agent theory in political science were used to 
explain autonomous behaviour of bureaucratic agencies in U.S. domestic politics (see, for 
example, McCubbins and Page 1987).  
In IR, principal-agent theory was used to explain the same observation – that IOs were acting 
autonomously, an observation neither neorealism nor neoliberalism could fully explain. Using 
principal-agent theory, scholars identified by and large the same mechanisms as explanations 
for autonomous behaviour of IOs as have been found to be at play in domestic politics. These 
mechanisms can be summarized as preference heterogeneity among principals, uncertainty 
about the effectiveness of a policy, the costs of information emerging from controlling agents, 
and the interests of the agent. 
Preference heterogeneity among principals mainly explains why states create IOs with 
discretion. Because it is unlikely that all states involved in the creation of an IO have the same 
goals and preferences, but prefer cooperation over unilateral action, delegation to a partly 
autonomous body can be beneficial for all principals (Hawkins et al. 2006: 20). As principals 
benefit in many ways from delegation to a partly autonomous body (Hawkins et al. 2006: 13-
19), it is likely that states will delegate decision-making power to an IO when their 
preferences over broader policy goals are shared but differ over detailed outcomes of 
cooperation. As Copelovitch (2010a) has shown, preference heterogeneity among main 
principals (i.e. the most powerful states in the international system) does actually lead to the 
creation of IOs with more discretion and creates opportunities for IOs to use this discretion in 
policy making (Hawkins et al. 2006: 28; see also McCubbins and Page 1987: 418). 
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Uncertainty about the effectiveness of a policy tempts principals to create agents with 
discretion because establishing cooperative agreements is costly for them. Basically, 
principals can choose between creating agents that are governed by a set of detailed rules or 
agents that are governed by discretion. Detailed rules are assumed to incur higher costs on 
principals because collective decision-making on these rules will be more difficult than 
endowing an agent with discretion. Especially when states are uncertain about the 
effectiveness of a policy or about the impacts of exogenous shocks on an IO, they prefer 
discretion over rule-based control, because they do not have to negotiate these rules again if it 
turns out that a policy does not work in the way it was expected (Nielson and Tierney 2003). 
A third reason why IOs are not seen as obedient servants in principal-agent theory is the costs 
of controlling an agent. Principal-agent theory suggests that control incurs costs on principals. 
In order for control measures to be effective, states have to take actions. They have to monitor 
the behaviour of IOs, interpret the signals they get from this behaviour and implement 
sanctions for undesired action (Hawkins et al. 2006: 28-30). These actions are resource 
intensive (especially in terms of time and knowledge) and can therefore be expected to be 
conducted imperfectly. Theoretically, principals can control agents tightly. Most delegation 
includes the tools for intensive control by states. They will, however, rarely use all these tools, 
because tight control incurs high cost on principals (Hawkins et al. 2006: 31) and because it 
potentially reduces the gains from endowing agents with discretion (Hawkins et al. 2006: 8). 
 
The mechanisms described above are concerned with what states do and why these actions 
create opportunities for IOs to act autonomously. IOs, however, have their own distinct 
interests and use their discretion to pursue them. As Hawkins and Jacoby (2006) have shown, 
IOs under certain circumstance even exhibit behaviours which aim at intentionally 
counteracting the ability of states to control them and limit their discretion. By drawing on 
organizational dependency theory (the rationalist strand of organizational theory) they 
identify ways in which IOs can act strategically to defy a principal’s ability to control them. 
All of these ways draw on the main assumption of organizational dependency theory: 
organizations want to establish a stable relationship with their environment that minimizes the 
potential impacts dependency has on its survival and growth (DiMaggio and Powell 1983: 
154-156). Organizational interests, therefore, are seen as the main driving force of 
international organizational behaviour by principal-agent theory (Vaubel, Dreher and Soylu 
2007). 
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Basically, IOs have three different ways in which they can influence the relationship with 
their principals. Firstly, they can actively engage in the negotiation of delegation agreements 
and the interpretation of these agreements. Because the creation of IOs incurs costs on 
principals, states often refer to existing IOs when delegating new tasks (Hawkins and Jacoby 
2006: 203-204). This allows IOs to engage in the negotiation of the terms under which 
delegation will be made. Furthermore, when a substantial number of states has delegated to an 
IO, it becomes less likely that the organization defers to the principals’ interpretation of the 
terms of delegation (Hawkins and Jacoby 2006: 206-207). Delegation – as seen from the 
agent’s perspective – has a decreasing marginal utility. When a sufficient number of states 
have delegated authority to an IO, acquiring new principals by invoking the impression of 
being a reliable executor of the principals’ interests becomes less important for the 
organization. When the delegation to an IO has crossed this tipping point, an organization 
becomes more likely to gradually interpret the terms of delegation in favour of its own 
interests.  
Secondly, IOs can attempt to increase their autonomy by protecting their core tasks from 
interference by their principals (Hawkins and Jacoby 2006: 210-211). Because control 
mechanisms of principals do not work perfectly, IOs can adopt strategies which make it 
difficult for states to control what they are actually doing. IOs can engage in superficial 
reporting about their activities and only publicly report those activities that are expected to be 
in accordance with the principals’ preferences. ‘Buffering’, as such strategies are called, are 
an almost universal feature of all organizations (Powell and DiMaggio 1991, Brechin 1997: 
173-175) and allow IOs to develop their core tasks in a way that fits the organizations’ 
interests rather than those of its principals.  
Thirdly, IOs can facilitate the access of non-principals to organizational decision-making 
processes (Hawkins and Jacoby 2006: 208-209). In the international arena, non-principals are 
often private organizations – such as advocacy networks – whose preferences differ from 
those of the principal. Because principals have incentives to include non-principals as part of 
the monitoring process in IOs, access is often granted by principals themselves. However, 
when the preferences of agents and non-principals align, it is likely that monitoring becomes 
inefficient and that facilitating access can result in greater autonomy of an IO. 
Taken together, the mechanisms identified by principal-agent theory provide a relatively 
coherent explanation for why IOs can be understood as being autonomous rather than tightly 
controlled actors in world politics. The mechanisms identified by principal-agent theory all 
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point in the same direction. From a rationalistic point of view, it seems highly unlikely that 
states have incentives to make IOs their obedient servants. 
In terms of autonomous behaviour most of the principal-agent literature is concerned with 
explaining one specific form of organizational behaviour - agency slack, i.e. autonomous 
behaviour of agents that is not in the interest of their principals. Although autonomy and 
agency slack differ in their meaning in important ways, in principal-agent theory, autonomous 
action is mostly understood to be agency slack (see also, Hawkins et al. 2006: 8). This, too, is 
at least partly the result of the rationalistic assumptions of principal-agent theory. As these 
assumptions make it plausible that principals create agents in a way which makes sure that 
they serve their interests, agent action that serves principals’ interest (even when it goes 
beyond the principals’ requirements) is not understood as autonomous action on the side of 
the principal (Hawkins et al. 2006: 8). 
 
Constructivist scholars studying IOs have developed a theoretical perspective which takes up 
these shortcomings of principal-agent theory by looking at the organizations themselves. They 
argue that without understanding what happens within organizations, it is not possible to gain 
a full understanding of the interest and autonomy of IOs and the influence they can exert on 
political outcomes in world politics. 
Constructivist theorizing on IOs draws heavily on organizational studies, a subfield of 
sociology. Originally concerned with the question of explaining widespread similarities of 
organizations, organizational studies have developed a variety of theories which explain 
similarities as well as variation in organizational design and behaviour. As compared to 
principal-agent theory, using organizational theories offers advantages for research on IOs. 
Organizational theories take organizations serious. They open the organizational 'black box' 
and attempt to explain how the inner working mechanisms of organizations shape their 
interest, identities and behaviour. In contrast to principal-agent theory, organizational theories 
understand organizations as social rather than rational actors in world politics. While this 
might make a theory of the influence of IOs on world politics less parsimonious, it at least 
allows to establish an understanding of the principal-agent theory's main rationalist 
assumption of basically expansion-oriented IOs.  
Sociological theories of IOs do not reject most of the ideas principal-agent theory has 
introduced to the study of IOs. Like principal-agent theory, sociological approaches assume 
that an organizations ability to act autonomously stems from the fact that states have 
delegated some authority to the organization. Furthermore, they agree that – at least in the 
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long term – IOs want to survive and that they have an inherent tendency to grow. However, 
they explain organizational behaviour not by rational calculations of IOs. The focus of 
sociological theories of IOs is not so much on showing that IOs are autonomous actors in 
world politics but rather on explaining what constitutes their autonomy and why they act in 
the way they do. Sociological theories argue that the behaviour of IOs can be best understood 
when seen as at the outcome of social processes within organizations (see for example Barnett 
and Finnemore 2004). 
Organizational culture is the centrepiece of organizational behaviour from a sociological 
perspective. It includes a wide range of formal and informal practices within organizations 
that shape the identities of those involved in these organizations. As one scholar has put it, 
organizational culture includes nearly everything ranging from “dress norms, stories people 
tell about what goes on” to the “the organization’s formal rules and procedures, its informal 
codes of behaviour, rituals, tasks, pay systems, jargon, and jokes understood by insiders (…)” 
(Martin 1992: 1). Organizational culture is the product of the interaction of those engaged in it 
and it is reproduced them. It is the institution that distinguishes the organization from the 
social relationships in which it operates, its ‘environment’. Organizational cultures shape what 
organizations do by shaping the understandings of those engaged in the organization about 
what the aim of the organization should be and how this mission should be achieved. 
Organizational culture, defined in this way, is certainly a blurry term but its analytical value 
lies in the departure from a purely mechanistic and functional view on organizations and 
organizational behaviour. An organization’s mandate or mission might be its initial raison 
d’être, but in a sociological perspective, organizations are able to evolve and develop an 
identity which can be fundamentally different from its functional origins. Organizational 
culture can drive organizational behaviour in a different direction than the creators of an 
organization have expected at the time of the creation of the organization (Brunsson 1989: 1-
12, Ness and Brechin 1988, Brechin 1997: 195-198).  
From a sociological perspective, this holds true for IOs as it does for any other (political or 
non-political) organization (Barnett and Finnemore 2004, Barnett and Coleman 2005, 
Nielson, Tierney and Weaver 2006, Weaver 2007, Weaver 2008). Barnett and Finnemore 
(2004) have convincingly argued that internal rules and procedures in IOs play a crucial role 
for what these organizations do and for how they do it. In their analysis of the reaction of the 
UN Secretariat to the emerging genocide in Rwanda in 1994, for example, Barnett and 
Finnemore (2004: 121-156) show that the Secretariat’s strong culture of non-intervention into 
on-going conflicts has significantly diminished its ability to see the developments in Rwanda 
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as being in the responsibility of its Department of Peacekeeping Operations. The guiding rule 
of the UN bureaucracy when it came to the deployment of peacekeeping forces and 
authorization of interventions was, that there needed to be a peace to keep. Without the 
agreement of all conflicts involved in a conflict, peacekeeping forces were not deployed by 
the UN. In the case of Rwanda, while there were some peacekeeping forces already deployed, 
they were not mandated make use of force to enforce the cease fire on which their mandate 
was based. Sticking to the rule that the UN’s peacekeeping forces are exclusively authorized 
to take action according to their mandate led the organization to process information about the 
imminent genocide wrongly and resulted in the failure to take action that could have averted 
the mass killings. 
Although it would be counterfactual to argue that the Secretariat’s understanding of peace 
keeping rules as being only applicable when ‘there is a peace to keep’ (e.g. when cease-fire 
agreement between conflicting parties already exists) has caused the failure of the 
international community to intervene in this conflict, it can be said that the strong non-
intervention culture of the Secretariat has at least impeded immediate international action in 
Rwanda. For an IO created to ensure peace and stability in the world and which has the 
protection of human rights inscribed in their mandate, Barnett and Finnemore aruge, this is 
rather odd behaviour with catastrophic results which is best explained by the way internal 
cultures of organizations shape the way in which organizations perceive the world.  
 
In sum, IR theories have developed two distinctive ways to explain why IOs are more than 
epiphenoma of the interests of powerful states or structures which enable cooperation among 
states. In the rationalist explanation, IOs are created to overcome problems emerging from the 
management of heterogeneous preferences among states but acquire a live on their own 
because the autonomous entities states had created to assist them in solving their own 
problems develop interests in their own right. These interests are defended by strategic action. 
In constructivist reasoning, states also create IOs to overcome collective action problems. But 
in doing so, they create first and foremost cultural entities which develop their own sense of 
what their raison-être is and how this can be achieved. In the constructivist perspective the 
agency of IOs becomes even more eminent. Organizations reproduce themselves through their 
internal cultures and become autonomous from what states want from them not only because 
of differences in interests but also because they see their mandates through their own culture 
and gear their behaviour according to their own perception of what they are and what they 
should achieve. 
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Autonomy is the prerequisite to understand how IOs can matter in world politics as actor and 
not only as structure. Without autonomy, agency cannot exist. Theorists arguing from both 
rationalist and constructivist perspectives have presented explanations for how IOs can 
become autonomous actors in world politics which act according to properties connected to 
the organization rather than to its environment (e.g. interests or internal cultures). Explaining 
the autonomy of IO creates the basis for understanding the role they can play in world 
politics.  
 
The Authority of International Organizations 
Establishing that IOs are autonomous actors in world politics does not explain why and how 
they matter. The autonomy of IOs is a prerequisite for them to play a meaningful role in world 
politics, but it is not yet an explanation for how IOs make a difference.  
Beyond the conclusion that IOs act strategically in order to maximize their autonomy, budget 
and staff, principal-agent theory does not add much to answer this question. Constructivist 
theories on the other hand have developed an extensive theoretical framework which explains 
why IOs are not only autonomous but also influential actors in world politics. The key to their 
influence, sociological theories argue, is the authority of IOs.  
 
Political authority is an elusive concept. Although, at first sight, it seems to be a property of a 
particular actor, one cannot think of political authority as existing outside social relationships. 
It would not make sense to speak of an actor as having political authority if this actor would 
act alone, because authority, by definition, includes that an actor’s behaviour is changed 
because of another actor’s behaviour (or in anticipation of such an act). Without anyone 
paying attention to a political authority, it cannot become the property of an actor. Political 
authority, therefore, is an inherently relational concept and not an objectively measurable 
property of a particular actor15.  
At the risk of oversimplification, the question who is an authority can be boiled down to the 
question why a particular actor is in charge. This, however, is an empirical rather than a 
conceptual question. Political authority, in its empirical sense, is social practice. It includes 
actors who claim that they are in charge for the treatment of a particular problem and actors 
which accept this claim as rightful, assuming that this particular actor has the capabilities to 
                                                          
15 See also Avant, Finnemore and Sell (2010: 9-10), for more extensive treatments of the concept of political 
authority see, Flathman (1980) and Raz (1990). 
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govern the problem in question and act according to the ‘guidelines’ issued by the actor how 
has put herself in charge (or was put in charge by acts of other actors). The trade-offs that 
come into existence through these mutually constitutive social acts are the social texture 
called political authority. In this sense, authority is not a fixed property of an actor. It emerges 
from social practice. Who is in charge, in the end, can only be derived from the attempt to 
understand the social relationships in which authority is enacted. 
 
Barnett and Finnemore (2004: 20-22) argue that IOs are in charge because they are 
bureaucracies. As they put it, bureaucracies “are, by definition, authorities – they are rational-
legal authorities in their domain of action” (Barnett and Finnemore 2004: 20). Because 
bureaucracy is seen as the embodiment of modern, depersonalized form of governance, 
bureaucracies are perceived to be legitimate decision-makers. In short, international 
bureaucracies embody the ideals of modern political legitimacy in their organizational 
structure.  
Barnett and Finnemore (2004: 23-29) identified two specific forms by which international 
bureaucracies come to be seen as authorities in world politics. Because their bureaucratic 
organizational form makes it possible for them to credibly claim that they are impersonal 
decision-makers which base their decisions on expertise and normative considerations. 
Expert authority stems from the accumulation of technocratic expertise in IOs. Basing 
decision-making on technocratic and scientific knowledge is an important part of the rational-
legal ideal type of exercising power. As Barnett and Finnemore (2004: 24) have put it: “One 
reason we create bureaucracies is that we want important social tasks to be done by people 
with detailed, specialized knowledge”. The accumulation of specialized knowledge in IOs is 
an expression of the division of labour in modern governance. Decision-making based on 
expertise creates the appearance of depoliticized decision-making and substitutes interest-
driven policies with evidence-driven policies. Together, Barnett and Finnemore argue, the 
appearance of adhering to modern principles of governance and the notion of depoliticized 
decision-making create a strong believe that IOs are legitimate decision-makers in world 
politics. This belief constitutes in parts the authority of IOs. 
Moral authority largely stems from the perception of IOs as impartial actors in world politics. 
IOs are often created in a way that makes it difficult even for powerful states to directly 
influence their decision-making and behaviour (Abbott and Snidal 1998: 20, Barnett and 
Finnemore 2004: 23). Because they are shielded from direct state influence, IOs often appear 
to represent broader social goals as opposed to myopic political interests and to do so in a way 
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that serves these goals rather than their own interests. IOs are perceived to be servants of other 
actors rather than actors in their own right, and their mandate – social goals on which states 
could collectively agree on – often makes them appear impartial towards solutions for 
problems that are mainly driven by ideology or interests (Barnett and Finnemore 2004: 23). 
 
Taken together, the argument why IOs are authorities in world politics is rather 
straightforward. States create IOs as authoritative actors in world politics. They design them 
in a way which allows at least partially independent from the influence of particular states. 
They design them in this way because states want IOs to accomplish tasks other forms of 
international cooperation cannot. Only an autonomous actor can establish the rational-legal 
rule that is needed to solve problems without the interference of interests and political 
conflict. From this, IOs derive two specific forms of authority which are closely connected to 
their rational-legal appearance: expert authority and moral authority. In the best case, the 
legal-rational organizational form of IOs and their expertise and impartiality – which makes 
them moral authorities – are mutually reinforcing (see also, Avant, Finnemore and Sell 2010: 
18-21). Basing decisions and behaviour on technocratic knowledge reinforces the rational 
appearance of IOs. Behaviour based on norms, principles and rules reinforces the legal 
appearance of IOs. And being constituted as bureaucracies reinforces the appearance that 
what IOs do is based on technocratic knowledge and the adherence of norms, principles and 
rules. 
From a sociological perspective, IOs are authoritative actors in world politics because the 
sources on which their claim for authority is based on are not in conflict with each other. This 
allows IOs to solidify their position as rightful ‘governors’ in world politics. This is what 
differs them from many other actors in world politics which claim rightful rule. Actors whose 
sources of authority are in tension experience problems to achieve a similar position in world 
politics (Avant, Finnemore and Sell 2010: 21).  
 
The Power Resources of International Organizations 
Authority builds the basis for IOs to become actors in world politics that make a difference. 
But how do they affect world politics? What are the resources and mechanisms through which 
IO transform authority into behavioural change of other actors? In short: how do IOs exert 
power? 
 
34 
 
Barnett and Finnemore (2004) describe three distinctive mechanisms through which IOs are 
able to change their environment and, subsequently, influence state behaviour. They 
distinguish between the classification of problems, the fixing of meaning and the diffusion of 
norms. 
The classification of problems – understood as the act of organizing information and 
knowledge about the world – is seen as the main power resource of IOs. As Barnett and 
Finnemore (2004: 32) put it: “Problems are not part of objective reality but are subjectively 
defined and constituted within social experience. Authorities help to create that subjective 
reality and to define what are the problems that require solutions”. Both expertise and moral 
authority play a crucial role for the way in which IOs identify and classify problems as well as 
for their ability to establish their classification as valid understandings of situations that 
require solutions. In terms of problem identification, the educational and technical training of 
international bureaucrats can have a strong effect on what IOs perceive to be problematic 
(Barnett and Finnemore 2004: 24-27). 
The fixing of meaning takes classification schemes one step further. While classification is 
mostly about sorting out what a problem is and which problems should be treated with 
priority, the fixing of meaning is about applying classification schemes to real world 
situations. Therefore, the fixing of meaning is about defining and redefining real world 
situations in the terms of classification schemes. It includes defining what kind of problem a 
given situation is, who is affected by the problem, how the problem should be solved and who 
is in charge of solving the problem (Barnett and Finnemore 2004: 32-33). The expertise and 
moral authority of IOs play an important role in creating such problem frames. They help IOs 
to be perceived as those actors in world politics who are in charge of making sense of 
emerging new situations.  
The diffusion of norms can be seen as the last step of IO action to establish a robust normative 
or ideational setting through which global problems are perceived. Unlike classification and 
the fixing of meaning, diffusion of norms includes active agent-to-agent action by IOs. It is 
often part of the mission and mandate of IOs to spread norms, and the accumulation of 
expertise IOs often leads to a technocratic understanding within IOs that the ways in which 
problems are seen by them is the way in which others should see the problems, too. 
Convincing others of the appropriateness of their understandings of problems is an inherent 
task of IOs (Barnett and Finnemore 2004: 33). 
Barnett and Coleman (2005: 600-602) identified two additional mechanisms through which 
IOs can change their environment: strategic social construction and manipulation. Both 
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strategies aim at changing the relationship between the organization and its environment by 
actions of the organization itself.  
Strategic social construction “revolves around the active effort by the IO to change the 
normative or cultural environment so that it becomes consistent with the values and goals of 
the organization” (Barnett and Coleman 2005: 602). IOs actively try to shape the utility 
functions of other actors  in a way that their utility function becomes consistent with what is 
best for the organization (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 910). Because organizational culture 
is, from the IO’s point of view, difficult to change, it can be easier and less costly for an IO to 
attempt to change the world views of other relevant actors in accordance with its own world 
views then to try to alter the internal culture of the organization. 
Manipulation on the other hand is a much more direct strategy. It is not concerned with 
redefining the normative context in which IOs operate but with changing the material 
relationship between an IO and its environment in order to preserve its autonomy and 
organizational culture. In many ways, manipulation resembles the strategic behaviour of IOs 
described by Hawkins and Jacoby (2006) from a principal-agent perspective.  
 
In sum, the mechanisms through which IOs influence their environment can be summarized in 
two broad categories - socialization and persuasion. While this is an analytical distinction due 
to the fact that some of the mechanisms described above can have both socializing and 
persuading effects, the distinction is important for empirical observations because 
socialization and persuasion change actor behaviour through different mechanisms. 
Socialization is an effect generated by a structure-to-agent relationship. Actors who get 
socialized act in a certain way because they believe that it is appropriate to act in this way in 
the given normative or ideational structure. This structure an intersubjectively shared set of 
believes about how the world that surrounds actors works and how actors should behave in 
such a world (Klotz and Lynch 2007: 24-43; 66-83)16. This does, however, not mean that this 
structure is a given or cannot be changed. 
The normative structure in which actors operate is created and can be changed by them 
(Wendt 1987, Wendt 1999). Barnett and Finnemore (2004: 20-22) argue that IOs play an 
important role in building and changing the ideational and normative structure at the global 
political level because of their bureaucratic authority. IOs are seen as appropriate actors to 
shape the understanding of other actors in world politics because they were created to do so 
                                                          
16 On the different meanings of the term ‘agency’ in constructivist and rationalist understandings, see Barkin 
2010: 100-118. 
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and have been given an appropriate organizational form that allows them to make credible 
claims to shape the ideas and norms about problems of global scope. Classification, the fixing 
of meaning and strategic social constructing seem to be the power resources of IOs that are 
more explicitly geared toward creating a normative structure which then affects the behaviour 
of other actors. 
Persuasion, on the other hand, works on an actor-to-actor basis. It can be understood as the 
attempt by one actor to convince another that it is appropriate to act in a certain way. It is 
more direct because it is not so much about the question what normative structure is created 
for then about the question how actors that are reluctant to act in accordance with this 
structure can be convinced that acting appropriately is the best way to take action.  
Manipulation and the diffusion of norms both include strong elements of persuasion, as they 
often include international bureaucrats actively promoting their world views to other actors 
such as non-governmental organizations, domestic bureaucrats or governments. It is, 
however, important to keep in mind that not all ways in which IOs can influence state 
behaviour are directly observable – as it would be the case with persuasion. Socialization 
might only be observable indirectly and by deeper investigation, as its the observation also 
includes answering the question who shaped an existing normative structure.  
 
The power resources of IOs are ‘soft’. IOs lack the material resources to coerce. What has 
been identified as the power of IOs might be best understood as ‘constitutive’ forms of power 
(see also, Barnett and Duvall 2005). IOs shape the way in which other actors perceive 
problems and through which they define their interests, form their preferences and choose 
their courses of action (see also, Barnett and Duvall 2005). 
Together, the autonomy, authority, and power of IOs explain why they are “central actors on 
the stage of world politics” (Barnett and Finnemore 2004: 156). Autonomy explains why IOs 
are more than structures through which others act in world politics. The mutually reinforcing 
sources of the authority of IOs explain why states and other actors in world politics tend to 
accept what they do and say. The power resources of IOs explain through which mechanisms 
IOs affect change in the behaviour of other actors.  
Based on autonomy, authority and power a coherent causal narrative can be formed which 
explains why IOs, despite their lack of material resources and their dependency on states as 
their creators, matter in world politics. 
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Dysfunctional International Organizations  
IOs are autonomous, authoritative and powerful actors in world politics. However, some of 
them are clearly dysfunctional. In order to complete the argument why dysfunctional IOs 
persist, this section provides an explanation for why IOs become dysfunctional.  
 
Explanations of dysfunction draw heavily on the insights of sociological organizational 
theory. They argue that IOs – like all organizations – need to bridge the gap between the 
organization and its environment. They have to adapt to changing problem constellations, 
changing expectations on their effectiveness and, after all, changing normative structures in 
which they operate.  
Adaption to change in the environment, however, is difficult for IOs. Organizational cultures 
change slowly, adaption to changes in the environment often happens incrementally and 
highly path dependent and in some cases, the organizational culture does not change at all. It 
is for this reason that IOs have been identified as recalcitrant actors in world politics (Ness 
and Brechin 1988: 247). As in any other organization, the culture – as a social construction 
and the product of social interaction in a relatively closed social system – of an IO is hard to 
change (Barnett and Coleman 2005, Nielson, Tierney and Weaver 2006). 
Because IOs depend on a changing environment, the relationship between organizational 
culture and the environment of an organization is complex and often tense. Barnett and 
Coleman (2005: 600, 615-616) have argued that IOs – under the condition that their survival 
is not immediately threatened – will extensively engage in actions that aim at preserving their 
cultures rather than considering cultural change within the organization as a behavioural 
option.  
The gap between environmental change and entrenched organizational cultures can render IOs 
dysfunctional. In order to ensure the survival of the organizational culture, IOs can become 
more concerned with fitting change in their environment in their existing cognitive 
framework, embodied in the organizational culture than with actual adaption to changed 
circumstances or problem constellations. They become irresponsive to their environment and 
eventually lose their ability to fulfil the expectations the environment has in them. In short, 
they become dysfunctional. 
According to Barnett and Finnemore (2004: 38-41) IOs are especially prone to become 
dysfunctional because they are organized according to bureaucratic principles. Bureaucracy 
depends on the establishment of routines: “[R]ules, specialization and compartmentalization” 
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(Barnett and Finnemore 2004: 39) make bureaucracies what they are: efficient, impersonal 
and rational organizations which perform complex social tasks. 
The heavy dependence of IOs on routines and division of labour to perform the tasks they 
have been mandated to perform bear the risk of becoming dysfunctional. Routines can 
become entrenched and and once a division of labour is established, it can become difficult to 
change. As long as routines and division of labour are in congruence with the problems they 
have been created to solve, this entrenchment is unproblematic. It ensures efficient 
performance of the complex social entities called IOs.  
However, if problems change, old tasks become less important and new tasks gain in 
relevance, and entrenchment can lead to problems of adaption in IOs. Because routines and 
division of labour shape how those within IOs perceive problems, they can impede change in 
organizations. In order to protect their organizational cultures, IOs stick to their routines and 
division of labour, creating a gap between the real world and how this world is perceived and 
treaded within the organization.  
Dysfunction comes in different forms. Barnett and Finnemore (2004: 39-40) identify a range 
of different forms of organizational behaviours which can render IOs dysfunctional. They 
range from extreme forms of rationalization in which routines become ends in themselves to 
insulation of entire organizations from feedback from their environment. 
The effects of entrenched routines on what IOs do (and do not) can be profound. The role of 
the DPKO’s behaviour in the outbreak of the genocide in Rwanda serves, again, as a 
paradigmatic example here. It is one of the best documented failure of an IO to manage its 
different roles as an actor in international politics and a provider of services (Barnett 2003; 
Barnett and Finnemore 2004; Piiparinen 2008).  
In managing peace keeping operations, the United Nations Secretariat – of which DPKO is a 
part – has two different roles. First, the organization provides advice to states. In accordance 
the charter of the UN, the Secretary General can bring to the attention of the Security Council 
any issue he or she considers a threat to international peace and security. In this role, the 
Secretary General is an actor in international politics. Although he or she has only little 
influence on what states actually decide or to what extent the issues are debated in the 
Security Council, the charter of the UN entitles the Secretary General to take part in setting 
the agenda of the Security Council.  
Secondly, the UN Secretariat through DPKO manages UN peace keeping operations around 
the globe. The UN Secretariat serves as the headquarter of these operations and implements 
decisions of member states about the deployment of the troops in the field and the 
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interpretation of their mandates. In this function the UN Secretariat is not so much an actor in 
international politics as it is a service provider accountable to member states.  
In the case of Rwanda, the DPKO’s role as a provider of information to the members of the 
Security Council has been crucial for the failure of the UN to react timely on the 
developments which lead to the death of approximately 800’000 people between April 6 and 
July 19, 1994. 
With the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) deployed in Rwanda, 
the DPKO had a direct link to the situation on the ground. UNAMIRs force commander 
General Roméo Dallaire was directly accountable to the DPKO and reported to the 
department. Based on UNAMIR’s mandate established in Security Council Resolution 872 of 
October 5, 1993, the DPKO decided on the course of action of the peacekeepers on the 
ground. The mandate, however, left room for interpretation, as the resolution stated that 
UNAMIR had to “contribute to the security of the city of Kigali, intern alia, within a 
weapons-secure area established by the parties in and around the city”17.  
As long as the cease-fire agreement on which UNAMIR was based upon was respected by all 
parties to the conflict in Rwanda, interpretation of the mandate was unproblematic. It included 
patrolling the areas designated in Security Council Resolution 872, controlling the movements 
of combatants and seizing visible illegal weapons. However, it did not provide the basis for a 
proactive role of UNAMIR forces, especially against plans to break the cease-fire agreement 
(Barnett and Finnemore 2004: 139). 
When General Dallaire informed the DPKO in January 1994 in a telegram that he had 
knowledge of a plan by one of the conflicting parties which endangered the cease-fire 
agreement and which included massacring civilians and peacekeeping troops, the DPKO 
reacted conservatively. It ordered Dallaire to terminate a plan to raid an alleged weapons 
cache which – according to Dallaire’s information – played a crucial role in the 
implementation of the plan. In the understanding of the DPKO, UNAMIRs mandate did not 
allow for such action as it had been based on the use of tactics including the consent of all 
parties to the conflict. At the same time, the DPKO – despite the potential dangers for the 
security situation in Rwanda emanating from the plan described by Dallaire – did not take 
action to inform the Security Council in order to request a more robust mandate for its 
peacekeeping forces in Rwanda. The DPKO’s failure to do so is widely recognized to have 
had a crucial impact on the deterioration of the security situation in Rwanda after January 
1994. 
                                                          
17 Security Council Resolution 872 (1993), para. 3. 
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The DPKO’s failure to respond appropriately to Dallaire’s warnings has been explained in 
different ways. One way, and this is also the internal perspective of the DPKO, is to 
understand the DPKO as an agent of the Security Council. In this perspective, the DPKO was 
anticipating the Security Council’s reluctance to approve a more robust mandate for the 
peacekeeping forces in Rwanda after the failure the UN had experienced with a robust 
mandate in Somalia. In this perspective, the DPKO acted as a subservient bureaucracy, 
implementing the decisions of states (see Barnett and Finnemore 2004: 143-144).  
A second explanation is concerned with the political meaning of Dallaire’s information 
provided to the DPKO: In this perspective, two aspects of the fact that Dallaire was providing 
the DPKO with new information about the situation in Rwanda are important. The UNAMIR 
was not perceived to have a preventative function. It had been deployed to implement a cease-
fire agreement which was based on the consent of all parties to the conflict. An early warning 
mechanism was not foreseen in its mandate. According to Piiparinen (2008: 711) this meant 
that Dallaire’s cable was perceived within the DPKO as an individual attempt to “’rupture’ 
the strict partition between bureaucratic categories, that is, between preventive deployment 
and peace settlement”. UNAMIR forces had no intelligence gathering capacities because 
states did not want UN peacekeeping troops to appear to ‘spy’ on any party to a conflict 
(Piiparinen 2008: 716). Entering intelligence – no matter how crucial it was – into the 
political process could have opened up questions about what the DPKO was doing to exert 
control over peacekeeping forces on the ground. 
Related to this, the implication of having early warning mechanisms is to be able to develop 
contingency planning. Without contingency planning, early warning mechanisms are not 
helpful to achieve goals on the ground. According to Piiparinen (2008: 715-716), contingency 
planning within the DPKO was perceived as a political act. The UN has no forces on its own, 
nor is it expected to have any interests which are going beyond the mandates it received from 
the Security Council. Planning ahead on the basis of information gathered by a peacekeeping 
mission on the ground would therefore be seen by states as a political act, even if the Security 
Council has the last word about such an expansion of a mission. The UNAMIR forces had 
already been watered down by the Security Council from over 5’000 personnel proposed by 
its planning committee to an actual force of 2’548 deployed troops. This reduction was 
justified by the Security Council with the commitment of all involved parties to the cease-fire 
(Barnett and Finnemore 2004: 139). 
Taking Dallaire’s information and his request to seize the illegal weapons cache would have 
made it necessary that the Secretary General or the DPKO would become involved in politics, 
41 
 
challenging long-standing, politically motivated understandings of what the DPKO is 
authorized to do – such as in the case of the blurring distinction between peacekeeping and 
preventative deployment – or questioning political decisions about the size, control and use of 
peacekeeping forces on the ground. This presented a risk to the DPKO as it meant to overstep 
rules which had been working in the interest of organizations and of powerful states (Barnett 
and Finnemore 2004: 139; Piiparinen 2008: 715). Or, as Piiparinen (2008: 716) has put it: 
“[T]he key consideration in the UN was less the rescue of civilians than the decision over 
whether an intervention in Rwanda would bestow credit or disgrace, success or failure, on the 
organization”. 
A additional explanation is concerned with the internal workings of the DPKO. This 
perspective argues that the rules of peacekeeping – impartiality of peacekeeping troops and 
the exclusive use of consent-based measures – played an important role for the DPKO to not 
take Dallaire’s warning seriously. In this explanation, the organizational culture of the DPKO 
impeded the UN Secretariat from taking action because the deteriorating security situation 
Dallaire observed could not be integrated in the existing ways in which peacekeeping had 
been conducted at the beginnings of the 1990s (Barnett and Finnemore 2004: 143-154).  
Impartiality of peacekeeping troops and consent based measures play an important role in this 
explanation because these rules were embedded in a larger framework of rules which the 
DPKO deemed to be decisive for the functioning of peacekeeping operations. Peacekeeping 
had been developed as a monitoring tool for peace-agreements in interstate conflicts. After a 
cease-fire in a war had been negotiated, one way to ensure that the parties were adhering to its 
provisions was delegating the monitoring of cease-fire agreement to the UN as an impartial 
third party. Monitoring of cease-fires, however, would only work properly when all parties 
involved in the agreement would consent to the appointment of a third party. Otherwise, the 
impartiality of peacekeeping troops would not have been ensured. After the end of the cold 
war, when the UN became involved in intrastate conflicts, the rules of impartiality and 
consent of all parties to the deployment of peacekeeping troops was sustained although it 
became more difficult to live up to them. In intrastate wars there was often no formal 
procedure of ending conflicts, it was unclear who the involved parties of a peace-agreement 
might be and what consent would mean when parties to the conflict involved governments, 
would-be governments and rebels. Shortly after the cold war, the UN had become involved in 
some peacekeeping operations which turned into peace-enforcement and subsequent failure 
exactly for this reason. Bosnia and Somalia are prominent examples of how the UN failed in 
peacekeeping operations because it departed from the rules of impartiality and consent in the 
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wake of humanitarian crises. These spectacular failures lead the UN to return to the 
requirements of consent and impartiality for the deployment of peacekeeping operations 
(Barnett and Finnemore 2004: 131-132). A return to established and working routines was 
seen as the best way to preserve the organization from more failures in operations which were 
not clearly defined as peacekeeping or enforcement of peace according to chapter VII of the 
UN Charter. In the case of Rwanda, the DPKO so strongly stuck to the rules of consent and 
impartiality because, according to Barnett and Finnemore (2004: 142), “the rules of 
impartiality and consent shaped the DPKO’s interpretation of the mandate” and “led the 
DPKO to predict that any enforcement operation might transform Kigali into another 
Mogadishu”. In short, the signs of escalation detected by forces on the ground were ignored 
by the DPKO’s headquarter because they did not fit into the rule-driven, routinized 
understanding of the meaning of peacekeeping. Instead of preventing a humanitarian crisis – 
the initial aim of peace-keeping in interstate as well as intrastate wars – the aim of the 
operation in Rwanda had become to stick to the rules the DPKO had established itself.  
 
But why would states not only accept such behaviour from entities they created to solve 
problems but also support them by remaining members of these organizations, invest in them 
and sometimes even decide to expand their budget and staff? 
Taking what has been said in the above sections together, the explanation for why 
dysfunctional IOs persist and grow appears relatively simple. In thiscausal narrative, the 
explanation is to be found in the way states perceive what IOs do. The explanation why 
dysfunctional IOs persist and grow is built on three constitutive – and necessary – elements. 
Because IOs are authorities and have an impact on how states perceive the world, states 
accept what they decide, propose and do as the appropriate thing to do. The profound 
influence IOs have on the perception of problem constellations and on the perception of what 
is the right thing to do in any given situation ensures that the behaviour of a dysfunctional IO 
is understood to be functional by states. 
Dysfunctional behaviour of IOs appears only dysfunctional to the outside observer, seen from 
within the context in which the actions of an IO takes place, this behaviour is functional. Seen 
from this perspective, states have no reason to abandon them. In the perspective of those 
involved in such decision, IOs are acting appropriately. 
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Weaknesses of Existing Explanations 
Theoretically, the persistence and growth of dysfunctional IOs is explained by their 
autonomy, authority and power. This causal narrative makes a plausible claim about how 
organizational cultures, legal-rational sources of authority and constitutive power resources 
interlink to produce the phenomenon of persisting and growing dysfunctional IOs. 
This section looks at the empirical evidence that has been gathered on the authority, autonomy 
and power of IOs over the past decade. It asks if and to what extent the causal narrative 
developed to explain why dysfunctional IOs persist and grow can be sustained in real world 
settings. Because few studies have been concerned with the question raised here, the review 
of empirical studies concentrates on asking how each of the constituting elements of the 
causal narrative – autonomy, authority, and power of IOs – have been observed in empirical 
studies.  
 
A review of the existing literature reveals that the notion of organizational autonomy and 
agency is widely confirmed in empirical studies. Studies which are concerned with the 
authority of IOs are rare but the cases they analyse show that IOs actually make claims for 
authority in world politics and sometimes are accepted as such by other actors.  
The power resources and the mechanisms through which IOs exert their ‘soft’ powers have 
been studied even less extensively. However, those who have studied the potential of IOs to 
socialize and persuade other actors in world politics have come to the conclusion that these 
mechanisms only work under very specific circumstances. This conclusion exposes a core 
weakness of the causal narrative explaining the persistence and growth of dysfunctional IOs 
and opens up the question if there are other, more convincing explanations for this 
phenomenon.  
 
The autonomy of IOs has been robustly confirmed in empirical research. Scholars working 
from a variety of perspectives have found empirical evidence for autonomous behaviour of 
IOs in world politics. When it comes to agency of IOs, the challenge of empirical research is – 
as Martin and Simmons (1998:730) have put it – “to focus on how, not just whether, 
international institutions matter in world politics”. Organizational agency has been described 
in various case studies that cut across issue areas and organizational contexts. Clearly, some 
organizations feature prominently in this research. The European Union (Scharpf 1994, 
Pollack 1998, Pollack 2002, Tallberg 2000, Tallberg 2002, Tsebelis and Garret 2000), the 
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World Bank (Finnemore 1996, Park 2007, Park 2009, Woods 2002, Woods 2004, Woods 
2006, Weaver 2007, Weaver 2008, Weaver 2010, Xu and Weller 2009) and the IMF (Abdelal 
2007: 123-161, Barnett and Finnemore 2004: 45-71, Best 2010, Chwieroth 2010, Copelovitch 
2010a, Copelovitch 2010b, Lombardi and Woods 2008, Woods 2004, Woods 2006) have 
received more attention from scholars than other IOs (see also Haftel and Thompson 2006: 
254).  
Other IOs have received less attention until recently, although there are some single-case 
studies and increasingly comparative studies on organizations other than the 'usual suspects'. 
For instance, the ‘Managers of Global Change’ (MANUS) research project focused on a 
comparative study of nine IOs in international environmental politics (Biermann and 
Siebenhüner 2009, Biermann, Siebenhüner and Schreyögg 2009) and a series of edited 
volumes by Reinalda and Verbeek (1998, 2004), and Joachim, Reinalda and Verbeek (2008) 
empirically investigated different ways in which IOs act autonomously. These studies are 
concerned with a variety of different organizations which range from the European Union 
(van der Vleuten 1998, Kerremans 2004) to the G7/8 (Bayne 2004), the World Meteorological 
Organizations (Schemeil 2004) and the UNHCR (Freitas 2004). Other studies focused on 
single-case studies or small-n comparative studies of IOs such as the WTO (Xu and Weller 
2007), the WHO (Cortell and Peterson 2006), the UNESCO (Jacobi 2007), different 
international judicial bodies (Hawkins and Jacoby 2006, Danner and Voeten 2010) and 
different human right bodies (Carpenter 2010, Oestreich 2007).  
 
All of these studies find that IOs are, to some extent, autonomous actors in world politics. 
While this finding is not surprising and might be to some extent an artefact of the theoretical 
perspective these studies adopt (and especially their strong emphasis of rejecting neorealist 
and neoliberal hypotheses on IOs), they at least show that, when conceptualized in the right 
way, it seems possible to show that organizational agency exists in IOs and that both 
principal-agent theories and sociological approaches find ways to empirically confirm their 
theoretical assumptions.  
Taken together, these studies contribute to our understanding of the circumstance under which 
IOs can develop autonomous behaviour. In this respect, assumptions of principal-agent theory 
as well as sociological theories seem to be empirically observable. Taking a principle-agent 
perspective, Colepovitch (2010a) for instance shows that preference heterogeneity among 
powerful principals of the IMF leads to a greater leeway for IMF staff in lending decisions. 
Similarly, Danner and Voeten (2010) find that the increasing autonomy of the ICTY and the 
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ICTR over time can be best explained by the growing interest of powerful states in 
independent rather than interest driven decision-making in international courts. Hawkins and 
Jacoby (2006) find that states have allowed the ECHR to aquire more autonomy over time 
because they were convinced by the organizations that it best represents its common 
preferences. 
Preference heterogeneity among principals and the costs of creating new IOs seem to be most 
crucial for the emergence of organizational agency and autonomy. Some of the mechanisms 
proposed by principal-agent theory such as costs of negotiation and control seem to be less 
easily observable in real world settings, but the importance of the two mechanisms described 
above seem at least to suggest that the underlying delegation problems exist. In sum, the most 
important contribution of empirical studies conducted under a principal-agent perspective to 
the understanding of IOs is that they showed that structural (i.e. the costs of agent creation) as 
well as situational (i.e. preference heterogeneity) factors exist that enable IOs to become 
actors in in their own right. 
 
Sociologically oriented studies have shown that IOs are able to use the latitude they have due 
to these structural and situational factors. Most of these studies (especially Barnett and 
Finnemore 2004, Oestreich 2007, Weaver 2008) find that the specific organizational cultures 
shape the ways in which these organizations act. Barnett and Finnemore (2004), for instance, 
show that the mainly economic expertise accumulated in the IMF has played a crucial role for 
the development of the – often criticized – lending and conditionality policies of the Fund. 
Weaver (2008) similarly shows that the identity of World Bank staff as being both expert 
authorities and international bureaucrats at the same time can explain the Banks failure to live 
up to its own anti-corruption standards. And Oestreich (2007) has shown how the internal 
structures and cultures of human rights bodies explain why some issues are taken up in 
international campaigns while others are largely ignored by them and how these internal 
settings shape the framing of international human rights issues. Similarly, Biermann and 
Siebenhüner (2009) find in their comparative study of nine international environmental 
organizations that leadership within organizations has a strong influence on how IOs act in 
world politics. 
In sum, sociological studies have shown that the behaviour of IOs does not consist of purely 
rational calculations about organizational survival and growth. Although it has been shown 
that organizational survival plays, at a very basic level, a role in the formation of 
organizational cultures and in the selection of the tasks they are willing to perform (Barnett 
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and Coleman 2005), for most organizations, cultural considerations are more important than 
organizational survival and growth (Barnett and Finnemore 2004). Organizational growth is a 
fact for most organizations, but often happens rather unintentionally than out of rational 
calculations (Barnett and Finnemore 2004).  
While states are unlikely to fully override organizational culture as a driving factor of 
organizational behaviour, powerful states can limit and guide the behaviour of IOs in 
important ways. Sociological studies, however, have argued that the relationship between an 
IO and its environment is neither linear nor unidirectional. Much more, the relationship 
between states and IOs often seems to be co-constituted by their interactions. 
 
Few studies are concerned with the authority of IOs. Most prominently, Barnett and 
Finnemore (2004) have explicitly aimed at uncovering the authority of IOs. In the three cases 
they study (IMF, UNHCR and the DPKO) Barnett and Finnemore find that the authority of 
these organizations played a crucial role in making the organizations important and influential 
actors in decision-making processes. In general, it can be said that all three organizations had 
an influence on state behaviour because they were perceived by other actors as being in a 
position in which their expertise or impartiality (or both) would or could not be successfully 
contested by other actors because these organizations were bureaucratic actors created exactly 
for the purpose of being impartial and accumulating specialized expertise. Furthermore, what 
connects the three cases is the finding that authority is not a given. The authority of the three 
organizations under study all built up over decade-long interactions between the organizations 
and states to a point where the organizations were accepted as expert or moral authorities.  
Barnett and Finnemore find that both forms of authority they identify at a theoretical level can 
play a role in world politics. In their perspective, the IMF relies heavily on its economic 
expertise (which is not only accumulated in the IMF but often also produced in its research 
department) in order to influence decision-making on lending and conditionality. Because 
states are lacking the capacity and expertise to identify emerging financial crises and 
designing interventions, the expertise of the IMF plays an important role for the ways in 
which states decide on macroeconomic interventions in a financial crisis. This, of course, 
gives the IMF the possibility to design interventions in a way that fits its own organizational 
culture.  
In the case of the UNHCR, Barnett and Finnemore find that its moral standing as a protector 
of state interests and refugee rights has played an important role in states accepting the 
UNHCR's handling of refugee crises around the world. Because states believe that the 
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UNHCR is enacting the rules they jointly decided on in the best possible way, they would 
allow it to design interventions in refugee crises and sometimes even allow the organization to 
decide which situations are to be seen as a 'crisis' that deserves (or demands) intervention in 
the form of repatriation as a permanent solution for these situations.  
The UN Secretariat's authority, in the perspective of Barnett and Finnemore, stems from a 
combination of its expertise on peacekeeping and its moral standing as the acting part of an 
IO that is first and foremost concerned with securing international peace. Barnett and 
Finnemore show that the UN Secretariat was believed to be the adequate authority to bring the 
genocide in Rwanda in 1994 to the attention of the UN's Security Council. In this sense, states 
left it to the Secretariat to decide if the Rwanda case was a situation in which the UN's rules 
on peacekeeping would justify at least a call for an intervention (expert authority) and if the 
case was to be seen as a threat to international peace (moral authority). In Barnett and 
Finnemore's interpretation, the failure of the international community to act timely in the 
Rwanda case can be traced back – at least to a certain extent – to the failure of an authoritative 
actor in world politics (i.e. the Secretariat) in making other actors aware of the situation and 
its implications for international peace and security. 
Barnett and Finnemore (2004: 18-19) understand the authority of IOs to be largely 
independent from the classical categories of organizational theory. From their point of view, 
neither the way in which these organizations are funded nor the operational involvement of 
other actors in decision-making and execution of concrete operations plays a crucial role for 
an organization to develop and maintain their authority. Authority seems to operate relatively 
independent from relationship these organizations have to their environment.  
Some studies, while not explicitly being concerned with the authority of IOs, have 
nevertheless revealed that the influence of IOs on world politics might be based on a sense of 
authority of these organizations. Finnemore's (1996) and Jacobi's (2009) studies of the 
UNESCO, for example show that this organization has successfully diffused norms about 
educational systems and induced change in domestic educational politics. Much of the ability 
of the UNESCO to do so seems to depend on its ability to construct itself as an actor that is 
working for the world-wide improvement of educational systems and the states’ beliefs about 
the UNESCO's primarily 'good' intensions. Biermann and Siebenhüner (2009) find that the 
influence of environmental IOs on political outcomes depends on a range of factors that lie 
inside and outside these organizations. From the factors that are to be found within 
organizations, organizational leadership seems to play an important role for an organization to 
successfully shape political outcomes. While leadership is not to be equated with the rational-
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legal authority Barnett and Finnemore (2004) identify as the source of organizational 
authority (it is, in fact, quite the opposite of this as leadership depends on the charismatic 
form of the Weberian ideal types of legitimacy), this finding nevertheless shows that different 
forms of authoritative behaviour obviously play a role in what IOs can achieve in world 
politics. 
 
Sociological theories of IOs have proposed two broad mechanisms through which they affect 
political outcomes - socialization and persuasion. Although empirical studies have shown that 
IOs have an influence on political outcomes, few studies have actually looked into the ways in 
which these two mechanisms work. In this sense, it can be said that while it is established that 
IOs do have influence, it remains unclear if the they do so by the merits of the proposed 
mechanisms. The few studies which have attempted to reveal mechanisms of influence 
suggest that both persuasion and socialization are actually at work when IOs influence 
political outcomes. However, these results cannot be generalized and they leave nearly 
entirely open under which conditions these mechanisms work (this critique does not apply in 
the same way to research on influence and socialization within the European Union, see the 
edited volume of Checkel (2007a) on this issue). While this is a critique that applies to most 
research in IR that is concerned with ‘sociological’ processes (Checkel 1998, Drezner 2003: 
7-8), it seems especially disturbing in the case of IOs, because they do not have, in most 
cases, other power resources available (Adler and Bernstein 2005: 295-296). 
Persuasion, although not from an exclusively constructivist perspective, has been studied in 
greater details by Woods (2006: 65-83) in her study of the World Bank's and the IMF's 
influence on lending decisions. Woods identifies it as a core dilemma of the two institutions 
that “politics too often gets in the way” (Woods 2006: 65) of implementing the economic 
restructuration plans the two organizations develop. The only way for the Bank and the Fund 
to have their ideas implemented is to find “willing and able interlocutors in borrowing 
governments” (Woods 2006: 65). Persuasion, which partly emerges from the bargaining 
power of the two organizations and partly from the willingness of domestic actors to accept 
the proposals of the Bank and the Fund, plays a crucial role in this process. The most 
important finding of Woods study of persuasive power of IOs – at least in terms of this study 
– is that the power of the Bank and the Fund does not entirely rest on their ability to impose 
conditionality on states that receive loans from them. Nor can it be exclusively explained by 
the authority of its expertise, as for example Barnett and Finnemore (2004) have claimed in 
the case of the IMF. Conditionality does not work mechanically but is often not as effective as 
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the two organizations wish it was (Woods 2006: 71). Without having domestic counterparts 
that share their understanding of macroeconomic processes and are in the position to influence 
domestic decision-making, not even the Bank and the IMF – two of the most powerful IOs 
which deal with states that are often at the verge of collapse and therefore willing to accept 
more than other states – are able to persuade states to adopt and implement their plans. For the 
IMF and the World Bank, two positions in the decision-making process seem favourable. 
When economic decision-making is made by executive or by an insulated elite or when 
economic matters are seen as largely technocratic and are institutionally detached from 
politics, the IMF and the Bank seem to be able to more successfully persuade states that their 
plans should be implemented (Woods 2006: 76). However, without domestic bureaucrats that 
share the economic mind-set of the Bank’s or the IMF’s staff, it seems unlikely that they will 
succeed in persuading governments to implement their policy proposals (Woods 2006: 73). 
Persuasion, like ideas, ‘does not float freely’, as Risse-Kappen (1994) has put it. At least 
when IOs are the actors that attempt to persuade states, their power to persuade seems to rely 
on the existence of a common understanding of what an issue is about and on the access to 
those who hold the power to change policies within states.  
Some, like Barnett and Finnemore (2004), claim that socialization of domestic actors could be 
a precondition for the power of IOs to persuade. However, for analytical purposes, persuasion 
and socialization can be viewed as two separate processes rather than as standing in a 
hierarchical relationship. Johnston (2003) has studied the micro-processes through which 
socialization by IOs occurs. His case study focuses on the socialization of Chinese diplomats 
and bureaucrats through their continued participation in decision-making processes in the 
ASEAN. In particular, Johnston is interested in the way in which participation in a 
multilateral forum changed the perspective on security and national interests of those that 
participated in the forum. His study has a quasi-experimental character because before their 
initial exposure to ASEAN decision-making Chinese diplomats and bureaucrats had little 
contact with multilateral processes and had an understanding of security that was rather 
focused on national security then on a collective notion of security governance (Johnston 
2003: 147-149). Johnston finds that over time, the Chinese diplomats and bureaucrats in 
question actually changed their behaviour and that their mind-set became less focused on a 
concept of national security that was based on sovereignty and independence. They were 
more willing to commit to participate in power-constraining institutions and were more 
concerned with the image China had within the ASEAN than with the distribution of power in 
South East Asia. Over time, their calculations changed towards reputation costs rather than 
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losses of material power (Johnston 2003: 174). Johnston (2003: 188) identifies a range of 
mechanisms and conditions under which socialization worked in the case under study. Most 
importantly, repeated exposure to ‘counter-attitudinal’ information seemed to play a central 
role for socialization. Furthermore, in the China case, it seemed also important that 
domestically, the diplomats and bureaucrats were relatively autonomous to their superiors, 
which gave them the freedom to develop and adjust their understanding of security over time. 
At the international level, it seems important that the organizations within which socialization 
occurred were relatively small, consensus-based and informal. However, even in such a 
setting, Johnston (2003: 188) sees side-payments and threats of reputational sanctions as 
crucial elements of the socialization process. Without material and non-material incentives, 
attitudinal change seems unlikely. 
 
Taken together, the two studies show that the proposed difference between persuasion (as an 
actor-to-actor process) and socialization (as a structure-to-actor process) to a large part seems 
to be an analytical differentiation. Both cases include structures (consensual understanding of 
the issue at hand in the case of the World Bank and the IMF; institutional design in the case of 
the ASEAN) as well as more direct actor-to-actor process as explanatory factors of the 
influence of IOs.  
Furthermore, the two studies show that neither persuasion nor socialization is exclusively an 
outcome of what IOs do. They certainly play an important role in setting the stage for norms 
and ideas and can therefore be seen as agents of change. But the process seems to be more 
complicated than Barnett and Finnemore (2004) suggest. Without appropriate domestic 
settings, IOs seem not to be able to fully take advantage of their power resources. In other 
words, there seems to be no generalizable ‘constitutive’ form of power which could be 
deduced from the authority of IO – be they dysfunctional or not.   
The insight that the constitutive power of IOs is limited at best because it is mitigated by 
domestic political settings has profound effects on the explanation of the persistence and 
growth of dysfunctional IOs. Because all three elements of the explanation – autonomy, 
authority and power – are necessary to make the claim plausible that dysfunctional IOs persist 
and grow, the causal narrative developed in this chapter seems only of limited value to answer 
the question at hand. An IO whose power resources are limited in the ways described by 
Johnston and Woods can hardly be assumed to constitute the perceptions of problems and 
appropriate behaviour of states to an extent to which dysfunctional behaviour is perceived as 
functional by states. 
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The lack of empirical evidence for salient constitutive effects of IOs on how states perceive 
the world makes it necessary to adapt the existing causal narrative or consider alternative 
explanations for the persistence and growth of dysfunctional IOs.  
 
Developing an Alternative Perspective on Dysfunctional International Organizations 
If existing explanations for the persistence and growth of dysfunctional IOs cannot be 
sustained empirically, how are they best developed to make sense of the fact that 
dysfunctional IOs persist and grow? This section discusses three options to develop 
alternative explanations.  
 
First, the persistence and growth of dysfunctional IOs could be explained as the result of 
symbolic action by states. This is the simplest explanation for the persistence and growth of 
dysfunctional IOs.  
As for most social phenomena, however, a simple explanation is not necessarily a good 
explanation. Symbolic action can only partly explain why states create IOs. And it does not 
explain why states allow dysfunctional IOs to survive and enable their growth. After all, if 
states are rational actors, it seems unlikely that they are willing to invest resources – time, 
money, staff – in an IO which defeats the aims which it has been created to achieve. IOs are 
more than cover-ups for the unwillingness or incapacity of states to solve common problems. 
Otherwise states would hardly be willing to pay for them and a growing budget of a 
dysfunctional IOs would be even harder to be explained than it is when it is assumed that IOs 
are taken seriously by states.  
Secondly, the conditions under which state socialization works could be further explored. 
Doing so would provide a deeper understanding of the micro-mechanisms of the power of 
IOs. The growing literature on transnational relations is – among others – concerned with 
explaining how ideas influence what states do in international politics. This literature 
disaggregates the state to those who actually act on behalf of states, looks at the ways and 
structures in which these actors develop and exchange ideas and how these ideas enter 
decision-making processes. This literature argues that ideational exchange among bureaucrats 
in epistemic communities, transnational, and transgovernmental networks plays an important 
role for what states do in international politics (see, for example, Haas 1992, Risse-Kappen 
1995, Slaughter 2004). Furthermore, this literature is concerned with explaining the dynamics 
in transgovernmental networks. A range of studies provide insights on why certain actors in 
transgovernmental networks have more influence on ideas, agendas and policies than others 
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(Raustiala 2002, Hertel 2006, Bob 2005, Ohanyan 2009, Kahler 2009, Lake and Wong 2009, 
Hafner-Burton and Montgomery 2009). These studies emphasize that the establishment and 
success of ideas is a highly complex process which is driven by material power, contestation 
and competition among ideas and positions of particular actors within networks. Locating the 
role of representatives of IOs in transnational networks and epistemic communities could 
provide a deeper understanding of the conditions under which IOs become authoritative and 
powerful actors in world politics. Integrating insights from the study of transnational networks 
into sociological theories of IOs would provide fine-grained explanations for the authority and 
power of IOs. Through this, it could provide an understanding of the micro-mechanisms 
which drive states to support even dysfunctional IOs. 
However, in respect of this study, doing so would only be partially helpful. While such a 
theory would provide a general argument about how IOs – even dysfunctional ones – can 
obtain powerful roles in transnational networks, it runs the risk of being overturned by a 
single case. A single dysfunctional yet persisting IO which does not operate under these 
conditions would put the explanation back to square one.  
The UNODC is such a case. It is a dysfunctional IO because of its strong commitment to a 
social norm which has counterproductive effects and does not contribute to the solution of 
‘world drug problem’. Its constitutive powers are minimal at best, because since its 
foundation problem perceptions of states have rather diverged than converged. And yet the 
organization has been growing over the past years. The question which needs theoretical 
clarification here is not so much how IOs can become influential actors in world politics but 
how a distinctive group of IOs – those which do not fulfil the expectations of states – persist 
and grow.  
 
Thirdly, to make a general argument about dysfunctional IOs I suggest to concentrate on a 
differentiation of expectations states have in IOs. Existing accounts to IOs are caught in what 
might be best called a ‘functionalist trap’. They assume that states create IOs because they 
want to solve problems they cannot solve themselves. In the functionalist reasoning, this 
means that they create IOs to provide them with what they lack to take collective action: 
reduced transaction costs, information about problem constellations and information about the 
behaviour of other states. In the constructivist reasoning, states create IOs to develop and 
teach them the norms that will lead to the achievement of broader social goals.  
There are, however, other ways to understand what states do and want in international 
politics. An important – but often ignored – feature of international politics is the gap between 
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what states declare and what states actually do to solve a problem. Krasner (1999) offers an 
explanation for this pattern by adapting the concept of organized hypocrisy – initially 
developed to explain the behaviour of organizations – to make it a useful tool for the analysis 
of international politics.  
Organized hypocrisy is about the gap between what actors say and what they do. It explains 
why principles and practice in international politics are often decoupled, creating the 
appearance that actors behave hypocritical (Kranser 1999: 226). According to Krasner (1999: 
71-72), such behavior is neither exclusively explained by power politics nor by suboptimal 
outcomes of coordination games between states. It is best explained by looking at the way in 
which institutions and behavior relate to each other in international politics.  
In international politics, institutions are never fully embedded (Krasner 1999: 226). Norms 
and rules sometimes are durable and sometimes do constrain behavior, but they are 
ambiguous. States might follow them for some time, but if it is their interest, they can and do 
disregard them if it is in their interests and they have the power to do so. In international 
politics “logics of consequence can override logics of appropriateness” (Kranser 1999: 238). 
Institutions are not embedded in international politics because they are not consequential. 
They do not produce the kind of patterned behavior in states that one would expect from rules 
which could be considered institutionalized. States violate rules and norms on a regular basis 
– even those rules which are considered to be the foundation of international order. According 
to Krasner (1999) even sovereignty cannot be considered an embedded institution among 
states. 
 
Institutions are not consequential in international politics but they do play an important role. 
They are expressions of interests and policies of powerful states (Krasner 1999: 59). They can 
reduce transaction costs, provide salient solutions or reduce enforcement costs. In many 
instances attempting to achieve conformity in behavior of other states through establishing set 
of rules and norms which reflect their interests is rational behavior of powerful states. 
Institutions in international politics might not be consequential, but they can be durable.  
In order to understand why principles and practice are often decoupled in international politics 
and why states attempt to create the appearance that they adhere to principles in their actions, 
Krasner suggests scrutinizing the motivations of those acting in international politics. In his 
perspective (1999: 43) analyzing states as unitary actors does not help to understand 
organized hypocrisy. Those who act in international politics are the rulers of states, those who 
make political decision. Their primary motivation is to remain in office and consequentially, 
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to satisfy the interests of their supporters. Rulers respond much more to domestic pressures 
than they do to the structure of the international system as it is imagined in the neorealism or 
neoliberalism or to the social structure in which international relations are embedded as 
constructivism suggests (Krasner 1999: 14; 64). 
Focusing on the motivations of rulers to act explains organized hypocrisy. Organized 
hypocrisy, according to Krasner 1999: 65), is rooted in the need of rulers to satisfy demands 
of different constituents at the same time. Decoupling talk and action – acting hypocritical – 
allows rulers to secure immaterial resources from their external environment and realize the 
material interests of their constituents at the same time. In order to remain in power, rulers 
sometimes must create the appearance to adhere to certain (international) norms which 
legitimate their behavior and at the same time violate them. 
Sovereignty – Kransers object of study – might be the most obvious case to connect the 
motivation of rulers to remain in office with hypocritical behavior of states in international 
politics. Sovereignty builds the core of statehood. International recognition and autonomy 
provide rulers with normative resources and creates certainty about how they will be treated 
by other rulers. Sovereignty is not the condition sine qua non of the existence of a state – but 
it is in many ways helpful to those ruling a state (Krasner 1999: 14-25). 
From this point of view, rulers are only willing to make concessions about sovereignty when 
staying in office is directly threatened. At the same time they have a clear motivation to act 
hypocritical – pretending that their actions are not compromising their autonomy and 
international recognition. 
 
Understanding international politics as organized hypocrisy offers alternative perspectives on 
the role of IOs. Unlike in a functionalist perspective, states operating in world politics 
dominated by organized hypocrisy might create IOs because they enable them to deal with 
problems in the way that serves their individual interests best. The difference between these 
two perspectives on state expectations lies in what is assumed about the goals of international 
cooperation. In the functionalist and constructivist perspective, states are assumed to engage 
in international cooperation to achieve more or less clearly defined ends. Cooperation, the 
institutionalization or principles, rules, norms and procedures and the creation of IOs work, 
because states consent about what they want to achieve and how they want to achieve it at 
least in broad terms. In the perspective suggested here, consent among states might not exceed 
the statement that there is a problem which each state cannot approach individually. If, how 
and to what extent this problem should be solved, however, is not subject to this consensus. 
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What the appropriate way of solving a problem is, is rarely clear from the outset in 
international politics (Krasner 1991). 
Furthermore, states might experience trade-offs between different interests. International 
cooperation can impose costs on states they are not willing to accept. The creation of 
international rules might be helpful to solve social problems at a global level but puts the 
power of those engaged in creating these rules at risk. An agreement on a binding set of 
principles, norms, rules and procedures – even when it seems appropriate to create solutions 
for a problem at hand – might not be in the interest of those engaged in creating these rules. 
As Krasner (1999: 72) has argued: “in an environment characterized by multiple norms, 
power asymmetries, and the absence of authoritative structures that could resolve conflict, 
rulers can select among strategies that deploy normative as well as material resources in 
different and sometimes original ways”.  
One of these strategies is to engage in international action that states cooperation among states 
as its aim to solve a problem while at the same time attempting to keep cooperative action as 
unaccommodating as possible. Making no or only few concessions which would enable the 
creation of a sustainable solution of a problem in order to realize individual interests is always 
an option for states in international politics. 
Despite such conflicting perspective on how to solve a problem best, containing the problem 
can be in the interest of states at the same time. States might not want to commit themselves 
to binding rules, but taking action on unfolding problems can be nevertheless important, and 
cooperative action in dealing with these problems is possible despite the fact that a broad 
consensus about how the problem should be solved does not exist. Beyond normative 
discourse, taking pragmatic action is often a central feature of international politics. 
Pragmatic action is to be distinguished from symbolic action here. While in symbolic action 
there is no intent to achieve any change in a given situation, pragmatic action aims at bringing 
change to a problem. However, the commitment to change a given situation is mitigated by 
the interest of states. Pragmatic action does not aim at achieving change at any possible means 
but only if other interests are not seriously touched by the attempt to solve a problem. In this 
sense, pragmatic action comes down to the point where states agree that ‘doing something is 
better than doing nothing’ but not more.  
 
In such a perspective, functional IOs might only be of limited interest for states. Concerned 
with facilitating consensus on problem solutions and developing norms on how to deal with 
cooperation problems, they neglect their operative functions which could be the most 
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interesting functions IOs provide to states. Dysfunctional IOs, on the other hand, can play an 
important role for states in achieving pragmatic results through international cooperation. 
They enable states to engage in what could be called ritualized normative discourses which do 
not necessarily aim at creating consensus among states but help to secure normative resources 
towards various constituencies. Because they are dysfunctional, there is no need for states to 
take their political role seriously. At the same time, dysfunctional IOs provide states with a 
tool to take pragmatic action in the wake of unfolding crises in which they would be 
otherwise paralysed by normative requirements.  
If states use IOs to deal with problems in the sense of addressing them rather than seriously 
attempting to solve them, then dysfunctional IOs – which often are weak actors in 
international politics – are the best choice for states. Dysfunctional IOs, because of their weak 
political position, hardly have the means to hold states accountable for their lacking 
commitment to sustainable problem solution. And if the attempts to deal with a problem fail, 
dysfunctional IOs can be easily blamed for the failure. In this sense, dysfunctional IOs are 
‘convenient’ agents of state interests when they lack commitment to sustainably address 
problems. They serve as a way for states to take action without taking the risks of failure.  
If international politics is, as Krasner (1999) has put it, organized hypocrisy, states use 
dysfunctional IOs to maintain the gap between talk and action. Dysfunctional IOs persist and 
grow because they do not provide states with solutions. Sometimes states expect IOs to deal 
pragmatically with problems, and dysfunctional IOs are better equipped to do so. 
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3 The Politics of Co-Existence in International Drug Control 
 
The core assumption of existing explanations for the persistence and growth of dysfunctional 
IOs is that states create IOs to enable international cooperation – be it through the distribution 
of reliable information as in rationalist theories or be it through the diffusion of perception 
and norms as constructivist theories argue. Indeed, it is this assumption that makes the search 
for explanations for dysfunctional IOs important in the perspective of rationalist and 
constructivist theories. And it is this assumption that forces existing theories to rely on causal 
mechanisms such as ‘buffering’, ‘persuasion’ and ‘state socialization’ which are conceptually 
flawed and difficult to reveal in real world settings. 
I have argued in the previous chapter that there are reasons to believe that states do not 
necessarily and indeterminately engage in international politics to achieve cooperation. If 
world politics work according to the logic of organized hypocrisy, the purpose of politics 
among state and even the creation of international institutions or IOs can be much less 
ambitious. They provide states with the necessary means to separate talk from action and 
problem solution from pragmatic problem management. In short, I have argued that states 
might be as likely to use international politics to achieve co-existence rather than cooperation 
and to defend the status quo rather than to induce change. 
In this chapter I argue that international drug control is an example of an issue in international 
politics in which achieving a state of co-existence is the primary aim of states. International 
drug control is dominated by the social norm of narcotic drug prohibition. While this norm 
was initially sought of being first and foremost a viable way to solve a problem of technical 
cooperation, over the past five decades, it has become obvious that the prohibition norms 
needs to be adapted if it should be effective and in coherence with other norms. This, 
however, has never happened. The social norm of narcotic drug prohibition still prevails 
largely unchanged in international politics.  
The chapter traces the reasons for this lack in norm development. In doing so, it looks beyond 
the often made argument that the U.S. is dominating international drug control and impedes 
norm development by making use of its power. The chapter looks at the interests and 
behaviour of those states which have become to be seen as the potential driving forces of 
normative change in international drug control – namely Western European and increasingly 
Latin American states which have domestic drug control policies deviating from the ‘zero-
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tolerance’ approach purported in the international drug conventions. The chapter asks how 
these states have attempted to defend their interests in international politics and why these 
attempts did not induce norm development. The chapter finds that although one of the reasons 
are actors in international drug control politics which try to impede norm development, the 
main reason for the lack in norm development are loopholes in the international drug control 
conventions. These loopholes make it possible for states making use of alternative policies to 
develop legal niches to co-exist with states favouring zero-tolerance approaches without 
changing the normative and legal basis of international drug control.  
 
The chapter proceeds as follows. The first section is concerned with the political aspects of 
international drug control. It argues that international drug control, initially perceived to be a 
largely technical problem, has normative implications which have incited normative discourse 
in the politics of international drug control. The second section is concerned with the 
normative basis which has made international drug control appear to be a technical issue for 
the most time of its existence. The technical aspects of international drug control have been 
driven by the fact that the social norm underlying it – narcotic drug prohibition – has been and 
still is widely accepted and uncontested even when it has adverse consequences. The third 
section looks at the correspondence of the existing legal framework in international drug 
control with the strong norm of narcotic drug prohibition. It argues that, despite the existence 
of a strong norm underlying international drug control, its legal framework is weak as it 
provides ample opportunities for states to exploit loopholes in the legal framework to create 
domestic policies which are not entirely compatible with the norm of narcotic drug 
prohibition18. The fifth section argues that states do not have an interest in either closing these 
loopholes or creating a new convention which would institutionalize the flexibility achieve 
through the exploitation of the loopholes in the existing convention. The sixth section 
concludes that the behaviour of states in the politics of international drug control in the past 
two decades suggests that achieving co-existence rather than cooperation was the primary aim 
states pursued in the politics of international drug control.  
  
                                                          
18 A similar observation has been made by Percy (2007) concerning the international law governing the use of 
mercenaries in wars.  
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International Drug Control: Technical Cooperation and Normative Trade-Offs 
The aim to eradicate or significantly reduce the production, trade and consumption of illicit 
drugs has driven international initiatives to establish a global system of drug control for the 
past five decades.  
According to the 1961 United Nations Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, the aim of 
international drug control is to restrict the use of narcotic drugs to ‘medical and scientific 
uses’19. All other forms of using narcotic drugs – commonly referred to as ‘recreational’ uses 
– are seen as illegitimate and should be prohibited by states. The close control of the uses of 
narcotic drugs is justified with the adverse health consequences and addictive potential of 
narcotic drugs. Although there are other interpretations of the nature of international drug 
control (Bayer and Ghodse 1999) most analysts of international drug control agree that the 
prohibition of drug use is the core norm of international drug control (Brunn et al. 1975, 
Nadelman 1990, Bewley-Taylor 1999, McAllister 1999, Paoli, Greenfield and Reuter 2009). 
Prohibition is institutionalized in three international agreements which establish what can be 
called ‘the international drug control system’. The 1961 Single Convention is concerned with 
the control of plant-based narcotics drugs, the 1971 Psychotropic Substances Convention 
establishes controls for synthetic substances, and the 1988 Illicit Trafficking Convention 
regulates the control of precursor substances of plant-based and synthetic substances. 
Furthermore, the three conventions request states to criminalize the production, trade and – to 
a large extent – consumption of the substances under international control by the conventions.  
In addition to the requirement of criminalizing narcotic drugs, the international drug 
conventions established a globally controlled market for the legal production and trade of 
narcotic and synthetic drugs. The aim of this controlled market is to ensure the availability of 
controlled substances for legitimate uses. The legitimate market is administrated by the 
International Narcotics Control Board (INCB) to which states report their annual estimations 
of legitimate demand. On the basis of this demand estimates, the INCB authorizes the 
production of raw materials and processed substances. Notification of shipments should avoid 
the diversion of precursor substances, raw materials and processed narcotic and synthetic 
drugs. The combination of criminalizing what is seen as illegitimate use and the establishment 
of a controlled market for legitimate uses of drugs together serves as a way to ensure the 
availability of drugs for medical purposes and at the same time deter the diversion of legally 
produced drugs or the production and trade of illegally produced substances.  
                                                          
19 1961 Single Convention, Preamble.  
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The international drug conventions are best understood as the attempt of states to regulate a 
social problem through technical cooperation on legitimate production and the collective 
prohibition of illegitimate uses of narcotic drugs.  
 
The effectiveness of internationally institutionalized prohibition is questionable because the 
effects of prohibition are notoriously difficult to measure (MacCoun and Reuter 2001, Paoli, 
Greenfield and Reuter 2009). However, in its 2008 WDR, the UNODC has argued that, when 
compared to the situation a century ago, international drug control has been highly effective. 
Production, trade and consumption of opium and its derivates have significantly dropped in 
South East Asia, which was the region on which concerns about opium addiction has 
concentrated at the beginnings of multilateral drug control efforts (UNODC 2008a). The U.S. 
Office on National Drug Control Policies has made a similar argument in a publication in 
2007 (see Paoli, Greenfield and Reuter 2009). While it is true that the global production of 
opium has dropped from 30’000 tons at the beginnings of the 20th century to approximately 
7’000 tons at the beginnings of the 21st century, drawing the conclusion that this drop of more 
than 70% can be attributed to the establishment and development of the international drug 
control system seems difficult. Such an analysis assumes that except the introduction of 
international measures against illicit drugs, nothing else has changed in the past century. 
A less aggregated perspective on drug markets shows a different picture of the effectiveness 
of international drug control. Between the years 1998 and 2007, for which sufficiently 
comparable data exist, the global markets for opium and cocaine – the two plant-based drugs 
of highest concern according to the 1961 Single Convention – have either been stable or 
growing. For cannabis, estimates are more difficult to produce. However, the UNODC 
assumes that existing evidence suggest that between 125 and 203 million people worldwide 
have used Cannabis as a recreational drug in 2009 (UNODC 2011a: 175). Amphetamine Type 
Substances (ATS) have been growing in an unprecedented way in this period of time.  
 
International drug control has not reached the aim of significant reduction of problems 
associated with drugs set with the adoption of the 1961 Single and reiterate at the United 
Nations Special Session on the World Drug Problem in 1998.  
The enforcement of prohibition is associated with a range of adverse effects which were 
unforeseen at the time international drug control was established. While these adverse effects 
are not causally linked to the ineffectiveness of international drug control in a direct way, they 
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explain at least partly why international drug control has not reached its aims in the past five 
decades. 
 
Figure 1: Illicit Production of Opium and Cocaine 1998 – 2007 in Metric Tons20 
 
Source: UNODC (2011: 60) and Reuter (2009: 26) 
 
The first and most obvious yet unintended effect is the existence of a lucrative transnational 
black market for controlled substances. The 1961 Single Convention was negotiated on the 
assumption that most of the narcotic drugs used for recreational purposes originated from the 
diversion of legitimately produced drugs (McAllister 1999). In this perspective, an 
overproduction of raw material and an oversupply of processed drugs enabled the existence of 
a market for recreational users. By establishing a controlled market in which overproduction 
and oversupply was not possible because producing licenses were administrated on the basis 
of estimates for medical and scientific demand, the shadow markets for recreational users 
would have been dried out. 
The problem with this attempt to control narcotic drugs is that diversion accounts only for a 
small part of the existing black market. Most drugs are grown, processed and traded in full 
illegality. Although it is impossible to proof, it is commonly acknowledged that prohibition 
raises prices for narcotic drugs (Reuter and Kleiman 1986), making the trade with illicit drugs 
a lucrative business. The UNODC estimates that global black markets for controlled 
substances are worth USD 320 billion (UNODC 2005).  
                                                          
20 Figures shown are averages of UNODC estimates and the ONDCP estimates used by Reuter (2009). Estimates 
differ between 2% and 47% for opium and between 0% and 23% for cocaine. Average deviation of estimates 
between 1998 and 2007 is 10.5% for opium and 5.6% for cocaine. 
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Secondly, enforcement of prohibition leads to dislocation of production and trafficking routes. 
Because the business with illicit drugs is lucrative and demand is insensitive to changes in 
prices, producers and traffickers have a strong incentive to ensure supply. This leads to the 
effect that crackdowns on production sites reduce overall production of narcotics only in 
short-term. As Friesendorf (2007) has shown, the production of heroin and cocaine shifts 
around the globe to places were law enforcement capacities of states are weak when 
production opportunities are restricted in one place by national or international law 
enforcement efforts. The same holds true for drug trafficking when law enforcement efforts 
are increased (Kenney 2006).  
Thirdly, enforcement of prohibition strengthens the organization of drug trafficking. 
Confronted with increased levels of enforcement, drug traffickers are strengthening their 
efforts to conceal their activities. The networks through which drugs are trafficked have 
proofed to be innovative in their methods to evade law enforcement efforts. Increased law 
enforcement activities, therefore, make drug traffickers more difficult to detect and criminal 
activities surrounding the narcotic drug business more organized (Andreas 2001, Andreas and 
Nadelmann 2006, Kenney 2006). 
Fourthly, enforcement of the criminalization of consumption increases the health problems 
associated with drug consumption. There is no evidence that the strict enforcement of drug 
laws has an effect on the levels of consumption. However, as the experiences of Portugal with 
the ‘decriminalization’ of drug consumption shows, strict enforcement is likely to increase the 
mortality of drug users as well as to decrease their propensity to seek treatment or at least 
professional advice (Greenwald 2009). This keeps demand for illicitly produced substances 
high and, more importantly, puts the health and live of drug consumers at additional risk. 
 
The second set of non-technical problems international drug control is confronted with is that 
prohibition is conflicting with other domestic and international norms. Most significantly, 
norm conflicts can be identified between prohibition and the respect of human rights (see, for 
example, Barrett et al. 2008).  
An illuminating example of this is what has become known as the ‘Taliban Opium Ban’ 
(Farrell and Throne 2005, Paoli, Greenfield and Reuter 2009), which is commonly seen as a 
success story of prohibition in recent years because it reduced global opium production by 
approximately 80% within less than a year.  
Afghanistan is the major producer of illicit opium in the world. It is estimated that up to 80% 
of all opium produced illicitly is grown in Afghanistan. In late 2000 and during the year 2001 
63 
 
the Taliban government cracked down on opium production in the areas under its control. The 
aim of the crackdown was to eradicate all poppy cultivation and thereby eliminating the 
production of opium in the areas controlled by the Taliban. Within a relatively short period of 
time, this aim had been achieved. The cultivation of poppy in Taliban-controlled areas had 
been reduced between 94% and 99%, according to estimation techniques, causing a 
significant reduction on global opium production in the year 2001 (see figure 1). Prices in the 
large demand markets in Western Europe did not react significantly on the slump in 
production for several reasons, including the brevity of the total ban – which ended with the 
U.S. invasion in Afghanistan in November 2001 – and the willingness of the Taliban to allow 
the sale of opium stocks (Paoli, Greenfield and Reuter 2009: 74). However, if the Taliban 
could have sustained their crackdown on poppy cultivation, it is likely that the reduction in 
production would have had effects on market prices. Starting at less than USD 100, shortly 
before the end of the ban in September 2001, farm-gate prices for a kilogram of opium 
amounted to USD 675 (Paoli, Greenfield and Reuter 2009: 74). From a prohibition 
perspective, the Taliban Opium Ban has been successful because it showed that the 
eradication of cultivation is possible within a relatively short time with a strong effect on 
global production. 
From a human rights perspective, the opium ban was disastrous, as the opium ban created new 
opportunities for a totalitarian government to demonstrate its power. The enforcement of the 
ban included close monitoring of local poppy producers with holding village leaders 
accountable for the noncompliance and public punishment for transgressors. Farrell and 
Throne (2005) present a detailed account of the punishments used to deter the production of 
opium which ranged from forcing peasants to destroy their own crop and, after having done 
so, being sent to prison over public humiliation to public beatings and whippings. There are 
no official accounts of the extent to which the Taliban regime used such punishment. 
However, the quick response of production levels and farm-gate prices suggests that public 
punishment was harsh and common enough to deter even those peasants who had built their 
existence on the production of poppy and opium.  
According to Farrell and Throne (2005), the opium ban was not a home-grown initiative of 
the Taliban regime. The UNODC and other international actors were deeply involved in 
persuading the Taliban to establish a ban on opium production in Afghanistan using the 
carrots of international development aid and the sticks of international isolation of the Taliban 
regime to gain leverage. Although it remains unclear to what extent international involvement 
influenced the decision of the Taliban to enforce the ban, it seems likely that the Taliban were 
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interested in development aid which had been promised to Taliban leaders by the then 
executive director of the UNODC, Pino Arlacchi, in 1997 according to unofficial accounts 
(Farrell and Throne 2005) – and an increase in international reputation by enforcing the ban 
(Felbab-Brown 2006). The unwillingness to extend the ban on the sales of opium stocks 
strongly suggests that the Taliban pursued other aims with the opium ban than contributing to 
a reduction in global heroin production (Paoli, Greenfield and Reuter 2009: 70).  
What can be seen in the example of the Taliban Opium Ban is that international drug control 
rarely is a purely technical issue. As Mena and Hobbs (2010) have pointed out, enforcing drug 
prohibition is often a question of neglecting human rights. Although the political dimension of 
international drug control does not always become as obvious as it does in the case of the 
Taliban Opium Ban, most issues of international drug control can be approached from a 
prohibition and a human rights perspective, leading to trade-offs in decision- and rule-making. 
 
Besides efforts to eradicate the cultivation of narcotic drugs – not only by the Taliban in 
Afghanistan but also by local governments, the U.S. and other international actors in 
Colombia, Peru, Bolivia, Laos, Myanmar and Thailand – the treatment of drug users has led 
to normative conflicts in international drug control. According to the 1988 Trafficking 
Convention, the possession and use of drugs should be made a criminal offence by members 
of the convention. In most states, this provision of the convention is strongly enforced, if not 
in practice (because they lack the capacity to do so) than at least in their laws. In the past two 
decades, however, a range of mostly Western European states has started to introduce 
practices which aim at treating drug addiction as a serious medical condition instead of a 
criminal offence. Harm reduction measures, as these practices are commonly named, aim at 
treating instead of punishing drug users and at reducing the negative consequences on health 
instead of achieving abstinence in drug users. They range from the distribution of syringes to 
injection drug users over the provision of outreach to the supply of heavily addicted users 
with substitution substances or the distribution of heroin. Some states, such as Portugal and 
Brazil, have started to decriminalize the consumption of drugs, turning the criminal offence 
into an administrative one and punishment into therapy. 
Nearly all of these measures have been denounced as being in conflict with prohibition 
(MacCoun and Reuter 2001). However, those states relying on harm reduction measures in 
their drug policies have successfully argued that they are within the provisions of the 
conventions. It seems important to point at the fact that much of the discussion surrounding 
harm reduction was led in the context of human and/or basic rights of drug users, suggesting 
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that not only the prohibition of supply, but also the prohibition of demand is causing trade-
offs between different norms in international politics which can hardly be solved on the basis 
of technical evidence. 
 
Rather, the highly technical approach of international drug control, established on the basis of 
the consensus that prohibition should be realized in a system of a controlled market, has 
produced side-effects which nearly inevitably rendered international drug control a political 
issue. In short, international drug control, as all international cooperation, is a political issue. 
Or to put it in the words of Bull (1977: 170): “It should not be assumed that international 
problems are always best approached as problems of technical management (…)”. 
 
The Strong Norm of Narcotic Drug Prohibition 
Since more than a century, when the first multilateral drug control agreement had been 
negotiated in Shanghai in 1909, international initiatives to control drugs have been driven by 
the desire to restrict the use of narcotics to a minimum.  
States never aimed at fully prohibiting them. Narcotic drugs have important medical uses. But 
since narcotic drugs have become available on a large scale outside the regions were they 
have been grown traditionally, states aim at restricting their availability to those in need for 
them for medical reasons. Prohibition is meant to confine the uses of narcotic drugs to what 
has become seen as ‘legitimate’ over the past century. 
It seems obvious why states want to control drugs. Narcotic drugs are dependency-
developing. Their wide-spread availability poses serious challenges to public health, produces 
social costs and depletes work force. Such concerns motivated states in the late 19th and the 
early 20th century to introduce drug legislations at the national level which aimed at the 
restriction of the use of newly discovered narcotics such as heroin and cocaine (Andreas and 
Nadelmann 2006: 37-38; McAllister 1999). 
Since the conference in Shanghai international efforts to control opium, its derivatives and 
many other mind-altering substances have developed in what one can be called an 
international drug control regime (Nadelmann 1990), and the history of international drug 
control is often seen as a success story of functionalist management of a transnational 
problem (see, for example, UNODC 2008a: 173-222). Because drugs do pose a strong and 
immediate threat to the society, states created an ever tighter framework of international law 
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through which drug use, which “constitutes a serious evil for the individual and is fraught 
with social and economic danger to mankind”,21 is restricted to the necessary minimum.  
 
However, the history of international drug control can hardly be told as the story of a spill-
over from the management of a national drug crisis to the global prohibition and 
criminalization of the production, trade and possession of even small quantities of mind-
altering substances. Between Shanghai in 1909 and Vienna, where the 1988 Trafficking 
Convention was negotiated, lie eight decades of international norm development which hardly 
resemble a functionalist story. The history of international drug control is the history of the 
institutionalization of the social norm of prohibition which, after a century of norm 
elaboration, “governments challenge only at the cost some international embarrassment” 
(Andreas and Nadelmann 2006: 19). Defection from the norm today seems nearly impossible 
because it would “deeply damage the country’s moral standing in the international 
community” (Andreas and Nadelmann 2006: 229)22.  
The norm of prohibition, which at the outset of the international efforts to control drugs was 
not established in the way it is today (McAllister 1999)23, has been elaborated, developed and 
institutionalized by influential individuals, bureaucrats of powerful states, transnational norm 
entrepreneurs and government representatives to what it has become today (Brunn et al. 1973, 
Nadelmann 1990, Bewley-Taylor 1999, McAllister 1999, Andreas and Nadelmann 2006: 37-
46).  
Commonly, the 1961 Single Convention is seen as a decisive point in the international 
institutionalization of drug prohibition. Before the adoption of the 1961 Single Convention, 
drug control was regulated internationally by a range of drug control treaties which had been 
developed over the past five decades. These treaties often were contradictory and represented 
the patchwork of state interests and different perspectives on drug control which had been 
present in the negotiations of these treaties (McAllister 1999). With the adoption of the 1961 
                                                          
21 1961 Single Convention, Preamble. 
22 Bolivia has denounced the 1961 Single Convention on July 29, 2011. The denouncement was a tactical move 
of Bolivia’s government in order to enter a reservation into the 1961 Single Convention concerning the 
traditional chewing of coca leave. The Bolivian government has announced to rejoin the 1961 Single Convention 
the same day the denouncement will be effective (January 1, 2011). The 1961 Single Convention prohibits the 
chewing coca. However, Bolivia and other Latin American states have problems to supress it, which made it 
necessary to enter reservation if Bolivia did not want to breech the convention. The Bolivian initiative was 
accompanied by diplomatic consultation with the United Nations and the U.S., which effectively mitigated the 
impression that Bolivia was defection from the international drug control regime. In this sense, it is questionable 
if Bolivia’s action can be considered as ‘defection’. See, the respective press release of the United Nations: 
http://www.un.org/News/briefings/docs//2011/110624_Bolivia.doc.htm [retrieved November 14, 2011]. 
23 For example, negotiations on international drug control initiatives undertaken during the period of the League 
of Nations were often more concerned with mitigating the public health aspects of drug consumption than with 
the criminalization of trade, production and possession (McAllister 1999).  
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Single Convention, states proofed that they were willing to remodel this patchwork of diverse 
interests in and understandings of international drug control into a legal text which established 
a global system to control drugs comprehensively. 
Latest since the adoption of the 1961 Single Convention, the prohibition of narcotic drugs has 
entered the stage in which “social pressures on all states to acknowledge and enforce the norm 
are quite powerful” and in which “international institutions and conventions emerge to play a 
coordinating role” in ensuring implementation of the drug prohibition norm into domestic law 
(Andreas and Nadelmann 2006: 21). With the 1961 Single Convention, drug control has also 
become what one might be able to call an internationally accepted social norm. 
 
Social norms are “collective expectations for the proper behaviour of actors” (Katzenstein 
1996: 5). Social norms guide behaviour and international norms guide the behaviour of states. 
However, the existence of a social norm – even of one that enjoys widespread acceptance – 
does not determine behaviour. No norm is ever fully complied with. Therefore, the existence 
of enforcement mechanisms and the acceptance of these mechanisms is strong indicator for 
the acceptance of a norm. Acceptance of enforcement mechanisms points at acceptance of a 
social norm.  
Formally, enforcement of the international drug conventions is in the competence of the 
International Narcotics Control Board. This ‘expert body’ oversees the implementation of the 
obligations of the international drug control conventions into domestic rules and procedures 
and can propose sanctioning states which do not comply with their obligations24. This 
enforcement mechanism is weak. The INCB makes rarely use of it, not because there is 
widespread compliance with all the provision of the international drug control conventions 
but because the impediments to actually sanction a state for transgressing obligations under 
the conventions are relatively high.  
There is, however, a much stronger and – as I will argue – more accepted informal 
enforcement mechanism which does not so much concentrate on compliance with 
international conventions but on the underlying norm of drug prohibition. This mechanism is 
mainly unilateral. The U.S., which has been one of the major proponents of the 
internationalization of drug control based on the prohibition of drugs since the early 20th 
century, has made efforts to increase compliance with the prohibition norm by establishing a 
unilateral system of sanctions against states which were not able or willing to suppress the 
illicit production of narcotic drugs. Unilateral enforcement of drug prohibition is often erratic 
                                                          
24 1961 Single Convention, Article 14 and 1988 Trafficking Convention, Article 22. 
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but it is exactly the inconsistency of the enforcement which makes a strong case for a deeply 
accepted, strong social norm of prohibition at least among the powerful states in international 
drug control. 
At the centre of unilateral U.S. enforcement of the provisions of international drug control 
conventions lies a certification mechanism. Under the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) of 1961 
as amended, the U.S. State Department assesses and certifies the compliance of other states 
with U.S. and international drug control provisions – especially with those of the 1988 
Trafficking Convention. In its International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, the State 
Department identifies countries which are a direct or indirect source of transnational drug 
flows to the U.S. Countries identified as non-compliant to the international drug conventions 
and representing a major source of narcotics face “decertification” and – depending on 
congressional decision – sanctions including cutting U.S. assistance up to 50% and voting 
against financial assistance in the World Bank and other international financial institutions. 
The president can determine not to take these measures if a country facing decertification has 
taken measures to comply with applicable drug control provisions and national interests are 
placed at risk by cuts in foreign assistance. Congress can override the presidential decision 
with a two-third majority. 
The amended FAA does not further specify to which countries the certification process 
applies. In practice, however, certification only applies to countries that meet a threshold of 
producing five metric tons of opium or derivatives or five hundred metric tons of coca or 
cannabis per year25. Countries meeting this threshold are included in the “major list”. Since 
1987, when the certification process was established, thirty-two states have been included in 
this list. Half of them have remained in the list from 1987 to present. 
The provisions of the FAA seem to create an automatic mechanism which enforces national 
and international drug control provisions. If a state meets the threshold and does not make 
attempts to get into control of its drug problem, sanctions will enforce compliance with 
provisions. 
According to Friman (2010), however, inclusion on the major list and ranking as 
cooperative/noncertified or eligible to national interest waiver are politicized processes which 
first and foremost are concerned with preservation of U.S. national interests. Measurements 
which are used to include a country into the major narcotics list are difficult to justify because 
neither tonnages nor hectares can be appropriately measured. Furthermore, it remains unclear 
                                                          
25 In 1994 measurements for threshold criteria were adapted: 1000 hectares of illicit poppy and coca or 5000 
hectares of illicit cannabis, respectively. 
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to what extent these measurements actually do say something about the extent to which drugs 
produced from these crops are reaching U.S. drug markets.  
Placement of countries into the categories available under the FAA (‘fully cooperative’, 
‘noncertified’ and ‘national interest waiver’) also lacks a clear definition. Although the major 
narcotics list is based on numerical thresholds, there is neither a specification of production or 
plantation reductions which would justify categorization as fully cooperative, nor are the 
standards against which the President’s decision to grant a national interest waiver can be 
measured. According to Friman (2010: 88), this makes the certification process vulnerable to 
influence by government officials. 
More importantly, however, the discretion in the certification process makes its effectiveness 
questionable. Certification rates have ranged between 57.7% in 1995 and 91.3% in 2002 and 
2004 respectively. Since the certification process has been effective, countries were 
decertified in 56 instances and national interest waivers were granted in 47 instances. Several 
countries had lost their status as certified but were recertified within short time spans. Others 
were decertified but dropped from the major list later without clear signs of cooperation or 
measurable changes in their significance for transnational drug trade. Some have seen a row 
of certifications, national interest waivers and decertification. Afghanistan has been 
decertified twice and recertified after regime changes. Despite the fact that the country is by 
far the most important source of illicit opium and the situation on the ground has hardly 
changed, Afghanistan has remained certified since 2002 (Friman 2010: 89-91). 
 
In relation to the norm of narcotic drug prohibition, while the implementation of the norm in 
domestic law has not been problematic26, compliance has been complicated by the fact that 
the activities subject to prohibition are “easily concealed” and that consumer demand for 
narcotic drugs is “substantial, resilient, and not readily substituted for by alternative activities 
or products” (Andreas and Nadelmann 2006: 22). The effectiveness of the norm of drug 
prohibition, which produces collective expectations among states, is therefore limited by the 
capacity of the individual state to exert control over the production, trade and consumption of 
illicit drugs27. 
This fact produced the paradoxical situation that some states, despite their willingness to 
comply with the prohibition norm, where not able to actually gain control over the production 
                                                          
26 Nearly all states are parties to the three international drug conventions and most states actually followed the 
norm by introducing prohibitive laws. 
27 For a discussion of variations in state capacity to control the production of illicit drugs and its effects on the 
1988 Trafficking Convention, see Jojarth (2009: 111-113). 
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and trade of narcotic drugs. For this reason, while the prohibition norm was widely accepted 
since the 1960s, compliance was difficult to achieve for ‘technical’ rather than ‘political’ 
reasons. Even if states – especially those in which narcotic drugs are cultivated – had been 
willing to comply with the prohibition norm, they lacked the sheer capacity to gain control 
over cultivation and production efforts. Although these ‘enforcement’ efforts were deem to 
fail because states affected by sanctions rarely were in the position to gain control over 
cultivation and production, weakening such states by sanctioning them unilaterally was likely 
to have adverse effects. 
Despite its erratic implementation and dubious effects on actual levels of drug production, 
unilateral enforcement of the provisions of the international drug control conventions has 
never incited criticism among states – at least not among those which were not affected by 
these efforts. While it has been an issue in the academic and advocacy literature (see for 
example Bewley-Taylor 1999: 172 or Raustiala 1999: 111) in the political process, unilateral 
action by the U.S. was never seen as problematic despite its disruptive potential on efforts to 
control the illicit production of narcotic drugs.  
This acceptance of the unilateral enforcement mechanism established by the U.S. shows the 
strength of the social norm of the prohibition norm. Not only were states willing to accept the 
unilateral enforcement strategies which had been developed despite the existence of a 
formally constituted sanctioning mechanism. They were also willing to accept it despite its 
potential adverse effects on the technical problem they attempted to solve by international 
cooperation.  
 
The Weak Law of International Drug Control 
States have paired the strong norm of drug prohibition with a detailed framework of 
international law. The three international drug conventions make explicit provisions about 
how international drug control should be organized in order to achieve the restriction of 
narcotic drugs to medical and scientific uses. The 1961 Single Convention and the 1971 
Psychotropic Substances Convention, for example, regulate which substances are subject to 
control and establish which controls apply to which substances28, or under which 
circumstances and how controls over a particular substance can be changed and through 
which international bodies such changes in the so called ‘scheduling’ of substance can be 
achieved29. Even as detailed provisions as the obligation that the chewing of coca leaves had 
                                                          
28 1961 Single Convention, Article 2. 
29 1961 Single Convention, Article 3. 
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to be abolished within 25 years in states where this practice had been considered as traditional 
had been included in the 1961 Single Convention30.  
The 1988 Trafficking Convention is even more strongly concerned with regulating state 
behaviour in a very detailed manner. Article 3 of the convention, for example, lists 31 
activities related to narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances which states should 
criminalize and adds that the criminalization of these activities should “take into account the 
grave nature of these offences” and should, therefore, be punished with “imprisonment or 
other forms of deprivation of liberty, pecuniary sanctions and confiscation“.  
The degree to which the three conventions seek to regulate state behaviour in concern to 
narcotic drug and the way in which the conventions delegate the supervision of what states do 
to control drugs has led Jojarth (2009: 134) to the conclusion that the international drug 
control conventions represent ‘hard law’ in the sense of Abbott and Snidal (2000). In a less 
scholarly manner, Thoumi (2010) has described the international drug control conventions as 
a “straight jacket”, from which states interested in more liberal and less supply-oriented drug 
control policies can hardly escape.  
 
There are, however, loopholes in the conventions which make the law of international drug 
control a less tight-fitting ‘straight jacket’ then some describe it. Even the INCB – who is one 
of the strongest defenders of a prohibitionist interpretation of the international drug control 
conventions – has acknowledged that not all the terms used in the 1961 Single Convention are 
as clearly defined as they seem at first sight (INCB 2004: 38).  
Two of these loopholes have been exploited by states to implement drug policy measures 
which deviate from a strong prohibitionist interpretation of the convention. 
The first loophole is a lacking definition of the core terms of the 1961 Single Convention – 
‘scientific’ and ‘medical’. Despite the centrality of these terms, they do not appear in the 1961 
Single Convention’s Article 1 which defines the terms used in the Convention. Neither the 
subsequent 1971 Psychotropic Substance nor the 1988 Trafficking Conventions provide a 
definition of the two terms. 
What ‘scientific’ and ‘medical’ uses actually meant became relevant when some Western 
European states started to experiment with what has become commonly known ‘harm 
reduction measures’. In general, such measures provide drug users with services and 
treatment which do not aim at achieving termination of drug use in the first place. Much 
more, improving the health conditions and social well-being of individual drug users is the 
                                                          
30 1961 Single Convention, Article 49. 
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aim of such measures. Needle/syringe exchange programs, heroin maintenance and opioid 
substitution therapy as a means of treating drug dependence and injection rooms all aim at 
improving the health conditions and social well-being of individual drug users – especially of 
those severely addicted to substances commonly referred to as “hard” drugs . Convincing 
them to lead a “drug free” live is rated second in the aims of these measures – if it is at all. 
Because ‘scientific’ and ‘medical’ lack further definition, the international drug conventions 
leave room of manoeuvre to states which are willing to experiment with harm reduction 
measures. In heroin maintenance and substitution programs, narcotic drugs in Schedule I and 
IV31 of the 1961 Single Convention – to which the highest measures of control apply – are 
distributed to drug users with the argument that maintenance as well as substitution are 
therapeutic measures. The use of heroin and opiate derivatives for substitution of heroin in 
this sense is understood to be of medical use. Therefore, the use of heroin and opiate 
derivatives in state sponsored programs can be seen as being in accordance with the 
obligations of the 1961 Single Convention and the 1988 Trafficking Convention despite the 
fact that these therapies do not necessarily lead to abstinence from substances regulated under 
these conventions. Some states, such as Switzerland, have used this definitional loophole 
systematically to develop drug policy measures which deviate from a strictly prohibitionist 
approach to control drugs.  
 
The second loophole is the fact that all penal provisions of the 1961 Single Convention and 
the 1988 Trafficking Conventions are subject to constitutional principles and basic concepts 
of the legal system of each states32. Although the consumption of drugs is not subject to any 
penal provisions in the three conventions, provisions of the 1988 Trafficking Convention 
suggest that states are also expected to criminalize the possession of drugs. Several states have 
eased this obligation by de facto or de jure ‘decriminalizing’ the possession of small 
quantities of drugs for personal use with the argument that incarceration for a minor offence 
such as the possession of a small amount of drugs is not compatible with the basic concepts of 
their legal system.  
De facto or de jure ‘decriminalization’ of the possession of small quantities of drugs for 
personal consumption has led to some variations in the way – especially European and Latin 
American – states treat drug possession. Some states, such as Portugal, have fully 
‘decriminalized’ the possession of small amounts of drugs, making it an administrative rather 
                                                          
31 Heroin is on Schedule I and IV; Methadone, often used in opiate substitution therapies, is on schedule I. 
32 1961 Single Convention, Article 36; 1988 Trafficking Convention, Article 3. 
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than a criminal offence (Greenwald 2009). Personal use, in the Portuguese definition, means 
the quantity required for an average individual consumption during a period of 10 days 
(Greenwald 2009). 
Similar laws, although referring to smaller amounts of drugs, have been put into force in 
Brazil, Argentina and Mexico in the past decade33. In other countries such as Germany or the 
Netherlands, directives are maintained which allow the police to ignore the possession of 
small amounts of drugs for personal use. Decriminalization is most advanced for the 
possession of cannabis for personal use. For this drug, which is still included in Schedule I 
and IV of the 1961 Single Convention, Holland, Switzerland, Belgium, Luxembourg, 
Portugal, Ireland, the United Kingdom, and a dozen states of the U.S. have released laws or 
established police practice which decriminalizes the possession of small amounts for personal 
use.  
 
The exploitation of loopholes in the international drug conventions increased variations in 
drug control policies across countries in the past two decades. However, to what extent this 
can be understood as a challenge to the international prohibition norm in international drug 
control is another question. Most states did not introduce harm reduction measures and 
decriminalize drugs because they did not agree with the idea that addictive substances need to 
be controlled. Much more, they did so to solve problems which purely prohibitive measures 
could not solve.  
For example, in Switzerland34, harm reduction measures were adopted in the wake of a severe 
increase in the consumption of heroin which resulted in one of the highest rates of substance-
related deaths in Europe and North America35. Zurich, the biggest city in Switzerland, was the 
epicentre of this heroin crisis, had adopted strictly prohibitive measures against drug users 
during the 1980s. These measures, however, where not effective. Drug use and drug trade 
persisted and intensified in the city, creating an open drug market which the police, despite 
stepping up enforcement, was not able to control. Whenever the police cracked down on open 
drug markets in one place, they would re-emerge in another shortly after. Around such open 
drug markets, public security deteriorated significantly.  
                                                          
33 See, “Mexico and Argentina move towards decriminalising drugs”, The Guardian, August 31, 2009.  
34 See, for a comprehensive discussion of the Swiss case, MacCoun and Reuter (2001: 278-286; 287-296). 
35 In 1992, substance-related death amounted to approximately 62 per million inhabitants, or 419 in absolute 
numbers (Jojarth 2009: 108). MacCoun and Reuter (2001: 278) described Switzerland as the “leader of the 
European nations in the prevalence of heroin addiction and the extent of HIV among its heroin addicts” at the 
beginnings of the 1990s.  
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This and the rapid spread of HIV among injection drug users led the city – in coordination 
with the government of the canton of Zurich and the Swiss Government – to adopt innovative 
measures. These measures included the introduction of a needle exchange program, a clinical 
heroin maintenance trail and a substation program. Within years, from the approximately 
30’000 heroin users in Switzerland at the beginnings of the 1990s, 23’000 had joined a heroin 
maintenance or substitution program. HIV transmission rates and substance-related deaths 
dropped significantly and open drug markets in Zurich and Switzerland shrank36.  
The aim of these measures was only partly to better protect drug users. While this certainly 
played a role for those engaged in designing the harm reduction measures, concern about drug 
users alone would not have enabled the harm reduction measures to become a defining 
element of Swiss drug policies. During the late 1980s and early 1990s, the police was heavily 
burdened by fighting petty drug offenders, which increasingly consumed resources. The Swiss 
Police Federation, for example, first and foremost supported the introduction of harm 
reduction measures because it would enable police forces to concentrate on drug traffickers 
rather than drug users and because an estimated 1 million Swiss Francs per day was disposed 
from illicit heroin market through maintenance and substitution programs37. The aim of the 
introduction of harm reduction measures in Switzerland – which made the exploitation of 
loopholes in the international drug conventions necessary – was not to undermine the 
prohibitive norm embodied in the international drug control conventions but to pragmatically 
deal with problems related to the consumption of drugs prohibition could not solve. 
Similarly, the decriminalization of possession of small quantities of drugs does not directly 
question the social norm of drug prohibition. Criminalization of petty drug law offenders puts 
heavy burdens on law enforcement and judicial systems, especially when even the possession 
of small amounts of drugs is punishable with incarceration. In the U.S., up to a quarter of all 
prison inmates are convicted for drug offences, many of them for the possession of small 
quantities of drugs. Decriminalization is a means to relieve law enforcement and the judicial 
system from prosecuting minor offences which often are seen as ‘victimless’. The resources 
invested in and the costs of the prosecution of petty drug offenders are often seen as wasted 
when compared with the gains society gets from strict enforcement of prohibition.  
Decriminalization of drug use does not necessarily mean that states are challenging the 
fundamental idea of drug prohibition. Even the Netherlands, known for its liberal cannabis 
                                                          
36 Interview with Swiss government representative, Zurich, September 4, 2009. 
37 Interview with Swiss government representative, Zurich, September 4, 2009. 
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policies, has recently announced that it will step up law enforcement activities against drug 
traffickers of all kinds38. 
 
In sum, it can be said that loopholes in the international drug control conventions have 
provided states with ample flexibility in the design of their drug control policies in a way 
which solves the problems they have been confronted with. Some analysts have argued that 
this flexibility is not enough to provide states with the possibilities to create truly liberal drug 
policies (Krajewski 1999, Bewley-Taylor 2003). To do so, the international drug conventions 
needed to be amended. This, however, seems unlikely because the amendment process is 
complicated and riddled with institutional impediments which are difficult to overcome. In 
this sense, the statement that with the international drug conventions states have matched a 
strong norm with a weak law needs to be qualified to the extent that this does mostly apply to 
advanced industrialized countries which are only partly vulnerable to economic pressure from 
prohibitionist states. 
For this group of states, however, exploiting the loopholes in the international drug control 
conventions provided the flexibility they needed to design policies which departed from a 
strictly prohibitionist understanding of drug control. To what extent actions of these states 
aimed at challenging the social norm of prohibition, however, cannot be determined by 
looking at what they are doing in their domestic drug policies.  
 
Fighting the Exploitation of Loopholes: The Tug-of-War of International Drug Control  
The exploitation of loopholes in the weak international drug control law has created 
normative discourses among states. Because the drafters of the 1961 Single Convention did 
not include a definition of the terms ‘medical’ and ‘scientific’ into the text of the convention, 
states became engaged in an extensive normative discourse about the question what the two 
terms actually meant when applied to domestic drug control measures which included 
practices such as the distribution of heroin – which had been placed in the heavily controlled 
Schedule IV of the 1961 Single Convention39 – to drug addicts. Because the 1961 Single 
Convention made all penal provisions related to drug offences subject to constitutional 
                                                          
38 Interview with Swiss government representative, Bern, February 1, 2010.  
39 Article 2 of the 1961 Single Convention requests states to establish a range of control measures for substances 
listed in Schedule IV of the Convention which do not apply to other controlled substances. In particular, states 
are requested to “prohibit the production, manufacture, export and import of, trade in, possession or use of any 
such drug except for amounts which may be necessary for medical and scientific research only”. Besides heroin, 
cannabis and cannabis resin are included in Schedule IV. 
76 
 
limits40 and the 1988 Trafficking Convention states that its criminalizing provisions are 
subject to  “constitutional principles” and “basic concepts” of the legal system of each state41, 
states could engage in debates about the question if prohibition of narcotic drugs necessarily 
meant the criminalization of all acts related to drugs. And because the 1961 Single 
Convention stated in its Preamble that the convention had been established in concern “with 
the welfare and health of mankind”, the question was brought up how much prohibition was 
too much when the human rights of producers and the health of consumers of narcotic drugs 
where concerned.  
The discrepancy of a strong norm embodied in weak international law made international 
drug control prone to normative conflict. In their essence, normative conflicts in international 
drug control revolved around the question if ‘the spirit’ or the ‘the letter’ of the three 
conventions was the proper standard to judge the cooperative behaviour of states. While some 
states were concerned with exploiting the loopholes and ambiguities of the international drug 
conventions in order to justify practices in domestic drug control, others attempted to keep 
interpretations of the conventions as close as possible to the prohibition norm. 
 
This can be best seen in the normative debate led around the question if harm reduction 
measures are in line with the provisions of the international drug control conventions or if 
they do overstretch the interpretation of the term ‘scientific and medical use’. This debate has 
largely been carried out as a ‘proxy war’ between the International Narcotics Control Board – 
which is mandated to interpret the international drug control conventions in case of 
ambiguities – and Western European states most extensively involved in harm reduction in 
their domestic policies, i.e. Switzerland and the Netherlands42. 
The role of the INCB in normative conflict in international drug control is decisive for two 
reasons. First, according to the 1961 Single Convention, the INCB functions as an impartial 
international body which interprets the conventions in the case of ambiguities. Over the years, 
the INCB has become accepted as a ‘quasi-judicial’ body in international drug control, which 
                                                          
40 1961 Single Convention, Article 36. 
41 1988 Trafficking Convention, Article 3. 
42 Other debates were led in the CND. See for example : „The United Nations and Harm Reduction“, 
Transnational Institute Drug Policy Briefing No. 12, March 2005 
(http://www.tni.org/sites/www.tni.org/files/download/brief12.pdf [retrieved November 14, 2011]) and “The 
United Nations and Harm Reduction – Revisited: An Unauthorised Report on the Outcome of the 48th CND 
Session”, Transnational Institute Drug Policy Briefing, No. 13, April 2005 
(http://www.tni.org/sites/www.tni.org/files/download/brief13.pdf [retrieved November 14, 2011] for a summary 
of the thematic debate on harm reduction measures at the 48th Session of the CND. However, as no official 
records of deliberation in the CND are published, this section concentrates on the INCB’s annual reports and 
interviews conducted with Swiss government officials and former INCB members.  
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takes decisions about how the international conventions should be implemented. Therefore, it 
was seen as being in charge of dealing with the question to what extent harm reduction 
measures were in line with the obligations of the international drug control conventions. 
Secondly, since its inception, it had functioned as what had been called the ‘guardian’ of the 
international drug control conventions (Bewley-Taylor and Trace 2006). In its reports, it 
mostly interpreted the conventions in a conservative way, favouring a prohibitive perspective 
on drug control over alternative approaches. Because of that, the INCB became seen as a 
handmaiden of those powerful states which were in favour of a strictly prohibitive 
implementation of the international drug control conventions. Because of this, normative 
conflict in international drug control is often most intense when it takes place between the 
INCB and states.  
 
Harm reduction caught the INCB’s attention first in the early 1990s. In its 1993 Annual 
Report, the INCB made a first reference to harm reduction, stating that it “acknowledges the 
importance of certain aspects of ‘harm reduction’ as a tertiary prevention strategy for demand 
reduction purposes”43. The report continues: “The Board considers it its duty, however, to 
draw the attention of Governments to the fact that ‘harm reduction’ programmes are not 
substitutes for demand reduction programmes”44. Although the INCB does not further specify 
the terms ‘tertiary prevention strategy’ and ‘demand reduction’ in its remarks, this 
formulation suggests that it differentiates between harm reduction measures and demand 
reduction in general. Simply put, it can be argued that by 1994, the INCB considered harm 
reduction measures as policies that might reduce demand for certain prohibited substance but 
only partially contribute to the aims of the international drug conventions – the ‘real’ 
reduction of demand by abstinence-based treatment or prevention of drug use.  
That said, the INCB never clarified these vague statements during the coming decade. It 
repeatedly suggested, however, that it was concerned that harm reduction measures could 
threaten the achievements made by international drug control efforts for two reasons. 
First, the INCB was concerned that harm reduction measures could proliferate without being 
properly evaluated. For example, in its 1997 Annual Report it commented on a Swiss heroin 
maintenance program: “The Board expressed its doubts about one element of the new policy 
in Switzerland, namely a project for distributing heroin to addicts, and recommended that the 
                                                          
43 Report of the International Narcotics Control Board for 1993, E/INCB/1994/1, p. 5. 
44 Report of the International Narcotics Control Board for 1993, E/ICNB/1994/1, p. 5. 
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scientific merits (…) and the results should be evaluated by the WHO.”45 and regretted that 
“(...) pressure groups and some politicians are already promoting the expansion of such 
programmes in Switzerland and their proliferation in other countries”46 although it was “not 
convinced the limited positive results claimed by the Swiss Government can be attributed 
solely to the distribution of heroin itself”47. While the diplomatic language of the reports 
allowed the Board only in a limited way to express its concerns, they were more explicit on 
other occasion. Officials of the Board are cited as having stated in reference of the Swiss trial 
that “anyone who plays with fire loses control over it” and that such experiments would send 
“a disastrous signal to countries in which drugs were produced” (cited in MacCoun and 
Reuter 2001: 294). Some statements of the Board furthermore suggest that it assumed that 
harm reduction measures could facilitate drug consumption. For example, in its 2003 Annual 
Report the Board states that “any prophylactic measures should not promote and/or facilitate 
drug abuse”48. 
Secondly, the INCB feared that harm reduction could divert states from implementing 
abstinence-based policies. In its 2000 Annual Report the Board stated that it regrets that harm 
reduction has “has diverted the attention (and, in some cases, funds) of Governments from 
important demand reduction activities such as primary prevention or abstinence-oriented 
treatment”49. The background of these concerns was that the Board classified harm reduction 
measures mainly by its impact on what it understood as the core of the international drug 
control regime – the distinction between medical and scientific uses (which were explicitly 
allowed by the conventions) and all other forms of uses (which were prohibited). Although 
not directly mentioned in the conventions, the Board had a well-established understanding 
that this distinction implied that the ‘spirit’ of the conventions aimed at promoting abstinence 
from drug use. Including harm reduction in the abstinence-based classification of drug control 
was essentially difficult for the INCB because harm reduction measures aimed at a medical 
purpose (treating drug dependence or reducing the negative health consequences of drug use) 
but at the same time were not directly oriented towards ending– in the interpretation of the 
Board – an internationally prohibited practice. Especially, injection rooms posed a problem to 
the categorization of the INCB as they had a medical purpose (increase of the health and well-
being of consumers) but the drugs consumed in such rooms seemed also to be consumed for 
non-medical purposes. The position of the Board was further complicated by the fact that the 
                                                          
45 Report of the International Narcotics Control Board for 1997, E/INCB/1998/1, para 366. 
46 Report of the International Narcotics Control Board for 1997, E/INCB/1998/1, para 367. 
47 Report of the International Narcotics Control Board for 1997, E/INCB/1998/1, para 368. 
48 Report of the International Narcotics Control Board for 2003, E/INCB/2004/1, p. 36. 
49 Report of the International Narcotics Control Board for 2000, E/INCB/2001/1, p 60. 
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drug conventions did not define the term ‘medical and scientific use’, which built the basis of 
the INCB’s classification of international drug control. The meaning of ‘medical or scientific’ 
was therefore largely left to what states made of it.  
After a decade of attempting to convince states that harm reduction was threatening the 
achievements of international drug control, the INCB resorted to a threefold strategy to end 
this problem in its 2003 Annual Report. First, it defined how harm reduction measures were 
related to the relevant international provision. It declared that needle sharing programs and 
opioid substitution were within the provision of the conventions50, while injection rooms were 
not, a position it had already expressed before51. This decision was made with reference to 
“the fundamental provisions of international drug control treaties which oblige State parties to 
ensure that drugs are used only for medical or scientific purposes”52. However, the Board left 
open on which provision it based its interpretation of what the ‘fundamental principles of 
international drug control’ were. A legal advice the INCB requested from the UNODC Legal 
Affairs Section, for example, shows that the conventions could be interpreted also in another 
way. The report states that it “would be difficult to assert that, in establishing drug-injection 
rooms, it is the intent of Parties to actually incite to or induce the illicit use of drugs, or even 
more to associate with, abet or facilitate the possession of drugs” and that therefore the 
establishment of drug injection rooms “would still fall far from the intent of committing an 
offence as foreseen in the 1988 Convention”53.  
Secondly, it repeated its concerns about the potential dangers of harm reduction measures by 
urging states to “carefully analyse the overall impact of such measures, which may sometimes 
be positive for an individual or for a local community while having far-reaching negative 
consequences at the national and international level”54, and reminded them that “experience 
of developed countries and their evaluation of the therapeutic usefulness, safety and efficacy 
of a drug might not necessarily be applicable to developing countries, et vice versa”55 .  
Thirdly, it provided a definition of medical use as understood in the three drug control 
conventions. It did so because it was convinced that “the drafters of the international drug 
conventions did not purposively leave the term ‘medical use’ ambiguous but that they could 
not reach agreement on a universal definition”56 and that the Board had to provide such a 
                                                          
50 Report of the International Narcotics Control Board for 2003, E/INCB/2004/1, p. 36-37. 
51 Report of the International Narcotics Control Board for 2003, E/INCB/2004/1, p. 37. 
52 Report of the International Narcotics Control Board for 2003, E/INCB/2004/1, p. 49. 
53 Flexibility of Treaty Provision as Regards Harm Reduction Approaches: Prepared by the Legal Affairs Section 
UNDCP, E/INCB/2002/W.13/SS.5. para 27-28, emphasis in original. 
54 Report of the International Narcotics Control Board for 2003, E/INCB/2004/1, p. 37. 
55 Report of the International Narcotics Control Board for 2003, E/INCB/2004/1, p. 38. 
56 Report of the International Narcotics Control Board for 2003, E/INCB/2004/1, p. 38. 
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universal definition “for the purpose of carrying out its own work“57. The definition makes 
reference to medicines as substances that are “improving health and well-being”, “preventing 
and treating diseases (including the alleviation of symptoms of that disease)” and to medical 
consumption as “medicine (…) consumed by patients for the purpose of improving health and 
well-being (…) and treating disease (including symptom alleviation)”58.  
The INCB’s attempt to defend its classification of international drug control as essentially 
abstinence-based failed. By defining ‘medical use’ in such open terms it opened up even more 
room for interpretation.  
After this failed attempt to end the debate surrounding harm reduction by transforming its 
longstanding classification of drug policies in a set of definitions and instructions on harm 
reduction, the Board resorted to a strategy of discouraging states from opening injection 
rooms59 and not actively encouraging states to make substances for opioid substitution 
treatment available60. However, it made no further attempts to bring the harm reduction in 
line with its well-established understandings of the aims of drug control. In the past seven 
years, the Board has not changed its stance towards needle exchange and substitution therapy 
– which are not obstructed but also not promoted despite their therapeutic effect which falls 
under the INCB definition of ‘medical use’ – and injection rooms – which are seen as 
violating the provisions of the 1988 Trafficking Convention and actively criticized in the 
INCB’s annual report. 
Reactions on the INCB’s interpretations of harm reduction measures by the most notorious 
states were hardly to seek consensus. In terms of direct allegations against Switzerland that its 
drug policies are violating international obligations, for example, Swiss representatives used 
the general debate of the CND on an annual basis to underline that the harm reduction 
measures implemented were in line with the international drug conventions61.  
This strategy was successful as far as relations between the Switzerland and the INCB have 
improved since 2006. In 2006, Switzerland and the Netherlands were invited by the INCB for 
closed hearings in 2006. According to Swiss government representatives, the hearings with 
the INCB had been surprisingly open-minded after more than a decade of harsh criticism. For 
Swiss officials, it therefore came as a surprise that the INCB did not attempt to convince them 
to finally abandon harm reduction measures and return to a law enforcement-based approach 
                                                          
57 Report of the International Narcotics Control Board for 2003, E/INCB/2004/1, p. 38. 
58 Report of the International Narcotics Control Board for 2003, E/INCB/2004/1, p. 38. 
59 Sometimes by threatening to use its sanctioning powers, see Bewley-Taylor (2004). 
60 Although this was in contradiction with the INCB’s obligation to ensure the availability of substances 
controlled under the international drug conventions for medical reasons and its practice for substances other than 
heroin and methadone, see Csete and Wolfe (2007). 
61 Interview with Swiss Government Representative, Bern, September 2, 2009. 
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to drug control. To the contrary, Switzerland and the Netherlands could convince the INCB 
that the harm reduction measures they make use of are compatible with the obligations 
especially of the 1988 Trafficking Convention. Since these hearings, the INCB has reduced 
criticism of Dutch and Swiss policies significantly62. Switzerland, in this sense, successfully 
entered a normative debate with the INCB about what drug control is about and how it should 
be done.  
 
Analysts of international drug control has argued that normative discourse in the CND and in 
international drug control more generally has reached an “impasse” which needs to be broken 
in order to move international drug control in a less prohibitive direction (Jelsma 2002). In 
order to do so, according to Jelsma (2002), those states interested in change in international 
drug control should “bring together a critical mass of like-mindedness” in order ”to become 
more assertive about their achievements, to bring a refreshing tone to the UN level and to 
support Southern countries eager to take steps in a similar direction”. 
Despite the fact that after the INCB’s failed attempt to define the term ‘medical use’ in a more 
meaningful way, Switzerland and other states making use of more liberal domestic drug 
policies were hesitant to address the question of harm reduction in a more principled way in 
order to achieve development or change of the conventions in the direction of a less 
prohibitionist approach. States which engaged in harm reduction domestically did not push for 
a new consensus in international drug control.  
The most assertive action of states making use of harm reduction measures in their domestic 
drug control policies took place during the debate of the 52nd session of the CND. As in 
relations between the INCB and states involved in harm reduction, it has also been a 
controversial issue in the CND63. The term “harm reduction” was not used in official 
documents of the CND because zero-tolerance proponents believed that using the term could 
lend legitimacy to practices which were violating obligations of the international drug control 
conventions and that this could open a gateway for more states to make use of harm reduction 
measures. 
This changed in 2009, when the CND reviewed the progress of international drug control 
efforts since 1998. During the final session of the 52nd CND, Germany declared on behalf of 
                                                          
62 Interview with Swiss government representative, Bern, September 3, 2009.  
63 See, for example: „The United Nations and Harm Reduction“, Transnational Institute Drug Policy Briefing 
No. 12, March 2005(http://www.tni.org/sites/www.tni.org/files/download/brief12.pdf [retrieved November 14, 
2011]) and “The United Nations and Harm Reduction – Revisited: An Unauthorised Report on the Outcome of 
the 48th CND Session”, Transnational Institute Drug Policy Briefing, No. 13, April 2005 
(http://www.tni.org/sites/www.tni.org/files/download/brief13.pdf [retrieved November 14, 2011]).  
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26 ‘like-minded’ states that it would interpret the term ‘related support measures’ – as it was 
used in the CNDs political declaration marking the diplomatic punch line of the CNDs 52nd 
session – as including measures that are commonly referred to as ‘harm reduction 
measures’64. With this statement, the term for the first time found entry into a politically 
binding document in international drug control. Among those objecting to this statement was 
the U.S. However, the U.S. was not concerned with the idea of harm reduction per se but with 
the fact that the German statement was not in accordance with the consensus states had agreed 
upon and that it therefore could put the resolution and the success of the review conference in 
danger. 
The German statement in the CND was not an attempt to push for a new consensus in 
international drug control. Consensus about the resolution had already been at the verge 
during deliberations leading up to the official debate65 and the U.S. had put great effort in 
finding a wording for the resolution which was accepted by all states66. The term used in the 
resolution – ‘related support measures’ – already had been a compromise. Much more, the 
initiative of the ‘like-minded’ group of states resembled the strategy of Switzerland in its 
decade-long conflict with the INCB about its harm reduction measures. By maintaining 
conflicting perspectives on what international drug control is – i.e. by insisting on the 
interpretation that harm reduction is fully compatible with the obligations of the international 
drug control conventions – states maintain their room of manoeuvre in domestic drug policies.  
This move of the ‘like-minded’ states might have been the most assertive action of states to 
bring the term harm reduction into an official document of the CND. However, neither was it 
a critical mass of states which moved to action nor was this action meant to achieve a new 
consensus of what international drug control should do (and not do). To the contrary, the aim 
of the group of states which took action in the 52nd session of the CND was to make sure that 
what they had achieved by flexibly interpreting the international drug control conventions was 
acknowledged in an international resolution. Affecting change or development of norms in 
international drug control, however, was not the primary aim of these states. 
 
Normative conflicts in international drug control are not led to achieve a new consensus in 
international drug control, nor do normative conflicts aim at creating a counterbalance to 
those international actors which support zero-tolerance drug policies.  
                                                          
64 Commission on Narcotic Drugs: Report on the fifty-second session; E/CN.7/2009/12, p. 119. 
65 Interview with Swiss government representative, Bern, September 2, 2009. 
66 Interview with Swiss government representative, Bern February 1, 2010. 
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Flexibility in the three drug control conventions is working to the advantage of those states 
which solve their problems with drugs in ways can be seen as deviating from the strong social 
norm of prohibition. Loopholes in the conventions are providing them with the opportunities 
to choose from a range of policies. Maintaining normative conflicts – as opposed to seek 
consensus – is in the interest of these states because substantive discussion about change 
could threaten what one could call a ‘convenient state of affairs’ in international drug control 
for most advanced industrial countries, in which they are able to fend off attempts to interfere 
in domestic drug control policies of the INCB and powerful states by referring to the 
ambiguities in the treaties. 
 
In sum, it seems hardly in the interest of these states to push for change in international drug 
control for the sake of those ‘Southern countries’ which are bearing the highest costs of the 
current international drug control regime. 
Bewley-Taylor (2003: 171) has argued that “[i]t seems that the time is not too distant when 
further movement within states away from the prohibitive paradigm will only be possible 
through some sort of change or defection from the regime”. The discussion of normative 
conflicts in international drug control suggests that change or defection might not necessarily 
be in the interest of these states. The status quo in international drug control – which one 
representative of a ‘zero-tolerance’ state has described as a “tug-of-war”67 – serves the 
interests of those states which want to maintain their room of manoeuver in their domestic 
drug control policies.  
 
Normative Conflict and Co-Existence in the Politics of International Drug Control 
International drug control is often portrayed as a struggle of scientific knowledge against 
policies based on ideology. The prohibition of narcotic drugs is understood as an American 
invention imposed on the rest of the world with the power and resources of a hegemon. The 
three international drug conventions are seen as an American tool to diffuse and 
institutionalize the social norm of narcotic drug prohibition on a global level. And where 
political pressure is not enough, the U.S. uses brute force to ensure narcotic drug prohibition. 
The problem with narcotic drug prohibition, however, is that it does not work. In the five 
decades since states have – by establishing the 1961 Single Convention – declared prohibition 
the most important standard against which state action on drug matters is to measure, only a 
                                                          
67 Interview with Swedish government representative, Vienna, February 18, 2010.  
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few things have changed to the better. Most have remained the same or even become worse. 
This is why the social norm of narcotic drug prohibition has become seen as an ideology. The 
‘war on drugs’ might serve political purposes, the expansion of bureaucracies and American 
hegemony, but after all, it does not solve the ‘world drug problem’. 
Against the ideology of narcotic drug prohibition stands evidence that alternative approaches 
to control drugs work. Decriminalization of drug possession for personal consumption, 
substitution therapy and heroin maintenance might not be aiming at achieving a drug free 
society, but these measure reduce harm inflicted on drug users, bring more drug users into 
therapy, can – if applied on a large scale – affect the demand for illicit drugs and enable law 
enforcement agencies to concentrate on those who earn money with drugs rather than those 
who are getting destroyed by them.  
International drug control is the arena where ideology combined with material power wins 
against scientific evidence. The U.S. – together with a few other wealthy states – dominates 
discourse, manipulates IOs and uses the UN system to enforce compliance with the 
prohibition norm. The persistence of an out-dated and ineffective international regime is 
ensured by those who created it for their own profit. States and staff of IO staff willing to 
achieve progress in international drug control and base politics on scientific evidence get the 
short end of the stick in this struggle because they lack the power to make a stand against the 
most powerful state in the world and its allies in international drug control. 
 
This chapter has developed a different perspective on international drug control. In this 
perspective, states do not engage in a struggle for either prohibitionist ‘zero-tolerance’ drug 
policies or ‘pragmatic harm reduction oriented’ approaches to drug control. Nor are they 
engaged in a struggle about the question if drug policies should be based on ideology or 
science. International drug control is mainly about organizing co-existence among states with 
different drug problems and different approaches to manage them. European – and 
increasingly Latin American – states making use of pragmatic solutions are not primarily 
interested in creating an international norm or legal framework which ends prohibition and 
establish pragmatic, science-based drug policies as a global standard. This might be the aim of 
individuals within the bureaucracies of these states, as it is the aim of some individuals in the 
American and other bureaucracies to spread the belief in prohibition as the best way to control 
drugs. As states, I have argued here, their interest in international drug control is to maintain 
the room of manoeuver loopholes in the international legal framework provide them. 
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This explains why normative conflict has been a defining element of the politics of 
international drug control in the past two decades. To achieve co-existence, neither a 
consensus on normative questions nor an IO supporting states in elaborating norms is 
necessary. To the contrary, both could destabilize the balance between the efforts of some 
states to arrange themselves in the niches the international conventions provide and those of 
the INCB, the U.S. and other states to keep the loopholes as small as possible. Politics of 
international drug control is not about ideology. It is about achieving a consensus about how 
co-existence should be organized. 
 
This is not to say that the current state of international drug control – in which a weak law 
enables deviance from a strong norm – is convenient for all states. The normative conflicts 
described in this chapter were mainly lead among advanced industrial states. Those who bear 
the highest costs of the prohibition of narcotic drugs are the production and transit states in 
Latin America, Central or Southeast Asia and to some extent West Africa. In these states, 
narcotic drugs create problems which go beyond social control and public health. In Mexico, 
Colombia and in Afghanistan, drugs fuel violence and corruption. They are a threat to the 
security and sovereignty of these states. For these states, only a substantial consensus on how 
to deal with the ‘world drug problem’ could change the situation. 
To change the situation, serious commitments of advanced industrialized countries to reduce 
their illicit demand for drugs and invest in the societies of production and transit countries 
would be necessary. Such a commitment, however, is not to be expected anytime in the near 
future. 
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4 Elusive Off-Stage Commentaries: The UNODC’s Role in International Drug Control 
 
Rationalist and constructivist explanations of dysfunctional IOs argue that states listen to IOs 
because they perceive them as impartial actors in world politics that help them to overcome 
cooperation problems. Constructivists go even further and argue that IOs – dysfunctional or 
not – are so deeply embedded in the social relationships in world politics that they are able to 
persuade and socialize other actors into behaviour which should lead to the achievement of 
the social goals underlying international norms. Indeed, this is why, from a constructivist 
perspective, dysfunctional IOs are allowed to survive and grow despite their dysfunctional 
behaviour. Because IOs are perceived to be expert and moral authorities in world politics, 
constructivist argue, states perceive what they do and what they say as the right thing to do. 
I have argued that this argument is flawed because it assumes that states delegate the 
development of norms and their translation into appropriate behaviour to IOs because they 
actually want to achieve the social goals inscribed in the mandates of IOs. If in world politics 
states separate talk from action as Krasner’s organized hypocrisy metaphor suggests, this 
cannot taken for granted in the way constructivist and to a lesser extent rationalist 
explanations of dysfunctional IOs do. In such a world, states can create IOs which deal with 
problems that are not in their immediate national interest but need to be dealt with for some 
reason. States can and do use IOs to dump problems and let those IOs figure out how these 
problems can be solved best. However, such IOs will be marginalized and their normative 
role confined to a minimum if these organizations start to act proactively in a way that 
touches the interests of states. In short, the inner workings of IOs might be important for the 
kind of dysfunctions an IO develops, but what makes the organization dysfunctional is that 
states do not want other actors besides them which attempt to bridge the gap between talk and 
action in international politics.  
This chapter argues that the UNODC has not achieved to play a significant role in the 
normative debates in international drug control. To the contrary, looking at the behaviour of 
the UNODC in relation to the two salient normative issue in international drug control of the 
past two decades – the adverse consequences of prohibition and the emergence of a public 
health approach to drug control – the UNODC’s role in the politics of international drug 
control seems to have been confined to that of an elusive off-stage commentator. Its 
comments on the purpose of international drug control follow the evolution of the political 
process closely but the organization remains overly unclear about the meaning of these events 
for both the norm and the law in international drug control. While this elusiveness might have 
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helped to achieve co-existence and fuelled the tug-of-war which maintains the achieved state 
of co-existence, it certainly did not contribute to enable cooperation or norm development in 
international drug control. This behaviour of the organization is explained by the way states 
influence the executive director of the organization in his decision through the funding 
mechanism of the organization. States invest increasingly in the UNODC, but they did not 
strengthen those parts of the organization which would have enabled the organization to play 
a meaningful role in the politics of international drug control. Most of the investment came in 
‘earmarked’ form and was directly assigned to specified projects. This weakens the 
headquarters which was the part of the organization that could become involved in the 
normative debates in international drug control and ensures that states achieve their primary 
aim in international drug control – co-existence.  
 
This chapter set out to explore the mechanisms through which states shape the dysfunction of 
IOs. The first and second sections look at the ways in which the UNODC has behaved in 
relation to the struggle for co-existence in international drug control. The two sections argue 
that the UNODC’s behaviour largely followed the broader normative discourse in 
international drug control. The first section looks at the way the UNODC dealt with the social 
norm of prohibition and its problematic effects on both the ‘world drug problem’ and on 
human rights. The second section then turns to the UNODC’s behaviour in the ‘harm 
reduction’ debate. The third and the fourth section explain the UNODC’s behaviour from two 
different perspectives. The third section looks into the internal working mechanisms of the 
organization and identifies the executive director of the organization as playing a central role 
for the organizations behaviour. The fourth section looks at the way the funding structures of 
the UNODC and the way states make us of this structures influence what the executive 
director does. The fifth section concludes that the insignificant and elusive role the UNODC 
played in the normative debates in international drug control is the role states have foreseen 
for the organizations. The dysfunction of the UNODC ensures that the primary aim of co-
existence can be achieved in international drug control. 
 
Committing to the Norm: The UNODC and Prohibition 
The UNODC had been created as a technical organization. Its initial mandates were mainly 
concerned with assisting states in multilateral cooperation on drug control measures and 
providing services in technical assistance. However, over the past decade, the UNODC also 
became involved in politics. An important political aspect of the UNODC’s work can be 
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found in its publications, especially its most prominent publication – the World Drug Report 
(WDR).  
 
While, from their set up, the UNODC’s WDRs and other publications are meant to provide 
technical guidance and compile information about how transnational drug markets work, they 
also include a wide range of interpretations which go beyond merely technical evaluations and 
fact-finding.  
Sometimes, such political statements by the UNODC are subtle. For example, in the 2005 
WDR, the UNODC, after having been criticized to overstate the value of illicit drug markets 
(see for example, Thoumi 2005), made an attempt to realistically estimate how much money 
is earned by the illicit trade with drugs. One of the central assumptions the UNODC made in 
its estimation model was that all drug markets are supply-driven, i.e. that drug consumers 
would actually consume more drugs when more drugs are available on the market (UNODC 
2005: 125). This assumption was commented in a footnote of the 2005 WDR despite its 
significance for the estimation model and no further reference is made to justify it. The 
political message of the assumption that illicit markets are inherently a problem of supply – 
and therefore not of demand – lays in the perspective it suggests on illicit markets. The 
question if demand or supply are the main problem of illicit markets has been debated 
extensively in international drug control. The international drug control conventions at least 
implicitly suggest that supply of illicit drugs is the main factor why illicit drug markets 
exist68.  
At the United Nations General Assembly Special Session on the World Drug Problem – 
commonly referred to as the ‘UNGASS’, a tense debate was led by states about the question 
to what extent this assumption is consistent with reality. Demand for illicit drugs, some states 
argued, had at least the same effect on the intensity of the ‘world drug problems’ as supply. At 
the UNGASS, states consented that there is a ‘shared responsibility’ of states to reduce supply 
and demand for illicit drugs. In this sense, the UNODC’s assumption of supply-driven illicit 
drug markets, even when introduced simply to make the estimation model less complex, is not 
without political content. It reveals an orthodox, supply-oriented understanding of illicit drug 
markets which, in the last consequence, suggests that those states not able to suppress the 
cultivation and trafficking of illicit drugs are responsible for the existence of an illicit market 
– according to the UNODC’s estimate – USD 320 billion (UNODC 2005: 143).  
                                                          
68 Indeed, the design of the 1988 Trafficking Convention can only be rationally explained when it is assumed 
that states wanted to put stronger controls on the supply-side of illicit drug markets, see Jojarth (2009: 97).  
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Sometimes, however, the UNODC’s political statements are more explicit. The 2009 WDR, 
for example, features a subsection titled “Why illicit drugs must remain illicit”, which 
complains that “of all areas of international cooperation, drug control is uniquely subject to 
calls that the struggle should be abandoned” (UNODC 2009a: 163) and argues that the 
criminalization of certain substance is the best way to prevent an even larger ‘world drug 
problem’. The point the subsection of the 2009 WDR is making is that between legalization of 
all drugs and prohibition of the currently controlled substances there are few alternatives and 
that from the two alternatives available prohibition might be the better one. These are clearly 
political statements. In another instance of attempting to gain political influence, the 2008 
WDR includes a section about the history of international drug control. As a proof for the 
effectiveness and success of the international drug control, the 2008 WDR compares opium 
production and addiction rates in states in Southeast Asia before the inception of the first 
international drug control convention in 1912 and today. According to this table, production 
as well as addiction rates have significantly dropped during the century in which the 
production and consumption of opium in Southeast Asia were controlled by an international 
agreement (UNODC 2008a: 214) and states: “[c]omparing the situation in 1906/07 with the 
situation in 2007 shows a clear net improvement with regard to the most dangerous class of 
drugs: the opiates” (UNODC 2008a: 213). Again, the intent and political message of such 
play with numbers is obvious – without international efforts to control drugs through 
prohibition, addiction rates could still be the same as they have been at the beginning of the 
20th century. However, such a comparison does hardly say anything about the effectiveness of 
the international control regime. Or as three renowned analysts of illicit drug markets have put 
it: “The frivolity of the comparison, because so much has changed apart from the formal 
controls, is indicative of the difficulty of providing a positive gloss to the performance of the 
current international system (…)” (Paoli, Greenfield and Reuter 2009: 258). 
 
Despite such rather simplistic attempts to signal agreement for prohibition the UNODC did 
not simply ignore the largely scholarly debate about the adverse side-effects of prohibition. 
Despite the sometimes heroic language and flawed arguments the UNODC used to defend 
prohibition, its WDR did also take up the problematic side of drug prohibition. Most notably, 
in its 2008 WDR – the same report which made the attempt to compare consumption levels of 
opiates in 1907 and 2007 and relate it to the introduction of an international drug control 
system – the UNODC also featured a chapter that was concerned with evaluating the 
“achievements and unintended consequences of international drug control”. The two-and-a-
90 
 
half pages concerned with unintended consequences of international drug control might be 
considered the piece most critical towards prohibition ever published in a WDR. It outrightly 
admits that prohibition has adverse consequences which have not been intended at the 
inception of the international drug control system, neither in 1909 nor in 1961. In some 
instances it even dismisses the diplomatic language usually used by the UNODC when 
commenting on the more controversial aspects of international drug control and points out 
that the current system based on prohibition does not only have advantage. And it calls on 
states to take these unintended consequences into consideration when designing drug policies, 
especially those unintended consequences which directly affect the health and human rights of 
drug users. For example, the UNODC argued that prohibition contributed to the emergence of 
drug control policies in “which those who fall into the web of addiction find themselves 
excluded and marginalized from the social mainstream, tainted with a moral stigma, and often 
unable to find treatment” (UNODC 2008a: 216) and closely relates addressing this challenge 
to harm reduction measures (UNODC 2008a: 216-217). The chapter concludes with an 
subliminally yet unmistakably critical statement about the relationship between the 
performance of international drug control, the commitment of states and the prospects of 
international drug control: “[M]aking the drug control system more 'fit for purpose', would 
appear to need a triple commitment: reaffirming the basic principles (multilateralism and the 
protection of public health); improving the performance of the control system (by doing 
enforcement, prevention, treatment and harm reduction simultaneously); and mitigating the 
unintended consequences” (UNODC 2008a: 218). 
Although this statement does not directly call the uses of prohibition into question, it could 
certainly be read as a step forward in the UNODC’s role in the politics of international drug 
control. After nearly a decade of defending prohibition publicly and committing itself to the 
norm, the organization seemed to have been come to terms with its role as an IO and 
attempted to push the normative debates in international drug control in a new direction. At 
least, the concluding statement involved all the problems and questions that had politicized 
the once technical issue of international drug control. 
The caution with which the UNODC prepared the 2008 WDR’s thematic chapter, however, 
suggest that its concluding statement was intended to initiate a normative debate which could 
lead states out of its tug-of-war in international drug control politics or even end the struggle 
for co-existence. Much more, the fact that the statement appeared in the 2008 WDR shows 
how deeply the UNODC, even in criticizing prohibition and the commitment of states to 
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international drug control, was itself committed to the social norm of narcotic drug 
prohibition.  
Initially, what later became this section of the 2008 WDR was circulated as an informal 
Conference Room Paper (CPR) at the 51st session CND two months before the publication of 
the report as a test and a provocation by the UNODC69. The organization wanted to see in an 
informal way how states reacted on openly discussing unintended consequences of 
international drug control and harm reduction and circulating its position as a CPF at a CND 
session was seen as an adequate way to do so. The aim was to see to what extent the UNODC 
could count on raising project money for its annual budget without getting into trouble with 
zero-tolerance donors. If some major donors would not have agreed to the UNODC spelling 
out such a position, its executive director and senior managers would have been noticed by 
these states within short time. At least, this was the expectation of the UNODC’s senior 
management which decided over the distribution of the CPR70. The UNODC received a range 
of positive comments from non-governmental organizations and not a single comment from 
states. This even surprised the drafters of the paper. And after not having received negative 
comments, the UNODC decided to include the Conference Room Paper into the 2008 
WDR71. If the ‘making fit for purpose’ CPR would have had the chance to incite a normative 
debate about the unintended consequences of prohibition and how they could be mitigated, it 
most likely would not have appeared again in an official UNODC document.  
 
The UNODC is an ‘honest broker’ in the conflictive relations in international drug control. Its 
impartiality and expertise provide it with the resources to moderate the conflicting interests of 
states and achieve solutions which states would not have agreed upon alone. At least this is 
how senior staff of the organization perceived its role in international politics72.  
If being an ‘honest broker’ means more than enabling the co-existence of conflicting 
interpretations of the international drug control conventions, then the UNODC has been only 
modestly successful in pursuing this role. The politics of international drug control have been 
driven by attempts of states to interpret the international drug conventions in a way that 
preserves their room of manoeuver. Normative conflict in order to ensure co-existence rather 
than cooperation to moderate conflicts had been the defining element of the politics of 
                                                          
69 Making drug control ‘fit for purpose’: Building on the UNGASS decade. Report by the executive director of 
the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime as a contribution to the review of the twentieth special session of 
the General Assembly. E/CN.7/2008/CPR.17. 
70 Interview with UNODC senior staff, Vienna, February 8, 2010. 
71 Interview with UNODC senior staff, Vienna, February 8, 2010.  
72 Interview with UNODC senior staff, Vienna, February 8, 2010. 
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international drug control in the past two decades. The UNODC’s commitment to the social 
norm of narcotic drug prohibition has neither contributed to nor mitigated these strategies.  
The argument that UNODC’s commitment to prohibition has obvious reasons because its 
mandate is based on the international drug control conventions is only partly convincing. As I 
have argued in the previous chapter, the international drug conventions provide ample 
flexibility which would allow deviating from an uncompromising commitment to the 
irreplaceability of prohibition. The UNODC’s behaviour simply reflected the degree to which 
the social norm of narcotic drug prohibition dominated international drug control and the 
UNODC’s inability to evade its importance even in criticizing the norm. 
 
Commenting on the Tug-of-War: The UNODC and Harm Reduction 
Commitment to prohibition alone, however, does not make the UNODC dysfunctional. 
Although its commitment to prohibition can be seen as a comment on the state of the 
normative debate in international drug control rather than an attempt to bring those who 
deviated from the norm by exploiting the loopholes in the international drug convention to 
reason, this does not preclude that the UNODC could play a more significant role in the 
integration of harm reduction into the existing normative debates in international drug control. 
As states like Switzerland and the Netherlands have shown, harm reduction does not 
necessarily exclude prohibition. Even while committing to prohibition, the UNODC could 
still have played a role in mitigating the tug-of-war of defining normative debates in 
international drug control. 
Similar to what has been said about the UNODC above, however, the organization obtained a 
rather passive role in the harm reduction debate as well. Despite the fact that harm reduction 
had been on the agenda of international drug control since the early 1990s – due to the 
INCB’s critical comments in the issue – the UNODC kept largely out of this debate for a 
decade.  
 
Judged by its mandate, the UNODC’s behaviour is surprising. Existing evidence from the 
evaluation of harm reduction measures suggested that some of the measures were effective 
and efficient in alleviating some of the most disturbing consequences of drug prohibition. For 
an organization which is mandated to provide states with the evidence-base for effective drug 
control policies, developing a position on the existing evidence and introducing this position 
into the political discourse would seem to be a behaviour which could be expected. Internally, 
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such positions existed early on in the debate73, however, neither in public nor in relations to 
the INCB or to states were these positions outlined.  
In public, the UNODC remained largely silent on harm reduction before the INCB’s 2003 
Annual Report. It cautiously referred to harm reduction measures in its 1997 WDR (UNDCP 
1997: 161) and a chapter about drug dependence treatment made reference to substitution 
therapy in its 2000 WDR (ODCCP 2000: 116-134). About its own attitude towards harm 
reduction, however, the UNODC remained silent. 
In relations to the INCB, the UNODC made clear why this was the case. In a legal advice 
issued by the UNODC’s Legal Affairs Section to the INCB, it was stated that the UNODC 
“has yet to adopt an official position on harm reduction” but that it supports “a balanced 
approach that would match supply reducing measures and (…) programmes aimed at reducing 
the overall health and social consequences and cost of drug abuse (…)”74. 
Antonio Maria Costa, executive director of the UNODC from 2002 to 2010, however 
expressed a fundamentally different view in a report to the UNGASS Mid-Term Review in 
2003: “[T]he concept ‘harm reduction’ has become a battlefield for recrimination, 
perpetuating an increasingly unhelpful debate (…). [T]he Conventions regulating the supply 
of drugs – making them available for medical purposes, or prohibiting them for non-medical 
uses – are forms of harm reduction. Law enforcement leading to the conviction of drug 
traffickers is reducing harm to society. Alternative development initiatives helping farmers to 
switch to licit crops are harm reduction measures; they also reduce the environmental damage 
of coca and opium cultivation“75.  
 
After the publication of the INCB’s 2003 Annual Report – which made some concessions 
toward some harm reduction measures – the UNODC’s position seemed to have changed in 
favour of a more open approach towards harm reduction. Needle exchange and substitution 
therapy gained more prominence in the UNODC’s statements. This change, however, was not 
straightforward, but took place in an interlocking process of acknowledging that drug control 
had adverse consequences, that these consequences could be partly relieved by harm 
reduction, and by incorporating knowledge about harm reduction produced by other UN 
agencies in its publications and work. 
                                                          
73 Interview with UNODC senior staff, February 22, 2010.  
74 Flexibility of Treaty Provision as Regards Harm Reduction Approaches: Prepared by the Legal Affairs Section 
UNDCP, E/INCB/2002/W.13/SS.5, para 6. 
75'Encouraging Progress Toward Still Distant Goals': Progress Report by the executive director to the Mid-term 
(2003) Review of UNGASS. April 8, 2003, UNODC/ED/2. 
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In 2004 the UNODC published a discussion paper which recommends – among others – that 
“low-threshold pharmacological interventions  (…) not directly related to drug-free oriented 
programmes, but to immediate health protection have to be easily accessible [and] 
needle/syringe programmes for injecting drug abusers may be implemented where 
appropriate” (UNODC 2004b: 5) . Similarly, the 2004 WDR featured a section on HIV and 
drug use which concludes that “both scientific evidence and the experience with such 
programmes [to reduce HIV transmission among injection drug users, including substitution 
therapy, C.S.] would seem to indicate that a package would be effective in reducing the risk of 
HIV transmission among injection drug users and the risk of HIV diffusion from drug users to 
the general population.” (UNODC 2004a: 52).  
Also in 2004, the UNODC co-authored leaflets that aimed at providing policy-makers with 
information about needle exchange programs76, outreach to drug users77 and substitution 
treatment78 as a means of reducing the transmission rates of HIV among drug users. Although 
all three leaflets were officially released by the World Health Organization (WHO), the 
UNODC’s regalia were printed on all of them, underlining that the position put forward in the 
leaflets was supported by the UNODC. 
Most notably, a joint WHO/UNODC/UNAIDS position paper published in 2004 states: “In 
countries with a significant prevalence of heroin or other opioid dependence, methadone 
and/or other substitution maintenance treatment programs should be considered as one useful 
treatment option (…)” (WHO/UNODC/UNAIDS 2004: 22). The publication concludes that 
“[s]ociety as a whole benefits from substitution maintenance therapy through reductions in the 
incidence of criminal behavior, reduced health and criminal justice system costs, reduced 
risks of HIV and other bloodborne viruses, and increased productivity. There is a strong case 
for investing in opioid substitution therapy, as the savings resulting from treating an 
individual far exceed the costs.” (WHO/UNODC/UNAIDS 2004: 32). 
Similarly, a joint UNODC/WHO discussion paper titled “Principles of Drug Dependence 
Treatment” states: “Attempts to treat and prevent drug use through though penal sanctions for 
drug users fail (….). ‘Nothing less’ must be provided for the treatment of drug dependence 
                                                          
76 Policy Brief: Provision of Sterile Injecting Equipment to Reduce HIV Transmission, WHO/HIV/2004.03 
http://www.unodc.org/documents/hiv-aids/reduc_HIV_trans_drug_dep_treat_eng.pdf [retrieved November 14, 
2011]. 
77 Policy Brief: Reduction of HIV Transmission through Outreach, WHO/HIV/2004.02 
http://www.unodc.org/documents/hiv-aids/Reduc_trans%20outreach_eng.pdf [retrieved November 14, 2011]. 
78 Policy Brief: Reduction of HIV Transmission Through Drug-Dependence Treatment WHO/HIV/2004.04 
http://www.unodc.org/documents/hiv-aids/reduc_HIV_trans_drug_dep_treat_eng.pdf [retrieved November 14, 
2011]. 
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than a qualified, systematic, science-based approach such as that developed to treat other 
chronic diseases considered untreatable some decades ago” (UNODC/WHO 2008: 1-2). 
Furthermore, since 2004 a range of studies and best practice guides have been published 
under the auspice of the UNODC which recommend needle exchange and substitution as 
means to reduce the transmission of HIV among drug users – most of them referring to prison 
setting (see for example, UNODC/WHO/UNAIDS 2006, Jürgens 2007, Donoghoe, Verster 
and Mather 2009). 
That the UNODC is not merely paying lip service to the inclusion of harm reduction measures 
into drug policy becomes clear in its technical assistance projects79. In his reports to the CND 
the executive director of the UNODC has outlined the organizations technical assistance 
projects related harm reduction measures80. Most of these projects aim at raising the 
awareness of policy-makers and governments officials for the relationship of injection drug 
use and the transmission of HIV, while some projects were also concerned with training 
prison staff in handling needle exchange programs in prison setting81. 
 
However, this process of acknowledging that harm reduction measures could be useful in 
drug policy and become part of the UNODC’s technical work was not accompanied by a full 
commitment to the normative consequences of integrating harm reduction into international 
drug control. Most publications have been co-authored with other UN organizations and 
usually include a disclaimer that the views expressed in the publications are not necessarily 
the views of the organizations. Furthermore, such publications tend to include references to 
abstinence-oriented ‘fundamental principles’ of international drug control. The UNODC’s 
2004 discussion paper on harm reduction, for example, concludes – after recommending harm 
reduction measures as a way to treat drug dependence – that “patients dependent of drugs who 
are motivated to stop drug abuse should be considered as the highest priority [for treatment, 
C.S.]. The United Nations Drug Conventions do not accept drug abuse as an inevitable fact of 
life (…). The prospective of a normal life with cannabis, cocaine, heroin, amphetamines and 
hallucinogens, legalized or not, is only an illusion“ (UNODC 2004b: 7). 
                                                          
79 However, the exact amount spent on harm reduction projects or the share of spending on harm reduction 
measures of the overall budget remains unclear due to the UNODC’s rudimentary public reporting practice. 
80 Responding to the prevalence of HIV/AIDS and other blood-borne diseases among drug users: Report of the 
executive director. Presented at the 51st session of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs, Vienna March 10-14, 
E/CN.7/2008/7, para 28-56, and Responding to the prevalence of HIV/AIDS and other blood-borne diseases 
among drug users: Report of the executive director. Presented at the 53rd session of the Commission on Narcotic 
Drugs, Vienna March 10-14, E/CN.7/2010/11, para 18-39. 
81 Responding to the prevalence of HIV/AIDS and other blood-borne diseases among drug users: Report of the 
executive director. Presented at the 53rd session of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs, Vienna March 10-14, 
E/CN.7/2010/11, para 20. 
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Similarly, the UNODC refrained from recommending harm reduction as a policy option in the 
WDR even when underlining the advantages of harm reduction measures. For example, the 
2004 WDR also features a section titled “Conceptual Advances in Drug Control”, in which 
needle exchange and opioid substitution are not mentioned as policy alternatives, despite the 
fact that such measures were referred to as important for the reduction of HIV transmission 
among drug users in the same report (UNODC 2004a: 52-56).  
In the 2009 WDRs a chapter titled “Confronting Unintended Consequences: Drug Control ant 
the Criminal Black Market” discusses a range of possibilities to address some of the adverse 
side-effects of drug prohibition – mainly in concern with the question how drug markets can 
be dried up (2009a: 163-183). While drug treatment in general is considered as a possibility to 
reduce the size of black markets, measures such as substitution and heroin maintenance are 
not considered in the report, despite the fact that such measures can have a profound effect on 
the illicit demand for drugs82. Instead the UNODC’s (2009a: 183) recommendation for 
demand reduction is “mainstreaming the half-a-percent” of heavy drug users in order to dry 
up the market.  
 
The way in which the UNODC presented evidence about harm reduction in its publicly 
accessible statements and publications demonstrates three things. Firstly, the UNODC was not 
able to develop an independent position on the status of harm reduction measures in drug 
policies should have in drug policies. It largely followed the state of the debate in 
international drug control expressed in the annual reports of the INCB. It was only after the 
INCB made some promising comments about how needle exchange could be helpful that the 
UNODC published a chapter on needle exchange and outreach practices in the 2004 WDR. 
And it was only after the INCB attempted to define the term ‘medical use’ of narcotic drugs 
that the UNODC became more assertive of talking about the value of opiate substitution 
programs. This behaviour is hardly an attempt to ensure coherence among UN bodies 
concerned with questions of drug control. Nor is such behaviour an expression of deference to 
the ‘moral authority’ of the INCB83. Closely following the INCB in its interpretation of the 
international drug control conventions helped the UNODC to make sure that its statements 
would not interfere with the interests of its major donors.  
                                                          
82 For example it is estimated by Swiss authorities that the substitution and heroin maintenance programs in 
Switzerland reduced demand for illicit heroin in Switzerland by 7.3 tons per year. Interview with Swiss 
government representative, September 4, 2009. 
83 Interview with UNODC senior staff, Vienna, February 8, 2010.  
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Secondly, the initial support for needle exchange and opioid substitution in the past six years 
has been limited to specific settings – such as HIV prevention programs in prisons – and been 
performed at a low profile. Publications on harm reduction matters were usually joined with 
the WHO and UNAIDS. Despite the success of the projects concerned with harm reduction in 
prison setting84, these successes have rarely been made public in the way success in the 
control of drug markets have been celebrated in the WDR. Maintaining a low profile on harm 
reduction serves the same purpose as following the INCB interpretations of the international 
drug conventions concerning harm reduction – reacting on current developments in drug 
control matters, but only to an extent that the organization can hardly be held accountable for 
what it is saying. From these publications, it is often difficult to get a clear sense of what the 
position of the UNODC on harm reduction is. 
Thirdly, the UNODC does not seem to have a coherent position on harm reduction. 
Statements in favour of harm reduction are often watered down with statements referring to 
abstinence-based treatment and strict enforcement, even when these two alternatives do not fit 
together. Harm reduction has not yet been integrated in the UNODC’s repertoire of standard 
arguments on drug control measures. It appears in the UNODC’s publications as a solution for 
drug problems that otherwise cannot be solved – as has been argued in the 2008 WDR – only 
to disappear and be replaced by other solutions shortly after that – as in the thematic chapter 
of the 2009 WDR. 
 
In the past years, the UNODC has remained so elusive about harm reduction in its publication 
that it remains difficult to even identify a position at all. Similar to its commitment to the 
social norm of narcotic drug prohibition, the UNODC has avoided making it clear in which 
direction the normative discourse should be developed from the organization’s perspective, if 
the perceived problems of cooperation in international drug control should be solved or at 
least mitigated.  
The UNODC’s behaviour concerning harm reduction suggests that the organization is largely 
engaging in ‘muddling through’. Depending on the audience it targets, the UNODC’s 
statements about harm reduction ranges from what one could see as cynical mockery – when 
Antonio Maria Costa refers to alternative development as harm reduction – to full 
endorsement of some measures – for example in the case of the discussion paper on 
substitution therapy co-published by the UNODC and the WHO and UNAIDS. 
                                                          
84 Interview with UNODC staff, February 28, 2010. 
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The extent to which the UNODC’s elusiveness has had an influence on the way states were 
leading the normative discourses in international drug control remains unclear. It is possible 
that the UNODC’s behaviour was helpful for both sides in the discourse by providing them 
for arguments for and against prohibition and harm reduction, respectively. What can be said 
with some degree of certainty, however, is that the UNODC was not embodying or serving a 
“widely shared set of principles” as Barnett and Finnemore (2004: 23) argue. With its 
comments on harm reduction, the UNODC was reacting on what states and the INCB were 
doing in international drug control. The UNODC was providing comments on what these 
actors were doing. And it was not providing them as a leader in the discourse. To the contrary, 
with its reactive pattern, the UNODC obtained the role of what one might call an elusive off-
stage commentator who was, instead of helping to make sense of the normative debate in 
international drug control, contributing to the confusion the tug-of-war between orthodox and 
liberal interpretations of the international drug control conventions had already caused.  
 
Elusiveness as Survival: How Executive Directors Shape the UNODC’s Role 
The previous sections have portrayed the UNODC as a side-lined actor with neither an 
influential position in the political process nor a clear message for those it has been created 
for to sort out the problems that make cooperation difficult in international drug control. 
While I have argued here that this role can be best described as one of an elusive off-stage 
commentator on the tug-of-war in international drug control, others have been more bluntly 
demanding that the UNODC clarifies its position.  
Transnational advocates like the Transnational Institute or the International Drug Policy 
Consortium have called on the organization to remain with the facts and give harm reduction 
more weight in its publications85. The U.S. permanent representative to the United Nations in 
Vienna during the first half of the 2000s has – according to unofficial reports – repeatedly 
threatened the executive directors of the UNODC to withdraw funding if the UNODC does 
not cede to promote harm reduction86. The UN’s Office for Internal Oversight Services noted 
in a report in 2001 that executive director, Pino Arlacchi, had overstated success of 
                                                          
85 See, for example, IDPCs statement on the UNODC on its website: 
http://www.idpc.net/policy-advocacy/global-advocacy/global-system-drug-control/unodc/read-more [retrieved 
November 14, 2011]. 
86 Allegations pointing in this direction have been made in an open letter to the delegates of the Forty-eighth 
session of the CND signed by more than 300 non-governmental organizations. See: 
http://www.tni.org/sites/www.tni.org/archives/drugsreform-docs/cnd010305.pdf [retrieved November 14, 2011]. 
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international drug control beyond the “limits of credibility” 87 suggesting that inadequate 
representation of data threatened the legitimacy of the organization. And one staff of the 
UNODC has – off the record – described the behaviour of the organization in the normative 
discourse as a result of the cowardice of the executive director and the senior management to 
take a clear stance in the normative debates in international drug control.  
These critiques of the UNODC’s behaviour have mostly emerged because the organization is 
a reactive rather than a proactive participant in the politics of international drug control. 
However, explanations for the way the UNODC behaves are still lacking. Pressure and 
ignorance alone do not seem to be convincing explanations for the UNODC’s ambivalence. If 
this was the case, it could be expected that the UNODC would have been giving in to either 
one or the other side. The question is why it has not done so yet. 
This and the following section argue that two interlocking circumstance have strongly shaped 
the UNODC’s behaviour in the past years and defined its role in international drug control to 
a large extent. This section is concerned with how the UNODC – or more exactly its 
executive director and senior management – organized its relationships to states and how this 
contributed to the elusiveness of the organization’s behaviour. The next section then looks at 
the way in which states organized relationships with the UNODC to play their part in the 
creation of an elusive actor in international drug control. 
 
Organizational mismanagement in the years around the turn of the century has certainly 
limited the UNODC’s room of manoeuvre88. But more importantly, the struggle for co-
existence rather than cooperation in international drug control – carried out among states and 
the INCB – has strongly shaped how the UNODC’s acts. What the UNODC does and what it 
says in the politics of international drug control is only rarely of importance to what states do. 
It is for this reason that the UNODC has attempted to keep a low profile which resulted in its 
ambiguous position in international drug control. 
This can be best seen in the way relations between states and the UNODC are structured. Cox 
and Jacobson (1973b: 429-430) identify two different models of how IOs – through their 
executive heads – and states relate to each other. In the oligarchic model, the role of the 
executive head is dominated by powerful states. They consider the issues the organization is 
                                                          
87 Triennial review of the implementation of the recommendations made by the Committee for Programme and 
Coordination at its thirty-eighth session on the in-depth evaluation of the United Nations International Drug 
Control Programme, E/AC.551/2001/4, para. 28.  
88 See for example, Triennial review of the implementation of the recommendations made by the Committee for 
Programme and Coordination at its thirty-eighth session on the in-depth evaluation of the United Nations 
International Drug Control Programme, E/AC.551/2001/4. 
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mandated to deal with as salient and therefore are prone to define the room of manoeuver of 
the executive head with precision, in many cases constricting it to make sure that the 
organization acts in their interests.  
In the monarchic model, the executive head is central to the definition of the role of the IO. 
Together with what Cox and Jacobson call the ‘organizations establishment’ – influential 
individuals loyal to the institution – the executive head enjoys considerable room of 
manoeuvre, as long as powerful states are not seriously affected by what the organization 
does. In the monarchic model, stable individual relationships ensure that the organization and 
the structure of influence are defended against attempts of states to gain more influence. The 
executive head and the establishment might be divided about the goals the organization 
should pursue, but in order to preserve the organization and the structure of influence, 
individuals of the establishment eventually unite in their loyalty to the organization. In 
monarchic IOs, the individuals of the organization’s establishment are, in practice, more 
accountable to each other than they are to states. As long as powerful states are not affected 
by this situation and start exerting control over monarchic organizations, executive heads and 
organizational establishments can preserve their room of manoeuver. Cox and Jacobson’s 
models are ideal types (Cox and Jacobson 1973: 429). However, most IOs tend to be 
characterized by one type. 
 
In the case of the UNODC, the monarchic model predominates. The organization is centred 
on the executive director and the senior management, which manage relations with major 
donors as well as with the other states in the CND. The rest of the bureaucracy is somewhat 
detached from the political process. As a manager of the UNODC’s bureaucracy, the 
executive director exerts considerable control over what the UNODC does. Although the 
means and extent of control vary with the executive director, all executive directors have been 
able to control not so much what the bureaucracy does but how it is presented to states and a 
wider public. Former employees have raised concerns about the way and the extent to which 
control exerted by the executive director distorts the ability of the organization to provide 
objective knowledge and evidence-based policy advice.  
Francisco Thoumi, a renowned expert on illegal drug markets who worked for the UNODC as 
a consultant until 2000, has raised serious concerns about the way in which then executive 
director Pino Arlacchi interfered in the compilation of the second WDR. According to 
Thoumi (2002: 181), Pino Arlacchi was the only ‘peer reviewer’ of the report’s manuscript 
after a long and complex process of production which followed scientific standards and had 
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included – as Thoumi (2002: 177) has put it – ‘world experts’ which had reviewed every 
chapter before a final draft was sent to the executive director. After having reviewed the 
manuscript, Arlacchi decided to eliminate several substantial chapters including a chapter 
critical to alternative development and one about synthetic drugs. Alternative development at 
the time was one of the predominant – although contested – areas in which the UNODC was 
performing projects. Synthetic drugs were the fastest growing illicit drugs at the beginning of 
the 21st century. As a drug problem, synthetic drugs affected advanced industrial countries to 
a large extent. Both were sensitive issues for the international drug control in general and the 
UNODC in particular. What remained from the manuscript after Arlacchi’s review was 
basically a statistical overview of trends in illicit drug markets, a few chapters on the basics of 
demand-reduction and a short, uncritical chapter on alternative development as a way to 
reduce production. 
These changes were made by Arlacchi, according to Thoumi (2002: 178), because the original 
manuscript did not reflect “his vision of the world drug situation” in which the “world drug 
problems was on the verge of being solved”. In the executive directors perspective showing 
progress in the solution of the ‘world drug problem’ was one of the two goals the WDR 
should achieve. The second was “to provide a large number of facts and one-liners that the 
press could use” (Thoumi 2002: 179). After all, through Arlacchi’s intervention, the WDR’s 
function was to entertain rather than to inform. During Arlacchi’s term as executive director, 
which lasted from 1998 to 2002, the UNODC’s bureaucracy was largely detached from its 
executive director. Although Arlacchi was involved in very direct decision-making within the 
organization, especially in relations to staff decision, his involvement was erratic and 
unpredictable, which often lead to paralysis in the organization  . Thoumi (2002: 177) reports 
that the executive director was difficult to get in touch with even for those working directly 
under his provision. And Fazey (2003) – also a former UNODC employee – describes the 
UNODC as a largely detached organization in which career bureaucrats “outnumber the 
specialists and occupy critical posts surrounding the ED [executive director], so that he does 
not have to talk to anyone who might disagree with him” (Fazey 2003: 162). Furthermore, 
Fazey, a former head of the UNODC’s demand reduction section, suggests that the UNODC 
was essentially managed by generalists – who were not sensitive to demand-control question 
(Fazey 2003: 164) – and lawyers who see “themselves not only as upholding the Conventions 
but as making sure (…) that the rest follows suit” (Fazey 2003: 162). Threats of non-renewal 
of contracts or ‘punishment posting’ in field offices of the UNODC were widely used as 
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means to keeping staff in line with a supply-oriented, prohibitive understanding of 
international drug control (Fazey 2003: 164). 
In short, during Pino Arlacchi’s term, those who provided the expertise to the organization – 
i.e. those who attempted to solve problems in international drug control – and those who made 
the decision were not engaged in an exchange that would have led to a transfer of expertise 
within the organization. Exchange was basically organized around hierarchical control within 
the organization. 
After Pino Arlacchi was replaced as executive director by Antonio Maria Costa in 2002 this 
situation changed. However, the gap between those who made decision - the executive 
director and his senior management – and those who provided the expertise remained 
although to a lesser extent. While Arlacchi had managed the UNODC very directly, by taking 
most important and – according to a former senior manager whose letter of resignation leaked 
to the press – also many decisions of lesser importance, Antonio Maria Costa concentrated on 
his function of representing the organization to the outside. Off the record, some interviewees 
would even agree to the interpretation that executive directors tend to be a good fund raisers 
but leave the management of the organization largely to the senior management.  
 
This made the organization and what it did more visible. But in many ways it did not change 
the way in which expertise within the organization and organizational behaviour related to 
each other. The UNODC as an international bureaucracy and the UNODC as an actor in 
international politics often were two different kinds of entities. 
An intriguing recent example for this comes from the UNODC’s Crime Programme of the 
organization and its involvement in research on human trafficking. Human trafficking became 
an issue for states in the late 1990s after trafficking of women from Eastern Europe for sexual 
exploitation came to be seen as a problem in Western Europe and North America. Human 
trafficking, by definition, has many aspects and can be seen from many different perspectives: 
as a problem of illegal migration, as a problem of forced labour, as a problem of transnational 
law enforcement, as a problem of lacking coherence in criminal law and judicial standards or 
as a human rights issue, to name just a few of the more prominent perspectives here. Each of 
these perspectives is important, but each of them leaves many of the other aspects of the 
phenomenon out.  
Consequently, a broad range of IOs started to provide expertise about the phenomenon from 
their perspective. Besides different UN agencies, the ILO, the IOM, the OSCE and the EU 
became aware of the topic and the consequences it had for the organization and its members. 
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In terms of data and analysis, the IOM was the leading expert among IOs. Otherwise being 
largely neglected by states, the IOM – thanks to its access to national data on illegal migration 
and its decentralized structure – was able to provide answers to some of the pressing questions 
states had about human trafficking. The problem with this was, however, that human 
trafficking, by definition, does not necessarily coincide with illegal migration. Trafficking can 
also occur within state borders – the biggest part of it does so – and many trafficked persons 
cross borders legally as tourists before actually being forced into exploitative schemes. The 
perspective of the IOM, therefore, provided only a partial picture of the problem of human 
trafficking.  
The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime was aware of this situation and with the 
ratification process of the UN Convention Against Transnational Crime – which included a 
Protocol Against the Trafficking in Human Beings – being underway, decided to enter the 
competition for providing expertise on issues in human trafficking other IOs had turned a 
blind eye on. The result of these efforts was a report titled “Trafficking in Persons: Global 
Patters” which largely relied on reports from IOs, non-governmental organizations and 
research institutes (data from governmental organization amounted to 27% of all data used in 
the report, UNODC 2006: 38) in order to present a comprehensive overview of the 
phenomenon and include human trafficking within states, on which only little official data 
was available. The aim of the report was to “identify the main reported patterns of trafficking 
in persons (…), including the relationship between origin, transit and destination countries, 
sub-regions and regions” (UNODC 2006: 38). The focus of the report, therefore, was on 
developing an understanding of the phenomenon of human trafficking. In order to make the 
report as evidence-based as possible, data collection followed social science standards 
(UNODC 2006: 106-123). 
States, however, did not react on this “attempt to close the knowledge gap” (UNODC 2006: 
10) in human trafficking in the way the UNODC expected. Instead of being welcomed as one 
of the most comprehensive treatments of the phenomenon from a global perspective with a 
sound social scientific background, states expressed their discontent with the report. They 
criticized the report as being inappropriate for a UN agency because it was filed without 
consulting states and relied on non-official sources and for being incorrect because the 
reported scale of human trafficking did not match their own data.  
Subsequently, the UNODC compiled a second report called “Global Report on Trafficking in 
Persons” in which more official data was included. This second report’s focus was on the 
“collective global response to human trafficking” (UNODC 2009c: 13) rather than on the 
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phenomenon itself. The report argues that “[d]ue to the nature of the information collected, it 
can say much less about the activity itself”, because “[c]riminal justice data do not accurately 
represent the nature or extent of the underlying activity more than a fisherman’s catch 
represents the state of the fish in the sea” (UNODC 2009c: 13).  
In order to produce the expertise states demanded from it, the UNODC had not only traded 
sound methodology against data which were of no use to make statements about the 
phenomenon itself (and which did only partly generate value added because the U.S. State 
Department published a similar report on an annual basis since 2001) but also chose to 
discredit its own methodology and data it used in the ‘Global Patterns’ report. In this case, 
expertise was a resource for the UNODC – its Crime Programme, which is concerned with 
human trafficking, has seen a steady rise in project funding in recent years. However, it was 
not expertise based on sound methodology and interested in the problem as such, which 
proved to be a resource. The expertise that counted for states as well as for the UNODC’s 
establishment was the expertise states expected from it.  
 
From the perspective of the organization, remaining elusive on its normative position was a 
viable strategy. Raising new issues, pointing at the contradictions international conventions 
and state actions produce and proposing solutions is often not an option for the UNODC 
because it would have put in danger the monarchic structure of influence mainly concentrated 
on the raising of funds for the organization. As the example of the two reports on human 
trafficking shows, states jealously observed what the UNODC was doing and with that set an 
incentive for the UNODC to remain ambiguous. It was with elusiveness and ambiguity that 
the UNODC’s executive director and the senior management could ensure that their fund-
raising strategies were working out best. In order to remain at least partly able to act and 
thereby maintain the existing structure of influence, retreating to the position of an elusive 
off-stage commentator in the political discourse which reacts rather than acts often became 
the best behavioural option for the UNODC and its executive heads. 
 
The Creation of Elusiveness: Major Donors and Disinterest in a Functional UNODC 
The previous section has argued that the executive directors of the UNODC shape its role in 
international drug control in important ways. They trade a meaningful role of the organization 
in the normative discourse in international drug control with their ability to raise funds from 
its major donors. Withdrawing from these discourses seems to be strategy by which the 
executive director can secure funding from states of various proveniences and at the same 
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time make sure that the more powerful states are not touched in their interests by what the 
organizations does. 
This, however, does only partly explain why the UNODC has obtained a dysfunctional role in 
the normative discourses in international drug control. The other, and more important, part for 
of the explanation of the organization’s behaviour is concerned with what states expect the 
organizations to do and they expect it not to do.  
 
If states wanted the organization to play a more decisive role in the politics of international 
drug control, they had the means to strengthen the normative role of the organization. They 
could, either collectively or unilaterally, provide the UNODC with the necessary funds which 
would allow the organization to develop a meaningful position on the normative issues in 
international drug control and eventually to increase its normative profile. At the core of the 
UNODC’s elusiveness lays its funding mechanism89, but how this funding mechanism is used 
by states is not a function of either its behaviour or its monarchic structure of influence. The 
use of the funding mechanism is a function of the interests states have in the development of 
the normative discourse in international drug control. Co-existence can be achieved under 
normative conflict, and it might even be achieved better under such circumstances.  
Some analysts of international drug control have argued that the funding structure of the 
UNODC is the key to understand why so little has changed in the conventions and the 
normative discourse in international drug control over the past two decades (Fazey 2003, 
Fazey 2007, Jelsma 2002, Bewley-Taylor 2004). The leverage the UNODC commands as a 
political actor in international drug control is significantly shaped by the contributions of 
Sweden and the U.S. The pressure powerful donors – especially the U.S. whose contributions 
accounted for between 7% (2006) and 13% (2009) of all general purpose funds in recent years 
– can exert on the UNODC is considerable when they threaten to withdraw all or parts of their 
contributions. Confronted with such threats of withdrawal, it seems obvious why the UNODC 
has never achieved a political role in which it could actually serve as an ‘honest broker’.  
However, blaming the U.S. for lacking a meaningful political role of the UNODC is short-
sighted. The core problem of the UNODC is not that there are some states which have an 
interest in determining what the organization does. To the contrary, at the core of the 
UNODC’s marginal role lays the fact that no state has a real interest in a strong normative 
actor in international drug control. At least this is what the funding behaviour of its ‘major 
                                                          
89 Other reasons are lack of oversight and ineffective governance by major donors. Interview with Swedish 
government representative, Vienna, February 18, 2010.  
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donors’ – those states which fund the UNODC with some regularity – in the past eight years 
suggests.  
Apart from rather small budget of USD 184.3 million in average in the years 2003 to 2010 – 
which indicates in itself that states are only marginally interested in what the organization 
does – both the absolute and relative distribution of unearmarked and earmarked contributions 
to the organization suggest that state have a much stronger interest in the UNODC service 
providing functions than in its normative function. 
States contribute to the UNODC’s budget in three ways. First, approximately 10% of the 
annual budget of the organization is funded through the regular budget of the United Nations. 
These funds are taken from the annual membership fee states have committed themselves to 
pay to the United Nations. Over these funds, states do not have much control. They are 
allocated to the UN’s programmes and specialized organization through a sub-committee of 
the General Assembly. But how funds are used by their beneficiaries is largely out of the 
control of states.  
 
Figure 2: UNODC Funding Structure 2003 – 2010, Share of Overall Budget 
 
Sources: UNODC website90, Annual Reports of the UNODC (2007a, 2008b, 2009b, 2010a, 2011b) and  
author’s own calculation 
 
The rest of the UNODC’s budget comes from voluntary contribution. These contributions are 
either donated to the UNODC for general use – usually called unearmarked or general 
purpose funds. Or they are assigned to specific projects as so called special purpose or 
                                                          
90 http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/donors/index.html?ref=menuside [retrieved November 14, 2011]. 
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earmarked funds. Over the former, the UNODC has largely the same control as it has over the 
funds that come from the UN’s regular budget. These are the funds that pay headquarters 
functions and could be used by the organizations to bolster its normative role in international 
drug control. Over the latter, the UNODC has only very limited control. These funds are paid 
to the UNODC to perform projects in the field. Through these funds, states purchase the 
expertise, the network of field offices and the legitimacy of UNODC when they want to see 
some more or less precisely defined problems in drug control to be dealt with. States either 
design the projects by themselves or have great leverage in changing a project which is 
offered by the UNODC.  
 
Table 3: General Purpose Funding by Major Donors 2006 – 2009 in Million USD 
 
2006 2007 2008 2009 
Australia 0.39 0.40 0.47 0.38 
Austria 0.10 0.05 0.00 0.27 
Belgium 0.00 0.06 0.36 0.18 
Canada 0.53 0.56 0.58 0.72 
Denmark 0.85 1.19 0.98 0.96 
EC 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Finland 0.29 0.30 0.49 0.73 
France 0.85 0.84 0.89 0.38 
Germany 0.77 0.79 0.91 0.82 
Ireland 0.51 0.81 0.54 0.16 
Italy 2.56 2.69 1.77 0.00 
Japan 0.88 0.79 0.58 0.92 
Luxembourg 0.12 0.07 0.16 0.13 
Netherlands 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.34 
Norway 1.77 0.19 1.78 1.26 
Spain 0.21 0.24 0.23 0.13 
Sweden 2.27 1.20 1.06 1.51 
Switzerland 0.04 0.06 0.01 0.00 
Turkey 0.15 0.26 0.20 0.20 
UK 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
USA 1.00 1.00 1.22 1.35 
Brazil 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Colombia 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.04 
Russia 0.10 0.10 0.08 0.08 
Total 13.38 11.61 12.31 10.56 
Source: Annual Reports of the UNODC (2007a, 2008b, 2009b, 2010a) 
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Also, states are eager to make sure that special purpose funds are not used to cross-finance 
headquarters functions of the organizations. 
 
The UNODC’s core problem is the share of its budget it can freely command. Already in 
2003, the UNODC has mentioned that the ratio between general purpose funds and special 
contributions has been dropping since the late 1990s (UNODC 2003: 22). Since 2003, this 
situation has aggravated. The share of general purpose funds has dropped from nearly 19% in 
2003 to 5% in 2009. Funds from the regular budget have increased in absolute terms but in 
relation to the overall budget they have dropped from 14% in 2003 to 8% in 2010. This 
significant drop in general purpose funds put the UNODC under pressure to raise funds for its 
headquarters functions.  
An analysis of individual contributions for the years 2006 to 2009 shows that state preferring 
liberal drug policies91 and states insisting on prohibitive policies92 are of equal importance to 
the UNODC when it comes to general purpose funds. While the ‘like-minded’ states 
contribute between 18% (2007) and 36% (2009) of the general purpose funds in recent years, 
contributions of ‘zero-tolerance’ states accounted for 24% (2008) to 37% (2009) respectively. 
In the light of the financing structure of the organization, remaining elusive in political 
positions commenting strongly on non-issues and reacting on pressure with about-face 
changes in arguments might be a worthwhile strategy for the UNODC to secure at least 
minimal general purpose funding from a broad range of different states.  
 
The role of an elusive off-stage commentator that the UNODC plays in the normative 
discourse in international drug control is, in this sense, not a voluntary one and it is neither a n 
exclusive function of its inner working mechanisms. The development of the funding 
behaviour of its major donors suggests that its role stems from a general disinterest in funding 
the UNODC’s headquarters functions. A rather small and weak IO in international drug 
control seems to be all that states want – even those states which could seemingly profit from 
a more independent actor capable of shaping the normative discourse in international drug 
control in their favour. These states made no attempt to provide the organization with the 
necessary leverage it would have needed to become less concerned with its monarchic 
structure of influence and its need to secure funding by retreating to a weak position. The 
UNODC’s normative role has been side-lined by states collectively. 
                                                          
91 Liberal states are those which had joined the group of like-minded states in the 52nd Session of the CND, see 
Commission on Narcotic Drugs: Report on the fifty-second session; E/CN.7/2009/12, p. 119. 
92 Japan, Sweden, Russia, and the U.S. 
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The politics of co-existence in international drug have strongly shaped the UNODC’s role in 
the normative discourse in international drug control. Those states who are, at least in the 
perspective of many transnational advocates, most likely to oppose this role are acting 
towards the organization in the same way as those who are favouring prohibitive international 
drug control policies. They increase special purpose funding and neglect donations which 
would enable the UNODC to develop its position as an actor in the politics of international 
drug control. Judged from their funding behaviour, none of the advanced industrial states 
commonly referred to as the major donors of the organizations has an interest in a functioning 
UNODC which enables cooperation among states in drug control matters beyond the point 
necessary for the co-existence of a variety of different approaches to drug control. 
The dysfunction of the UNODC in international politics therefore is first and foremost a 
function of a lack of interest of states to achieve cooperation in international drug control.  
 
Elusiveness and the Politics of Co-Existence: Who Benefits from Dysfunction? 
This chapter has been concerned with the UNODC’s role in the normative discourse in 
international drug control. It has argued that the UNODC does not play the role functionalist 
or constructivist expectations of what IOs do in world politics suggest. Instead of playing a 
leading role in developing and championing norms and behavioural rules which could lead to 
the achievement of the stated goals of states in international drug control – the significant 
reduction of the ‘world drug problem’ – the UNODC has retreated to a role of a commentator 
of what states do international drug control. And even in this role, the UNODC is hardly a 
critical voice. It remains elusive about its own position how norms in international drug 
control could be developed in a way that leads out of the current impasse. With its elusive 
commentaries on international drug control, the UNODC has kept itself aloft the more 
controversial issue which have driven normative discourses in international drug control over 
the past – such as the intersection of drug control and human rights or the ‘harm reduction’ 
debate – and left the playground of normative discourse to states. In doing so, it has also 
resigned from developing a role in which it could have influenced these discourses. The 
UNODC is not only an elusive commentator, it also comments off-stage – reacting on what 
states demand from the organization rather than providing the basis for evidence-based or just 
international drug control.  
 
This elusiveness of the organization – its dysfunction as an actor in international politics – is 
best explained as a strategy of survival. Talking out of both sides of its mouth helps the 
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UNODC to secure the minimal influence it has on states in persuading them to fund the 
organization. Fund-raising is the central role of the executive director of the organization and 
stepping on someone’s toe by championing a particular set of norms or principles does not 
pay in an environment in which existing norms and legal frameworks sufficiently ensure that 
states get what they want by not cooperating extensively. I have argued that the executive 
directors of the UNODC and the senior management have developed internal and external 
mechanisms which ensure that organization remains elusive in what it says. Internally, 
elusiveness is – when necessary and in differing degrees – ensured by managerial control. 
Externally, the UNODC acts with caution when taking up new ideas and pays deference to 
states when – despite all precautionary measures – its publications touch the interests of 
states. By remaining elusive, the UNODC creates the basis for its executive director to raise 
funds undisturbed.  
These observations are not entirely new, nor are they surprising for an organization that relies 
heavily on voluntary contributions from states. Most analysts of international drug control 
have blamed the U.S. for the weakness of the organization. They argue that all the cautious 
and submissive behaviour of the UNODC is caused by constant threats of the U.S. to restrict 
or withdraw funding, if the organization does not as the U.S. wants it to do. This is certainly 
true as the U.S. is an important funder of the organization and can be expected to use its 
financial influence to direct the organization’s behaviour in a way that does not touch its 
interests.  
However, a closer look at the UNODC’s funding structure suggests that U.S. behaviour alone 
cannot explain why the UNODC acts in the way it does. All major donors have kept the 
organization short of financial leverage which could have helped the organization to develop a 
less deferent role in the normative discourses in international drug control. General-purpose 
funding – the funds the UNODC can command freely – has been declining in relative terms 
over the past seven years, while the UNODC’s overall budget has grown considerably. States 
have strengthened the UNODC’s role in the field by increasingly investing in its project work, 
but they neglected the head-quarters functions of the organization which needed to be funded 
at least partly through general-purpose funds. This added to the need of the organization to act 
cautiously. Especially, those states which could be expected to be interested in a more 
outspoken UNODC were not counteracting this imbalance in the funding structure or even 
just trying to mitigate the influence the U.S. and other ‘zero-tolerance’ states had on the 
organization.  
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This suggests that the weak normative role of the UNODC was rather an outcome of 
collective disinterest than a particular interest of the U.S. None of the major donors of the 
organization had an interest in creating and supporting an IO capable of taking the leadership 
in the normative discourse in international drug control. With the opportunities the strong 
norm of narcotic drug prohibition and the weak law of international drug control created for 
all major donors there was no need to increase cooperation in drug issues or develop existing 
norms. Preserving the state of co-existence which had been created by the exploitation of 
loopholes in the international drug conventions was in the interest of most of the major donors 
of the UNODC – and it was even more so for those states which were attuned to more liberal 
approaches of drug control. In the same way major players benefited from the tug-of-war of 
international drug control, they benefited from the UNODC’s dysfunction.  
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5 Functions of Dysfunction: The UNODC’s Role in Fighting the ‘Narco-State’ in 
Guinea-Bissau 
 
Politically, the UNODC is a weak IO. The UNODC’s role in the politics of international drug 
control, partly because of a lack of consensus and partly because of the weak law in which the 
norm of narcotic drug prohibition is embodied in, is not “to embody, serve, or protect widely 
shared set of principles” (Barnett and Finnemore 2004: 23) in order to foster cooperative 
behaviour among states when it comes to drug control. To the contrary, states have limited the 
UNODC’s normative role to an elusive commentator on the normative discourses they are 
leading. The organization reacts to states’ expectations rather than setting agendas, monitoring 
state behaviour or ensuring compliance. This is hardly a functional role, because it does 
neither increase efficiency of decision-making nor the development or consolidation of 
existing norms. 
Nevertheless, the UNODC’s budget has been growing over the past decade. Budgetary 
growth has mainly been related to increasing earmarked contributions to the organization. 
While unearmarked contributions have remained stable, states with all sorts of interests in 
international drug control have increasingly funnelled money into the organization for specific 
projects. 
This points at the fact that states do not have an interest in strengthening the UNODC’s 
authority in the politics of international drug control. However, the significant increase in 
earmarked voluntary contributions indicates that states do have an interest in the 
organization’s technical expertise and operative capacity to solve drug-related problems 
where they occur. Judged by the development of its budget, the UNODC might be playing an 
insignificant role in the development of the normative foundations of international drug 
control, but it seems to serve the interests of states well when it comes to its technical 
performance. Be it because of the increased efficiency of centralized project implementation 
or because of the legitimating veil IOs provide for “activities that might be unacceptable in 
their original state-to-state form” (Abbott and Snidal 1998: 19), the funding structure of the 
UNODC suggests that politically dysfunctional IOs can still be functional agents of state 
interests. 
This would provide a simple explanation for why dysfunctional IOs persist and grow. As 
dysfunction is a matter of perception, one could argue that those who see dysfunctional IO 
just ignore the fact that the normative role of IOs is only a part – and maybe the smaller part – 
of what IOs actually do. Despite their dysfunctional behaviour in international politics, 
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equipped with the necessary expertise and discretion from individual state interests, IOs do 
what states could not do alone.  
 
So, are dysfunctional IOs just a matter of perspective? Are they politically flawed but 
operationally sound actors in world politics which serve as agents for states? Do they grow 
and persist because of their ability to transform technical expertise into effective outcomes on 
the ground? 
This chapter looks at the mechanisms of state delegation to dysfunctional IOs by the example 
of the UNODC’s engagement in police capacity building in Guinea-Bissau in order to provide 
an answer for these questions. The tiny, West African state has received considerable public 
attention since the mid-2000s because of its alleged role as a hub for cocaine trafficking from 
Latin America to Western Europe. The UNODC was delegated the task to – among others – 
assist the country in the establishment of police capacities to fight drug trafficking on its 
territory. These capacities have been lacking in Guinea-Bissau which is one of the reasons 
why the country has been targeted by drug traffickers as a transit destination.  
The chapter traces how the UNODC became involved in police capacity building in Guinea-
Bissau, how it worked to implement a project concerned with the creation of a police unit 
specialized on organized crime investigations and how the implementation process was 
shaped by actors internal and external to the organization. 
The case of the UNODC’s work in Guinea-Bissau is exemplary because it shows that states 
can profit from dysfunctional IOs even when they fail to achieve the goals defined at the 
outset of a project. There might be cases in which the UNODC performed better and there 
might be cases in which the organization performed worse. However, doing police capacity 
building is considered to be one of the UNODC’s core tasks and one in which it is strongest93. 
The aim of this chapter is not to argue that the UNODC has failed to achieve anything in 
Guinea-Bissau or wasted the money invested in the organization by donors. The reason for the 
fact that the project has not developed in the way which donors have imagined it to develop 
are complex. Blaming a particular actor for it would oversimplify the situation. The aim here 
is to develop a deeper understanding of the opportunities the existence of a dysfunctional IO 
creates for states and why states make use of these opportunities independent from the 
chances of achieving sustainable problem solution or even the management of a problem. In 
                                                          
93 Even critics of the organization admit that the UNODC performs strongest when it comes to the 
implementation of the ‘control aspects’ of the international drug conventions. See, for example: 
http://www.idpc.net/policy-advocacy/global-advocacy/global-system-drug-control/unodc/read-more [retrieved 
November 14, 2011]. 
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this sense, this chapter is concerned with exploring the baseline for organizational growth and 
persistence. When an IO is sent on a hopeless mission and still can profit from that even the 
failure of a project can have a function for states. 
 
The chapter is organized in six sections. The first section is concerned with the emergence of 
West Africa in general and Guinea-Bissau in particular as a trafficking route in the 
transnational black market for cocaine. This section looks at the role of the UNODC in 
placing West Africa and Guinea Bissau on the international agenda. The second and third 
sections are concerned with how states reacted on the emergences on the new problem of 
cocaine trafficking through West Africa. While the second section is concerned with what 
states were saying should be done, the third section explores what they have done and why 
they have done in the way they did. The fourth and fifth sections turn to the process of 
implementation. The fourth section is concerned with the UNODC’s role in implementing 
what states had decided to do and the impediments the organizations has met during the 
implementation process. The fifth section is concerned with the achievements of the 
organization. The concluding section turns to the boarder implications of the case study for 
the explanation of growth and persistence of the UNODC. 
 
From the Gold Coast to the Coke Coast: Framing Cocaine Trafficking in West Africa 
Africa was the region of least concern in international drug control. Cannabis use and 
production was an issue on the continent, but the drugs usually associated with highly 
organized trafficking networks, exalted profits, violence and severe addiction did not affect 
Africa the way they did other regions of the world. Cocaine is produced in Latin America. 
Heroin mainly comes from Central and Southeast Asia. Most of these drugs are consumed in 
North America, Europe and Australia. In Africa, cocaine and heroin were not a particular 
concern in international drug control politics. Cocaine seizures on the continent usually did 
not exceed one ton annually94. Similarly, heroin was only a small problem on the African 
continent when compared to the prevalence rates in Western Europe, North America or 
Russia. The most dangerous drugs, it seemed, caused the least problem on the African 
continent95. Africa was rarely ever mentioned in international drug control politics. 
 
                                                          
94 According to the World Drug Reports statistical annexes. 
95 There is, however, a history of drug trafficking in West Africa which reaches back to the 1950s. Especially, 
heroin was trafficked through Nigeria since decades, see Ellis (2009). 
115 
 
This has changed, however. In the years 2005 to 2009 up to 12 tons of cocaine have been 
seized in West African countries or off the West African coast annually. These seizures often 
came in large – and on the African continent indeed unprecedented – quantities ranging 
between several hundred kilograms and several tons. In the largest seizure made on the 
African continent so far, 3.7 tons of cocaine were discovered on a ship off the coast of Sierra 
Leone. Between 2005 and 2010 more than 50 seizures of more than 100 kg were made in as 
much as a dozen West Africa countries. The UNODC (2011c: 26) estimated that between 21 
and 62 tons of cocaine were passing the West African region between 2005 and 2010 
annually. 
 
Figure 3: Cocaine Seizures in West Africa of more than 100kg, 2005 – 201096 
 
Source: UNODC (2011c: 13) and author’s own calculation. 
 
The sudden rise in cocaine seizures along the West African coast came as a surprise to many. 
Large scale cocaine trafficking had commonly been associated with direct routes from 
producing regions to the large demand markets in North America and Western Europe. The 
Caribbean and Central America had been used as transit routes from the major producing 
regions in Colombia, Peru and Bolivia to the U.S. To Western Europe, cocaine was either 
transported by sea hidden in ship containers or modified boats or smuggled on commercial 
flights by so called ‘drug mules’. That drug traffickers would chose West Africa as a transit 
route to the consumer markets in Europe had not been expected. 
                                                          
96 Figures represented included seizures of more than 100kg only. Calculation of average seizures per country is 
based on the number of countries in which seizures of more than 100kg have occurred in the respective year. The 
basis of calculation for the individual years was 3 (2005), 7 (2006), 12 (2007) 7 (2008), 2 (2009), 2 (2010). 
Seizures in international waters have been allocated to the country closest to the point of interception.  
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In comparison to the transit routes in Central America, the West African cocaine trade was 
rather modest. The UNODC estimated that at least 140 tons of cocaine were passing through 
Mexico alone on their way to the U.S. and Canada annually (UNODC 2011c: 12)97. The DEA 
seized 20 tons of cocaine – more than the estimated annual consumption of the whole West 
African region98 and at least a third of the cocaine trafficked through West Africa on an 
annual basis – in a single operation on a ship in the Gulf of Mexico99. 
If anything, in quantitative terms, the West African cocaine trade was an alternative route for 
cocaine destined to Europe. The bulk of the estimated 130 tons of cocaine consumed on the 
European continent was still smuggled into Europe directly by sea or air (UNODC 2011c: 
12). Whatever caused some cocaine traffickers to funnel their drugs through West Africa was 
not so attractive or deterring that it could entirely change the dynamics of the cocaine market. 
The side-effects of drug markets so visible in countries in Central America did not reach 
Africa. Cocaine trafficking through West Africa did not spark wide-spread violence as it did 
in other countries along trafficking routes such as Mexico or Guatemala. Although it cannot 
be fully excluded that involvement in cocaine trafficking provided a motivation for a coup 
d’état in Guinea-Bissau in 2009100, drug related crime and violence have never reached the 
levels of those in Central America or the Caribbean.  
 
Nevertheless, the emergence of large scale cocaine trafficking in West Africa appeared to be 
alarming, because so few was known about the impacts drug trafficking could have in these 
states, its societies and the stability in the region. One of the most alarmist voices in the 
speculations surrounding the new trafficking route in West Africa was the UNODC. The 
organization had been present in the region since a decade with a regional office in Dakar. In 
accordance with the negligible drug trafficking problems in the region, capacity building for 
law enforcement in large scale drug cases had not been a priority of the regional office in 
Dakar. However, confronted with the large seizures and the need of European law 
                                                          
97 Of these 140 tons, 17 tons are estimated to remain in Mexico for domestic consumption, see UNODC (2011c: 
12). Although no estimates are available, it is likely that some of the shipments along the ‘Pacific route’ – as the 
trafficking route through Central America is called – is directly shipped to the U.S. by sea. This means that the 
part of the 140 tons estimated being trafficked along the Pacific route does never get Mexico. However, it is 
likely only a fraction of the shipments do not pass Mexico.  
98 The UNODC estimates that 13 tons of cocaine are consumed in West and Central Africa. See, UNODC 
(2011c: 26). 
99 “DEA, Coast Guard Make Record Maritime Cocaine Seizure”, U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration Press 
Release, March 21, 2007. http://www.justice.gov/dea/pubs/states/newsrel/wdo032107.html [retrieved November 
14, 2011]. 
100 Interview with UNODC consultant, Bissau, September 07, 2011. 
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enforcement agencies to make sense of this new situation, the UNODC became involved in 
framing the new drug situation in the West African region.  
The UNODC’s framing of the situation in West Africa had three central features which were 
underlined in extensive reporting on West Africa by the UNODC’s office in Dakar and the 
UNODC’s Policy Analysis and Research Branch101. Firstly, the UNODC presented drug 
trafficking as a threat for the stability of the whole region. Drug trafficking was not just 
another problem in West Africa, it threatened to destroy what had been achieved in the region 
in the past decade. In one report, entitled “Drug Trafficking as a Security Threat in West 
Africa”, the UNODC (2008d: 28) states that the drug trafficking situation in West Africa 
suggests “a scenario closer to Central America than to the Balkans. Many small operators 
appear to be trying their hands at drug trafficking (…). Given the economic desperation and 
entrepreneurial ingenuity of the populace, many more will likely enter the markets in the near 
future.” 
Secondly, the UNODC argued that West African states were defenceless against drug 
traffickers. Lacking the capacity to conduct large scale investigations, the judicial system to 
convict drug traffickers and the correctional system to detain them, these states had no other 
choice than to let drug traffickers do their business on their territories. Furthermore, the 
UNODC argued, for example, that a police officer’s salary in a West Africa country amount 
to only a few grams of street value cocaine and that therefore the potential that drug 
trafficking could undermine legitimate governance structures in West Africa was especially 
high, because law enforcement was vulnerable to corruption. This lead Antonio Maria Costa 
to the conclusion that, “[d]rug traffickers seek the path of least resistance. In Africa, they have 
found the weakest link. West Africa is a trafficker's paradise, partly because of its 
geographical position as a link between Europe and South America and partly because its 
national governments are unable to mount effective security exercises against the drug 
traders”102. 
Thirdly, the UNODC held European states responsible for the changing drug situation in West 
Africa. The cocaine seized in West Africa was not intended to be sold on local drug markets. 
Indeed, in most West African countries there is not much that could actually be called a 
market for cocaine. In a speech titled “Europe’s Cocaine Problem is a Curse…And Not Only 
for Europe”, Costa argues: “[W]ealthy Europeans looking for coke stimulation are destroying 
entire nations (…) Africa faces a crisis of epic proportions, by and large fuelled by Europe’s 
                                                          
101 See, UNODC (2007b, 2007c, 2008d, 2009d, 2010b, 2010c, 2011c). 
102 “Rebels without a clue”, The Age, March 11, 2011, Op-ed by Antonio Maria Costa. 
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cocaine users”103. In Costa’s perspective, “Africa is under attack and cannot defend itself” and 
the “international community is reacting, but not as forcefully as needed”104. Or as one 
UNODC report (2008c: 4) has put it:  
 
[T]here is a danger of history repeating itself. In the nineteenth century, 
Europe’s hunger for slaves devastated West Africa. Today, its appetite for 
cocaine could do the same. The former Gold Coast is turning into the Coke 
Coast. The problem is so severe that it is threatening to bring about the 
collapse of some West African States where weak and corrupt Governments 
are vulnerable to the corrosive influence of drug money. 
 
Together, the three features of the UNODC’s West African drug trafficking narrative 
culminated in the portray of a troubled region in which the state was brought at the verge of 
collapse by drug traffickers and the inactivity of those responsible for the crisis. Antonio 
Maria Costa concluded that Guinea-Bissau and other West African states were corroded by 
drug trafficking “to the point that they risk collapse”105 and that a “narco-attack” on West 
Africa will “cause political instability, socio-economic hardship and even a regional crisis“106.  
In its framing, the UNODC successfully pushed the emergence of a cocaine trafficking route 
through West Africa into a worst case scenario in which everything seemed to work in favour 
of drug traffickers and against those interested in a stable region with functioning states. West 
Africa was portrayed to be in a deep crisis. The conclusion drawn from this scenario was 
straightforward and nearly inevitable: without decisive action by those responsible for the 
situation, West Africa could become yet another region devastated by reckless criminals.  
 
In the UNODC’s framing of the West African cocaine trafficking crisis, Guinea-Bissau 
played a central role. Although the country was neither the place where the largest seizures 
were made nor the one from which most of the cocaine was seized in Europe, Guinea-Bissau 
was framed as the hot spot and major hub of cocaine trafficking in West Africa. It became a 
                                                          
103 “Europe’s Cocaine Problem is a Curse…And Not Only for Europe”, Statement of Antonio Maria Costa at the 
Conference for Cocaine, Madrid, November 15, 2007. http://www.antoniomariacosta.com/ [retrieved November 
14, 2011]. 
104 “Europe’s Cocaine Problem is a Curse…And Not Only for Europe”, Statement of Antonio Maria Costa at the 
Conference for Cocaine, Madrid, November 15, 2007. http://www.antoniomariacosta.com/ [retrieved November 
14, 2011]. 
105 “Europe’s Cocaine Problem is a Curse…And Not Only for Europe”, Statement of Antonio Maria Costa at the 
Conference for Cocaine, Madrid, November 15, 2007. http://www.antoniomariacosta.com/ [retrieved November 
14, 2011]. 
106 “Africa under Attack“, Statement of Antonio Maria Costa at the ECOWAS High-level Conference on Drug 
Trafficking as a Security Threat in West Africa, Praia, October 28, 2008. http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/about-
unodc/speeches/2008-28-10.html [retrieved November 14, 2011]. 
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model case of the West African drug crisis and a pars pro toto example of how West Africa 
was bound to look like, if the West African cocaine transit route was not consequently shut 
down as soon as possible. Despite its unclear relevance for the organization of trafficking in 
the region – apart from two seizures of more than 600kg in 2006 and 2007 there is not much 
verifiable information about drug trafficking on the countries territory – the case of Guinea-
Bissau attracted the attention of global media as well as researches claiming that Guinea-
Bissau had become “Africa’s first narco-state” (Bybee 2009: 18). 
There have been good reasons for the concern about the country. Police and other law 
enforcement or security agencies in the country lacked the knowledge, capacity and 
equipment to effectively control the Guinea-Bissau’s territory. The country’s coastline 
includes more than 80 small islands, many of them remote and uninhabited and some of them 
with still existing infrastructure from the colonial time. It was suspected that some of the large 
scale trafficking operations were taking place on these islands far off the capital Bissau, where 
the capacities of the Navy were concentrated.  
On the main land, approximately 3000 police officers were on duty. However, few of them 
had the equipment and training to become engaged in conducting investigations into drug 
trafficking cases. One UN Police Advisor estimated that at least three quarter of the current 
police forces in the country did only have rudimentary qualifications and were not able to 
contribute to more than very basic community policing services107. Further, in many police 
stations even basic equipment such as paper and pens are lacking, which makes it virtually 
impossible for the police to contribute to the rule of law in the country108. 
Besides geography and training, a big obstacle to an effective ‘defence’ against the ‘narco-
attack’ was seen in lacking equipment. The Navy consisted of four boats, of which only one 
was a boat possibly capable of intercepting boats crossing the Atlantic loaded with cocaine109. 
Control over the airspace was rudimentary and did only include civilian aviation. The Air 
Force’s only means consisted of a few pieces of anti-aircraft artillery. Aircrafts and pilots 
which could have intercepted incoming aircrafts delivering cocaine were missing. On the 
ground, police forces lacked appropriate vehicles, fuel, communication means and even 
handcuffs. Another obstacle in the fight against drug trafficking was the lack of a functioning 
judicial and penitentiary system. The judicial system was considered to be vulnerable to 
                                                          
107 Interview with UNIOGBIS staff, Bissau, September 6, 2011. 
108 Interview with UNIOGBIS staff, Bissau, September 6, 2011. 
109 As of September 2011. According to Jane’s – an private defence intelligence agency –the existing fleet of 
Guinea-Bissau’s Navy is capable of ”fishery protection duties and customs patrol” but is “routinely confined to 
port due to a lack of fuel or maintenance”. See: http://articles.janes.com/articles/Janes-Sentinel-Security-
Assessment-West-Africa/Navy-Guinea-Bissau.html [retrieved November 14, 2011]. 
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pressure and corruption. However, even if drug traffickers had been convicted, sentences 
could hardly be executed because a correctional system – apart from a few holding cells in 
local police stations – were missing110. 
However, even if the police and other security agencies were trained and equipped, the 
judicial system working and a penitentiary system existing, it seemed doubtful that 
investigations against drug traffickers would have been successful.  
 
Reports indicated that high ranking individuals were involved in drug trafficking. The Chief 
of the General Staff as well as the Heads of the Navy and the Air Force were suspected to be 
key figures in the facilitation of drug trafficking through the country111. The army was 
repeatedly involved in irregularities in drug trafficking cases. In the first large seizure in 
Guinea-Bissau in which the police accidentally discovered 674 kg of cocaine in a car, for 
example, the army played an important role in covering the seizure and in impeding 
investigations. In the immediate aftermath of the seizure, police forces stored the cocaine in a 
safe of the National Treasury because they lacked safe storing facilities on their own. 
Allegedly, the drugs were removed from this safe in the same night the seizure had taken 
place by four men in army uniforms and disappeared. Governmental investigations into the 
removal of the drugs from the safe were repeatedly impeded to the point that the inter-
ministerial commission tasked with investigating the case was never able to compile and 
publish a report “due to reasons beyond our control”, as the spokesman of the ministry of 
transport has put it112. After the failure of the inter-ministerial commission to produce the 
report, two high-ranking police officers were dismissed because of their alleged involvement 
in the case113. However, no further inquiries were made into the background of the 
disappearance of the drugs.  
In another case, which involved the second-largest cocaine seizure in Guinea-Bissau, four 
soldiers were arrested together with two foreign nationals in a car loaded with 635kg of 
cocaine114. Repeatedly, law enforcement officials had been threatened in order to pressure 
them to abandon investigations into drug cases115 and the military was accused of playing an 
                                                          
110 Interview with UNIOGBIS staff, Bissau, September 6, 2011. 
111 “US names two Guinea-Bissau military men ‘drug kingpins’”, BBC News, April 6, 2010. 
112 Cited in “GBissau fails to release report on 600kg of missing cocaine“, Agence France Presse English, June 8, 
2007.  
113 “GBissau axes two top police officers over missing cocaine“, Agence France Presse English, June 11, 2007. 
114 “Guinea-Bissau soldiers arrested with 635 kilos of cocaine”, Agence France Presse English, April 4, 2007. 
115 “Guinea-Bissau prosecutor threatened over drugs haul“, Agence France Presse English, July 29, 2008. 
“Minister threatened as African drug war heats up”, Associated Press, July 31, 2008. 
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important role in obstructing probes into drug cases116. Allegedly, government officials to the 
highest ranks were involved in enabling or at least allowing cocaine trafficking through 
Guinea-Bissau. In connection to a case of a Venezuelan airplane which landed on an 
abandoned air strip in Guinea-Bissau alledgely loaded with 500kg of cocaine, attorney general 
Luis Manuel Cabral was confronted with death threats when an investigation was initiated 
into the case. According to Cabral, the threats were made because “[t]here are some people 
among high-ranking figures in politics, the army and the security forces who do not want this 
investigation to be held”117. After these and other cases of suspected involvement of high-
ranking army officers in drug trafficking, the U.S. Treasury had named the heads of the Air 
Force, Ibraima Papa Camara, and the former Navy chief, Jose Americo Bubo Na Tchuto ‘drug 
kingpins’ under the Drug Kingpin Act, which inhibits any business contacts with individuals 
listed on the so called ‘Drug Kingpin’ list118 
 
The UNODC reported extensively on the situation in Guinea-Bissau and achieved – if 
consciously or not remains unclear – within a short time that Guinea-Bissau did not only 
become perceived as a model case of the impact of drug trafficking in the region but as a 
‘narco-state’ in which everything was possible for drug traffickers119.  
The UNODC was certainly not alone in shaping Guinea-Bissau’s image as a narco-state and 
the trafficking situation. For example, a senior agent of the U.S. Drug Enforcement 
Administration (DEA) stated: “A place like Guinea Bissau is a failed state anyway, so it's like 
moving into an empty house. You walk in, buy the services you need from the government, 
army and people, and take over. The cocaine can then be stored safely and shipped to Europe 
(…)”120. And in a report sponsored by the International Peace Institute two renowned 
organized crime analysts compare drug trafficking in the region to an ”invisible tide” which is 
“rising on the shores of West Africa, creeping into its slums, its banks, its courts, its barracks, 
and its government ministries” (Cockayne and Williams 2009: 1). But the UNODC’s 
extensive reporting had shaped the perception of what was happening in West Africa with 
                                                          
116 “Guinea Bissau military blocking probe into drug haul“, Agence France Presse, September 9, 2008. 
117 Cited in “Guinea-Bissau prosecutor threatened over drugs haul“, Agence France Presse English, July 29, 
2008. 
118 The full list of 1026 individuals and entities (as of September 21, 2011) sanctioned under the Drug Kingpin 
Act can be retrieved on the U.S. Treasury’s website: 
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/Documents/drugs.pdf [retrieved November 14, 
2011]. 
119 According to Bybee (2009: 18), a narco-state is defined as a state that “has been taken over and is controlled 
and corrupted by drug cartels and where law enforcement is effectively non-existent”. 
120 Cited in “Cocaine Trade: How a tiny West African country became the world's first narco state“, The 
Observer, March 9, 2008.  
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detailed accounts and statistical analyses from the ground which it could provide because of 
its presence in the region. By framing West African cocaine trade as a crisis which potentially 
could get out of hands at any time, the organization paved the way to take action in the region. 
 
A Drop in the Ocean: Taking Action Against the ‘Narco State’ in Guinea-Bissau  
The UNODC successfully framed the drug trafficking situation in West Africa as a crisis and 
it was hardly doubted that action had to be taken. Nor was there a doubt that this action had to 
be taken in West Africa, despite the fact that the root causes of the problem were seen in the 
demand for cocaine on the European continent.  
Drug trafficking and organized crime in West Africa was discussed twice in the Security 
Council in December 2009 and again in February 2010 as a threat to peace and stability in the 
region. Based on its reports and the corresponding threat assessments, the UNODC as well as 
the UN Secretary General called on states to take immediate action to fight the establishment 
of a cocaine trafficking route in West Africa. In one report to the Security Council, Secretary 
Ban Ki-moon writes: “Given the country’s inability to combat this new phenomenon alone, a 
collective response is required. Vital technical and financial support from regional and 
international partners is therefore urgently needed”121. 
 
The calls of the UNODC and the UN’s Secretary General on states to take action did not 
remain unheard. In the UN, two major initiatives were launched to prevent the perceived 
crisis in West Africa. At its 51st session the CND adopted resolution 51/18 entitled 
“strengthening international support for States in West Africa in their efforts to combat drug 
trafficking”. It “invites Member states and relevant IOs to intensify their efforts in support of 
those West African Stats most affected by the problem of drug trafficking”122. 
On the regional level, the UN, under the lead of the UNODC, promoted a campaign named 
the “West African Coast Initiative”. The West African Coast Initiative is an attempt to 
strengthen the capacities of law enforcement agencies of West African countries with respect 
to the investigation of drug trafficking and organized crime cases. This includes the creation 
of so called Transnational Crime Units which should be able to lead intelligence-based 
investigations and operations. The West African Coast Initiative has been established in 
December 2008 in the context of the ECOWAS Political Declaration on the Prevention of 
                                                          
121 Report of the Secretary-General on developments in Guinea-Bissau and on the activities of the United 
Nations Peacebuilding Support Office in that country. S/2007/576, para 33. 
122 Commission on Narcotic Drugs: Report of the fifty-first session (28 November 2007 and 10-14 March 2008). 
E/2008/28, E/CN.7/2008/15, p. 41.  
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Drug Abuse, Illicit Drug Trafficking and Organized Crime in West Africa. In February 2010, 
the “Freetown Commitment”, which marked the official start of the implementation process 
of the initiative in Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia and Sierra Leone, was signed 123. 
In the context of these actions taken by states under the lead of the UN, Guinea-Bissau, as the 
perceived hot-spot of the West African cocaine trade, received special attention. Even before 
the CND adopted the resolution 51/18, European states organized, under the auspice of the 
Portuguese government, a fund-raising conference for Guinea-Bissau in late 2007. The aim of 
the conference was to secure funding for the implementation of the “Operational plan to 
support the government of Guinea-Bissau in the fight against drugs” which had been set up by 
the UNODC and the government of Guinea-Bissau124. 
In relation to this conference, European states decided to pledge USD 4.3 million paid by the 
European Commission for a UNODC project in Guinea-Bissau125. The project, called 
“Guinea-Bissau Anti-Trafficking – Establishment of a Specialized Unit within the Judicial 
Police to investigate and combat Drug Trafficking and Organized Crime”, was set up for a 
duration of 44 months and was later extended by another twelve months, supported with an 
additional USD 0.3 million126. In total, European states, through the European Commission, 
plan to spend USD 4.7 million over a period of 56 months for the creation of a police unit 
trained and equipped to investigate drug trafficking and organized crime cases. Furthermore, 
the project aims at increasing the local INTERPOL Office’s capacity to provide criminal 
intelligence about drug trafficking and organized crime in the country127. 
After all, the constant calls of the UNODC for action seemed to have triggered a response by 
states. Normatively, they committed themselves to cooperate in order to alleviate the 
emerging crisis in West Africa. On the operative level, those seen as responsible for the crisis 
took action and started to assist the endangered region in their fight against the ‘corrosive 
power’ of drug trafficking.  
                                                          
123 At the time of writing, the Units have not been fully operative in any of the four countries. 
124 There has been no public accessible report of this conference and neither is the “Operational plan to support 
the government of Guinea-Bissau in the fight against drugs” publicly available. For more information on the 
conference see: http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/html.cfm/index48989EN.html [retrieved November 14, 2011]. 
125 The UNODC is involved in other projects in Guinea-Bissau concerned with the reform of the penitentiary and 
judicial system of the country. These projects also contribute to the fight against drug trafficking as they provide 
the basis for legal system capable of not only investigating cases but also prosecuting them. Furthermore, there is 
also a project concerned with drug demand reduction. 
126 The project is commonly known under its project abbreviation GNB/U-44. At the time of writing, while the 
USD 0.3 Mio had been pledged by the European Commission, the described extension of the project was still 
pending and depended on evaluation of the project’s first phase. However, the extension is widely expected to 
take place by UN and European Commission personnel on the ground.  
127 The project outline is an UNODC internal document, which cannot be publicly retrieved. Statements made 
here are based on the revised project plan of February 23, 2011. Extension of the project was pending at the time 
of writing and depended on outcomes of the first phase of the project.  
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However, the extent to which the reaction of European states on the expertise and principled 
calls of the UNODC to take action in West Africa was based on the authority of the 
organization remains questionable. In the light of the problems identified in Guinea-Bissau’s 
law enforcement agencies, pledging USD 4.7 million is merely a drop in the ocean. In a 2007 
report about the vulnerabilities of Guinea-Bissau the UNODC identified – besides cultural ties 
to both Latin America and Europe and a very fragile economy – three problems which were 
seen to be in direct connection with vulnerability to drug trafficking: a poorly resourced 
police, an inefficient judicial system and a nearly inexistent correctional system (UNODC 
2007c: 14-16). The European Commission’s project aimed at building capacities of the police. 
Other projects were concerned with improvement in the penitentiary system and in the 
judicial system.  
Neither funding nor staffing and the aims of the initial project were in any way adequate to 
the situation as the UNODC had described it. As the project title indicates, the major aim of 
the project was to establish, equip and train a specialized police unit capable of handling 
investigations into drug trafficking. For a deployment in the hotspot of a new trafficking 
route, which was suspected to develop into a beachhead of Latin American drug traffickers 
and in which drug trafficking seemed to be intimately related to political power, the 
UNODC’s mission to Guinea-Bissau seemed to be inherently ill-equipped. With these project 
aims, the ‘narco-attack’ could hardly be expected to be halted.  
 
Why the Drop Has Not Become a River: Donor Interests in the Fight against the ‘Narco 
Attack’ 
Explaining why European states decided to engage in Guinea-Bissau with a rather symbolical 
contribution, is not an easy task. Donor representatives as well as staff of IOs on the ground 
hesitate to provide explanations for the discrepancy between the alleged magnitude of the 
crisis and lack of a more comprehensive and more active involvement of West European 
states into stemming the inflow of drugs into the country and the disentanglement of power 
and crime. Indeed, while most of those concerned with the drug trafficking situation in the 
country would agree, off the record, that a mere USD 4.7 million will not drive the traffickers 
out of the country and put Guinea-Bissau’s law enforcement agencies in the capacities to 
investigate large scale drug cases, providing an explanation for this behaviour of the 
UNODC’s donors seems to be much more difficult.  
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One reason for this could be seen in the need of European law enforcement agencies to make 
sense of the situation in the countries along the West African coast. Funding the improvement 
of information sharing capacities about the situation on the ground is – compared to the 
creation of new police units – cheaper, more effective and in the direct interests of the donors 
of the project. In the improvement of the intelligence capacities of Guinea-Bissau’s police 
agencies, USD 4.7 million would do a lot to appease the concerns of those engaged in fighting 
cocaine inflows into Europe. 
Some within the European law enforcement community suspected that Latin American drug 
traffickers aimed at building a ‘beachhead’ on the African continent which allowed them 
nearly uncontrolled and uncontrollable access to European consumer markets128. They 
suspected the situation could evolve similar to the one in Miami in the 1980s, when drug 
traffickers from Latin America had establish a direct and nearly uncontrolled link to the North 
American consumer market. However, with not much more than some large seizures and 
limited knowledge about the modi operandi of the West African traffickers, their motivations 
or the actual size of the trafficking route, such allegations could be neither proved nor 
refuted129.  
There is an obviously functional aspect of strengthening the intelligence capacities of Guinea-
Bissau’s law enforcement agencies. Without capacities to gather intelligence about 
transnational trafficking networks and sharing this information, large scale investigation into 
organized crime are hardly possible. Equally, in order to investigate drug trafficking cases, 
police units need to be able to receive and process information produced and shared by police 
units of other countries. In this sense, investing in the capacity to gather intelligence is 
favourable both for donors and for receiving countries. 
There was also another aspect of the development of the intelligence capacities of Guinea-
Bissau’s police system. While the modi operandi of the drug traffickers shipping cocaine 
from Latin America to West Africa were believed to be known – seizures indicated that most 
of the cocaine was smuggled by sea and some by air in modified airplanes – European law 
enforcement agencies had difficulties in determining how the cocaine was brought from 
Africa to Western Europe. Better intelligence and increased capacity to share information was 
also in the interest of European states wanting to know how cocaine was getting into their 
countries. 
                                                          
128 Interview with Swiss government representative, Bern, February 24, 2010.  
129 Interview with UNIOGBIS staff, Bissau, September 6, 2011. 
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However, for those interested in criminal intelligence sharing with Guinea-Bissau, the 
UNODC’s GNB/U-44 project became of more interest only after its initiation. During the first 
phase of the project, local beneficiaries were extended from the Judicial Police to the locally 
run INTERPOL office130. Similarly, in the context of the West African Coast initiative, 
Guinea-Bissau and three other West African states have – with the support of the UNODC – 
started the process of creating so called ‘Transnational Crime Units’ which are planned to 
combine the gathering and sharing of critical intelligence on serious crime with the operative 
capacities not only to investigate but also to intercept transnational trafficking activities. 
The attempts to strengthen the integration of Guinea-Bissau’s law enforcement agency in the 
global transgovernmental network of criminal intelligence sharing has so far only seen limited 
success. The creation of the Transnational Crime Unit is still under way and it is likely that 
they will not be operative anytime soon. The local INTERPOL office – after having been 
equipped with a better information system and vehicles which allow its investigators to extend 
the office’s reach beyond the capital Bissau – has received over 200 requests for information 
from foreign law enforcements services in 2010, which indicates that Guinea-Bissau’s law 
enforcement agencies become better integrated in investigations which cross borders. 
According to one UN police advisor, however, the office has not responded to any of these 
requests131. For the time being, the European law enforcement agencies attempts to make 
more sense of what is happening along the West African cocaine trafficking route have not 
been successful. While technical capacities have been deployed, making use of them to reveal 
the structure and workings of organized crime in Guinea-Bissau and gain leverage in the fight 
against cocaine traffickers targeting Europe was not possible. 
The integration of Guinea-Bissau into transgovernmental networks of criminal intelligence 
sharing might have been a projected long-term aim of the GNB/U-44 project and the 
Transnational Crime Units starting to populate the policing landscape in West Africa in the 
wake of the implementation of the West African Coast Initiative. And if the West African 
Coast Initiative succeeds, better and more timely information about drug trafficking and its 
perpetrators could actually become the most important long-term spin-off of international 
police capacity-building efforts in the region. However, creating a new partner in the global 
criminal intelligence sharing network was hardly the initial aim of the GNB/U-44 project. 
Strengthening intelligence capacities was an idea that only gained leverage during project 
                                                          
130 Guinea-Bissau’s INTERPOL Office had not been included in the initial list of beneficiaries of the GNB/U-44 
project. Interview with European Commission representative, Bissau, September 9, 2011. 
131 Interview with UNIOGBIS staff, Bissau, September 6, 2011. 
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implementation. It is hardly the explanation for why donors were only modestly interested in 
supporting Guinea-Bissau in the building of adequate police capacities. 
 
Finding other explanations for the rather half-hearted engagement of Western European states 
in the fight against the raising ‘narco-states’ along the West African shore is not as simple as 
one might expect. If the increased trafficking of cocaine through West Africa was of real 
concern to Western European states, more financial leverage for the UNODC could have been 
expected. If the concern about Guinea-Bissau was purely symbolic, pledging even USD 4.7 
Mio seems to be too much.  
Determining how, by whom and why the decision to set up the GNB/U-44 project was made 
in the way it has been, is difficult because neither are there publicly accessible records of the 
conference which preceded the decision nor is the European Commission eager to publicly 
explain the rather modest commitment.  
Some individuals with background knowledge on this decision might agree, off the record, 
that the UNODC’s account on Guinea-Bissau as a state imminently threatened to be taken 
over by organized criminals and the subsequent media attention the nearly forgotten country 
has had its effects on taking the decision to become engaged, after all. The UNODC certainly 
played a role in bringing the issue of the West African cocaine trade on the international and 
public agenda. And it has played an important role in framing the surprising increase in 
cocaine seizures in West Africa as an emerging crisis and threat to the stability of the region. 
Guinea-Bissau had become a model case for West African cocaine trafficking, which could 
hardly be ignored because of the risk that relations between drug traffickers and government 
officials could become institutionalized to an extent which could cause problems well beyond 
its borders132. With this, the UNODC had triggered a political process which led to the 
establishment of a project in the country. That ‘something’ should be done and that Western 
Europe should play a leading role in taking action seems to have been out of question by the 
end of 2007.  
However, what should be done was another question. While the process of decision-making 
about the GNB/U-44 project remains largely in the dark, from the project’s initial outline it 
seemed that main of its aims appealed much more to the interests of European states than to 
the expectation that a tiny, overstrained West African state needed to be helped out of a crisis 
which threatened its stability and ability to enforce its laws. As in any police reform project, 
the project in itself was crafted to achieve a quick change in the trafficking situation in 
                                                          
132 “How Britain could save a ‚narco-state‘”, Prospect, September 5, 2011.  
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Guinea-Bissau. In the light of the rather obvious but deeply rooted reasons for why Guinea-
Bissau had become targeted by Latin American drug traffickers, an initial project duration of 
four years seems rather short-termed and most of the indicators established to measure 
success of the project point in the direction that a quick establishment of some sort of 
functioning law enforcement agencies was the primary aim of those funding the project133. 
This newly established police unit should also – according to the project outline – be able to 
effectively conduct operations which measurably decrease cocaine trafficking through the 
country and – at the same time – increase the amount of seized drugs on the territory of 
Guinea-Bissau. While this is not necessarily a contradiction because a short-term increase in 
seizures can actually be interpreted as a sign of declining organized criminal activities – in 
such an interpretation, an increase in seizures indicates the breaking up of established 
trafficking routines (see UNODC 2005) – achieving both aims within such a short time period 
seems to be a very optimistic, if not to say utopian. 
According to Mainzinger (2010: 59) there are good reasons why donors push for ‘quick wins’ 
in police reform projects. Often, quick results in police reform are needed to stabilize the 
security situation on the ground or fill the gap after law enforcement has collapsed, as it 
sometimes happens in civil war settings. Quick wins in police reform can help the local 
population because – although they are often imperfect – they help to restore some of the 
basic functions of a state. In the case of Guinea-Bissau and its trafficking problem, however, 
neither were quick wins necessary to restore the security situation nor were they actually 
helpful for the cause the project had been created to achieve. Drug trafficking was – from all 
that was known about it – largely confined to the Latin American traffickers which were 
concerned with shipping cocaine over the Atlantic and a fraction of the local political and 
military elite involved in facilitating trafficking from Latin America and organizing 
trafficking further North. Locals involved in trafficking operations were mainly paid in kind, 
but even these drugs rarely stayed in the country and were shipped to Europe, where the street 
value of cocaine was significantly higher. An immediate threat to the security situation in the 
country was not visible. Neither were there increased levels of violence, not to say ‘drug 
gang’ or ‘drug cartel’ violence, nor did cocaine consumption rise in an alarming way. In this 
sense, there was no immediate threat to the security in this country which would have made 
the donors’ push for quick wins necessary or unavoidable. Besides this, the focus on the quick 
materialization of project aims could also have counterproductive results for the work of the 
                                                          
133 With functioning, things usually taken for granted such as regularly paid salaries and furbished offices are 
meant here. 
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specialized police unit. Putting pressure on the process of establishing, equipping and training 
a police unit specialized on serious crime investigations can lead to shortened vetting 
procedures, shallow training and lacking operational knowledge. In respect to one of the 
formulated project aims which states that “the Judicial Police’s Specialized Unit is fully 
operational and conducts operations” by the end of the projected period one interviewee, off 
the record and only slightly exaggerating, estimated that it would take several decades before 
any law enforcement agency in Guinea-Bissau would be able to conduct a sophisticated ‘sting 
operation’ which could lead to the targeted conviction of organized criminals in the country.  
Quick wins, however, do also appeal to donors for other reasons. Their administrative system 
is organized in relatively short planning cycles of two to four years. Within this period of 
time, donors usually expect to see some achievements in funded projects134. In the case of 
Guinea-Bissau, the rationale of a quick return on investment – which can be demonstrated in a 
measurable decrease in trafficking activities – seemed to have played a much more important 
role than the actual need to improve the security situation in the country for donors to insist on 
a short time frame and ambitious project aims. The aim of the project from a donor 
perspective was to stop cocaine trafficking trough the country, not to divert the threat that a 
state would be undercut by drug traffickers. 
 
European states have not decided to engage in international cooperation to restore Guinea-
Bissau’s law enforcement capabilities because of the authority of the UNODC. The 
UNODC’s alarmist voice might have made it inevitable that European states take some 
action. However, the decision how European states started to engage in international 
cooperation to stem “the invisible tide” (Cockayne and Williams 2009: 1) of cocaine and drug 
money which was perceived to hit the West African coast had been driven more by what 
states were willing to do in the perceived major hub of the West African cocaine trade.  
And this was, obviously, not much. Donors put the UNODC under pressure to achieve a quick 
change in the situation despite the huge challenges the organization was confronted with in 
restoring Guinea-Bissau’s policing capacity. The project’s aims were already in the projects 
initial set up utopian and the inclusion of new aims and beneficiaries did not make the task of 
the UNODC easier. 
If the West African cocaine trade would have presented an immediate threat to Western 
European states, one could expect massive investment in Guinea-Bissau’s law enforcement 
agencies. If lacking intelligence was perceived to be a real problem, more resources could 
                                                          
134 Interview with European Commission representative, Bissau, September 9, 2011.  
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have been expected to be deployed to make the local INTERPOL office work. If West 
African cocaine trafficking posed a threat to public health, security or law and order in 
Europe, one could have expected public outcries about the rather minimalist engagement in 
‘Africa’s first narco-state’. Instead, donors scrambled – while the project was on going – new 
project aims under the GNB/U-44 umbrella without significantly increasing the projects 
funding and without being criticized for it by the UNODC or the media so eager to report 
about Guinea-Bissau falling prey to Latin American drug traffickers. Including intelligence 
sharing into the project might have raised the appearance that the project was functionally 
coherent – indeed, trafficking can hardly be seriously challenged without useable intelligence 
and its timely availability – but made it even more difficult to achieve anything by the project. 
Such behaviour suggests that donors were much more concerned with doing something in 
Guinea-Bissau after all than with achieving something in particular by channelling project 
funds into the country through the UNODC. What this ‘something’ was, however, remains 
largely unclear. This is partly due to the fact, that it is difficult to unravel what the intentions 
of those making the decisions to pledge funds for a UNODC project in Guinea-Bissau were. 
However, as I will argue in the following section, this is also because their intentions were 
unclear at the outset of the project and remained so while the project was running.  
 
Doing the Dirty Work for States: Negotiating Allocation of Project Resources 
When the UNODC started to implement projects in Guinea-Bissau in early 2008, it entered a 
complex political landscape populated by IOs concerned with a wide range of problems. 
Guinea-Bissau, being one of the poorest countries in the world, had hosted a bulk of 
international governmental and nongovernmental organizations in the past decade, which 
were concerned with everything from environmental issues to re-building public 
infrastructure which had been destroyed during the civil war in 1998. Local government 
officials were used to be working with staff of IOs and accustomed to the procedures by 
which projects were implemented and donor money spent.  
Internationally assisted security sector reform, the realm of international technical cooperation 
in which the UNODC’s police capacity building mission fitted in best, had already been an 
issue in the country before. Although on a very much lower profile than the UNODC’s police 
capacity building projects, Guinea-Bissau had hosted the United Nations Integrated Peace-
Building Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNIOGBIS) since 1999135. The UNIOGBIS, initially 
                                                          
135 Established by Security Council Resolution 1233 (1999). Until 2009, the UN office in Guinea-Bissau was 
called United Nations Peace-Building Support Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNOGBIS). The name was changed 
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mandated to establish the political framework and leadership to enable general and 
presidential election in the country after the end of the civil war136 in the country, had 
become, among others, involved in Security Sector Reform in Guinea-Bissau after its 
mandate was extended in 2004 and 2009137. It was in this institutional context that the 
UNODC had to integrate its project concerned with creating the capacity of Guinea-Bissau’s 
Judicial Police to conduct large scale investigations against drug traffickers and other 
organized criminals. What had been largely ignored in the UNODC’s reports on the drug 
trafficking situation – that there was international assistance on the ground and that IOs were 
involved exactly with those players who were accused of facilitating trafficking in the country 
– would soon become problematic for the organizations work and success in the 
implementation of the project.  
 
Security Sector Reform in Guinea-Bissau, as in many other post-conflict societies, 
concentrated on the reform of the armed forces. The military elite had played a decisive role 
during the civil war138 and in the peace-building process that followed the war. It had proved 
to be factor of destabilization – at least in the perspective of the international community – as 
it had removed three elected presidents from their position in the history of the country. 
Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of soldiers were therefore priorities of the 
United Nations in the run up to the first elections after the civil war and had remained so after 
the extension of UNIOGBIS’ mandates. Demobilization presented a thorny issue because 
affiliation with the army provided especially officers with social status139 and because the 
question of financing pensions for demobilized soldiers was not resolved for nearly a 
decade140.  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
with Security Council Resolution 1876 (2009) in accordance with a recommendation in the Secretary General’s 
report on the situation in the country of June 2009 (S/2009/302). 
136 The civil war in Guinea-Bissau lasted from June 1998 to May 1999. It was initiated by a military coup 
attempt against President João Bernardo Vieira. During the civil war, thousands died, most of the public 
infrastructure of the country was destroyed and nearly a quarter of its population was internally displaced. 
137 See, Security Council Resolution 1580 (2004) and Security Council Resolution 1876 (2009). 
138 The army had played an important role in Guinea-Bissau since the liberation wars in the 1960s and 1970s and 
enjoyed strong historical legitimacy during decades. On the history of Guinea-Bissau, see Lobban and Mendy 
(1996). Today, the army is still considered one of the main power centres of the state. Interview with the 
Director of of the National Institute for Studies and Research (Instituto Nacional de Estudos e Pesquisa – INEP), 
Bissau, Sept 8, 2011. 
139 Guinea-Bissau‘s army has more officers than non-commissioned officers and soldiers. Interview with 
UNIOGBIS staff , Bissau, September 5, 2011.  
140 At the time of writing, the process of establishing a pension fund for demobilized members of the army was 
still on-going. Negotiations for the establishment of the fund had taken more than five years. So far, 
approximately 50% of the amount needed to establish the army’s pension fund has been allocated. Interview 
with the Director of the National Institute for Studies and Research (Instituto Nacional de Estudos e Pesquisa – 
INEP), Bissau, Sept 8, 2011. 
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In this environment, the reform of the police, the judicial system and the penitentiary system 
had long played only a minor role in the UN’s engagement in the country. Before the 
UNODC started its projects in the country, UNIOGBIS employed a single law enforcement 
advisor141. Although this law enforcement adviser was already concerned with drug 
trafficking through the country before the two large seizures in 2006 and 2007, the 
UNIOGBIS did not show a particular interests in developing this issues, because, among other 
reasons, the suspicion that the military elite was involved in drug trafficking was already 
established before talks about the ‘narco-state’ had raised world-wide public attention142. 
Making such allegations public was seen as a threat to the achievements that had been made 
in the establishment of relations with the military elite143.  
Before the UNODC published its first alarming reports about the drug trafficking situation in 
West Africa and placed Guinea-Bissau in the centre of its reporting, the UN’s mission in 
Guinea-Bissau had already been established for several years and had developed an 
understanding of its mission in the country. Drugs did virtually play no role in this 
understanding, the attempts to reform the security sector resembled those made in other 
countries of the region and staff on the ground largely lacked a sense of being involved in an 
environment defined by revenues from drug trafficking and organized crime activities144. 
 
Bringing police reform into a Security Sector Reform context is a task which can be met by a 
range of impediments from all involved parties – i.e. donor countries, local governments and 
IOs. The Security Council had assigned the Secretary-General to strengthen the UN’s efforts 
to reform the judicial system of the country and assist local authorities in building capabilities 
to fight drug trafficking in Guinea-Bissau in its resolution 1876 (2009). Furthermore, in 
consultation with the Secretary General, the European Commission and some European states 
had recognized the need and responsibility to become engaged in police reform in Guinea-
Bissau145. However, such general commitment to engage in reforming the police of an entire 
country are only the beginning of a series of more detailed planning and implementation steps 
riddled with problems and frictions146.  
                                                          
141 Interview with UNIOGBIS staff, Bissau, Sept 8, 2011.  
142 Interview with UNIOGBIS staff, Bissau, Sept 8, 2011. 
143 Interview with UNIOGBIS staff, Bissau, Sept 8, 2011. 
144 There had been allegation that the army’s establishment was involved in small arms trafficking in the region 
before drug trafficking became an issue in Guinea-Bissau. See, for example, Kohnert (2010). 
145 “Report of the Secretary-General on developments in Guinea-Bissau and on the activities of the United 
Nations Peacebuilding Support Office in that country”, S/2009/302, p 6.  
146 See, for a general overview over problems of police reform in the context of security sector reform, Marenin 
(2007) and Mobekk (2005). 
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In Guinea-Bissau, police reform was met with the problem that the resources and expertise 
needed to achieve a comprehensive reform of the police in the country were not available. In 
its resolution 1876 the Security Council defined eleven tasks concerning Security Sector 
Reform in Guinea-Bissau. Of these tasks, five were directly or indirectly connected to 
reforming the police of the country. These five tasks did not only include building capacities 
to fight drug trafficking and organized crime, but also more general aims such as the creation 
of an environment in which the respect for the rule of law is guaranteed147. This meant, 
besides creating organizational structures capable of conducting large scale investigations, to 
virtually reorganize the entire police forces of the country.  
Since 2007, when a single UN police advisor was engaged in the country, the UN’s police 
mission to Guinea-Bissau had been enlarged but, it is still small compared to the challenges a 
police reform in the country is facing. This leads to a situation in which the UN has to set 
priorities on certain projects and pool the available resources in order to achieve at least some 
of the aims the Security Council has issued to the Secretary General. However, even when 
available resources are joined across the different UN organizations on the ground, staff often 
lacks key qualifications to advise local counterparts in comprehensive police reform. For such 
a task, not only specific knowledge on policing is required, but also expertise in 
organizational development, accounting, in local and international politics or project 
management (Mainzinger 2010: 70). These qualifications are largely lacking among the UN- 
staff in Guinea-Bissau148. This, however, is not a specific problem of police reform in Guinea-
Bissau but one that is inherent to many police reform attempts lead by IOs (Mainzinger 2010: 
70). The GNB/U-44 project did not take place in an isolated context. It was part of the 
decade-long international engagement of IOs in Guinea-Bissau and the efforts to reform the 
security sector of the country. The available resources needed to be pooled, to achieve at least 
some progress in the policing situation in the country and the available expertise in the form 
of UN police advisors was not fully adequate for the situation on the ground. It was in this 
context that the project had to be implemented.  
 
Achieving rapid change in the drug trafficking situation in Guinea-Bissau was the stated aim 
of donors, when they decided to invest into the creation of a specialized police unit concerned 
with drug trafficking in the country. The drug trafficking situation was – and still is – 
                                                          
147 Security Council Resolution 1876 (2009), S/RES/1876 (2009), p.2-3. 
148 Interview with UNODC staff, Bissau, September 6, 2011.  
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perceived to be grave and constituting a threat to stability in the country149. Delegation of the 
task to the UNODC was, among others, an expression of this expectation. The European 
Commission did lack the expertise and staff to implement a police reform mission and 
expected the UNODC to have the organizational ability and local expertise to perform such an 
endeavour in Guinea-Bissau. Furthermore, no European country was willing to provide 
bilateral technical assistance for reforming the police in the country150. With no other option 
readily available to take immediate action, the UNODC was a viable partner for the European 
Commission for the implementation of its plan to improve Guinea-Bissau’s drug law 
enforcement capacity by creating a specialized police unit concerned with investigating large 
scale drug trafficking cases. 
These are largely technical goals which were planned to be achieved by providing technical 
advice to local government authorities in charge of creating and maintaining such a 
specialized unit. In the case of GNB/U-44 this was the Judicial Police of Guinea-Bissau, 
which is in charge of investigating drug trafficking and organized crime cases and the local 
INTERPOL office, which is responsible for information exchange with foreign law 
enforcement agencies.  
However, as one UNIOGBIS staff has put it, no police reform is purely technical 151. In many 
ways, those charged with implementing projects in the police sector reform in Guinea-Bissau 
were concerned with decision-making of political relevance. This is not only because Security 
Sector Reform always touches the power balance in a country, as one UN staff consultant has 
put it152, but also because donors insist on the ‘local ownership’ of such projects.  
According to Nathan (2007) ‘local ownership’ is a necessary condition for successful and 
accepted Security Sector Reform. Local ownership is associated with increased legitimacy of 
the reform process and enhanced commitment to the outputs of these processes by those who 
have to bear its consequences153. If principles of local ownership are disrespected, Nathan 
(2007: 3) argues “domination and paternalism by external actors generate resentment, 
resistance and inertia among local actors” and the steps to reform the security sector of a 
country “are unlikely to be implemented properly and sustained”. Local ownership, therefore, 
is not only a matter of respect towards local actors but also of prudence of donor governments 
                                                          
149 Interview with European Commission staff, Bissau, September 9, 2011. 
150 Portugal is now providing some direct technical assistance to Guinea-Bissau’s judicial police. Interview with 
UNODC staff, Bissau, September 6, 2011.  
151 Interview with UNIOGBIS staff, Bissau, September 8, 2011.  
152 Interview with UNODC staff, Bissau, September 6, 2011. 
153 For a similar position see OECD (2005). 
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and their responsibility toward taxpayers. Without granting full local ownership, investments 
in Security Sector Reform are likely to be wasted.  
The possible disadvantages that come with respect for the principles of local ownership – 
prolongation of reform processes and lacking control over spending of donated funds – are, in 
this perspective, only short-termed and a matter of perception. If due process ensures better 
outcomes, being patient and accepting that funds are spent according to local rather than 
external agendas are acceptable price tags for increased security in a country.  
Local ownership puts staff of IOs in a position in which the process of project implementation 
has to be negotiated with those in charge in the local government and administration. At the 
heart of local ownership is the idea that local actors design reforms and external actors 
provide them with the resources – material and immaterial – necessary to make this process 
work. In this sense, entering negotiations with local governments and administration is the 
part IOs play in Security Sector Reform.  
However, insistence on local ownership puts IOs as service providers in a weak position 
between donor and local government interests. Both donors and local actors inevitably have 
their own agendas which can diverge. If this is the case, IOs can experience severe tensions in 
project implementation because they have to be attuned to two agendas none of which they 
are likely to contribute to the satisfaction of those behind these agendas.  
Donors expect IOs to implement the projects they are paying for efficiently and effectively, 
which means – at least in projects largely perceived to be of technical nature as in the case of 
GNB/U-44 – that donors expect a timely implementation according to predefined technical 
standards and results in measurable indicators. In the case of the GNB/U-44 project this meant 
that the European Commission expected the UNODC to create a small and effective police 
unit equipped with all resources necessary to conduct and complete complex investigations 
within 44 months where no such structure had existed before. It was in this context that one 
UNIOGBIS staff associated to the implementation process of GNB/U-44 stated that UN 
organizations operating in the field should not and cannot be reduced to “charity 
organizations” but have to insist on technically feasible solutions which can be justified 
towards donors even against the preferences of local counterparts154.  
On the other hand, the Head of Guinea-Bissau’s Judicial Police – the major local counterpart 
of the UNODC in the GNB/U-44 project – is not necessarily interested in establishing the 
specialized police unit exactly the way donors have pre-defined the project. This is not due to 
the lack of political will to conduct any kind of reform in the Judicial Police but because he 
                                                          
154 Interview with UNIOGBIS staff, Bissau, September 4, 2011. 
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had different priorities in how the organization of the Judicial Police is to be set up155. For 
example, the unit had been expanded by the Head of the Judicial Police from a planned 
strength of 35 officers to a current 110 without an increase in funding for equipment or 
facilities. The specialized unit as it exists now is oversized and underfunded to effectively 
perform its mission156. 
Furthermore, some of the central technical equipment needed to effectively investigate drug 
trafficking cases had not been allocated three months before the end of the regular project 
duration. Especially, a drug analysis laboratory could not be established. Such a laboratory, 
however, is essential in the investigation of drug trafficking cases because the procedures 
used to verify drugs in the immediate aftermath of a seizure are not accepted as prove before 
court. Capacity to test for drugs according to procedures approved by court practice is 
therefore essential for keeping suspected traffickers in custody. Despite the relative low 
financial costs of establishing the laboratory of USD 50’000, the UNODC had not succeeded 
in the first 40 months of the project to establish the laboratory within the Judicial Police or 
initiate negotiations between the Judicial Police and the Ministry of Health for a common use 
of existing laboratories which would have the capacity to perform approved drug testing157.  
Additionally, the so called ‘mobile units’ of the specialized branch of the Judicial Police had 
not been established in the first 40 months of the project. These mobile units were an integral 
part of the project because they would have investigations and interdictions of drug trafficking 
to be more flexible in the regions of Guinea-Bissau. The current unit, as it has been 
established after 40 months, is concentrated in the headquarters of the Judicial Police in the 
country’s capital of Bissau. Mobile units of five to six officers, equipped with adequate 
shelter, vehicles and a speed boat, should have enabled the specialized unit to decentralize its 
activities and interdict drug shipments upon arrival in the more remote areas of the country. 
Furthermore, the mobile units were also planned to build the core of a permanent 
decentralization of investigation capacities. For this, mobile units are foreseen to obtain 
permanent housing and move their mobile shelters in to other regions of the country. With 
this strategy, investigation capacity could be further decentralized and reach all regions of the 
country. After 40 months of the project and 4 months before the end of the first phase of the 
project, the mobile shelters had not been delivered to the Judicial Police. Neither had adequate 
                                                          
155 Interview with UNIOGBIS staff, Bissau, September 4, 2011. 
156 The loss of efficiency is not only due to lack of equipment. According to one UNIOGBIS staff, a unit of 35 
officers would have been sufficient to provide basic drug trafficking and organized crime investigation capacities 
in a country with a territory of 36’125 km2. A larger unit creates unnecessary administrative tasks which could 
make the unit less effective. Interview with UNIOGBIS staff, Bissau, September 5, 2011. 
157 Interview with UNIOGBIS staff, Bissau, September 5, 2011. 
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locations for the first two mobile units been evaluated. And even if the establishment of the 
two mobile units would still succeed before the end of the project’s first phase, UN police 
advisors doubt that the specialized unit could make adequate use of them because it lacks the 
technical capacity to transmit information necessary for investigation to the mobile unit and 
supplying the mobile units with food and fuel158. 
In these three examples, resources of the project were not allocated in the way preferred by 
the European Commission and UN (including UNODC) staff issuing advice to the Head of 
the Judicial Police159. Both the reason for why the Head of the Judicial Police had an interest 
in a larger, centralized unit with an integrated drug testing laboratory as well as who actually 
took the decisions to allocate resources not according to the preferences of the donor can 
hardly be determined. In this and similar cases of decision-making, it is often difficult to 
reconstruct decision-making processes ex-post because they often resemble what Lipson 
(2007: 85-87) has called ‘organized anarchy’, denominating decision-making under the 
conditions of unclear preferences, unclear technologies of decision-making, fluid participation 
and ambiguity. In decision-making processes shaped by organized anarchy, the question why 
a decision was taken and who actually has taken the decision often cannot be determined160.  
However, in all these examples, the reasons for the failure to allocate decisive resources 
according to the projects aims or advice from UN police experts are not uniquely to be found 
in the lacking will or deviating preferences of local counterparts. An equally important reason 
was that international police advisors were put in a weak position by conflicting expectations 
of donors about their role in the process of implementing the project. On the one hand, the 
UNODC as the leading organization in this project is expected to allocate project funding 
efficiently. This means that allocation of resources should be guided by the expertise of the 
police advisors on the ground in order to achieve the best results in the creation of a 
specialized police unit under the given financial situation of the project. On the other hand, 
the UN is expected to respect the basic principles of ‘local ownership’ which include that 
initiatives in security sector reform should be guided by local government representatives 
rather than planned from the scratch and implemented according to this plan by IOs or other 
external partners.  
                                                          
158 Interview with UNIOGBIS staff, Bissau, September 6, 2011. 
159 Interview with UNIOGBIS staff, Bissau, September 8, 20011 and Interview with European Commission 
representative, Bissau, September 9, 2011.  
160 For the purpose of this study, answering the question why preferences of donors and local government 
representatives differ is not as important as demonstrating that diverging interests exist and what effect they have 
on those put in charge of implementing the project by donors.  
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It would be too harsh to claim that by demanding sound technical implementation and local 
ownership at the same time donors deliberately sabotaged the implementation process of their 
own project. But it is not too much to say that putting the UNODC in the role of a guardian of 
due process and the role of a watchdog of sound technical implementation at the same time 
has brought staff on the ground in an inconvenient position.  Between these two – often only 
rudimentary defined – roles of the UNODC in police reform in Guinea-Bissau, the room of 
manoeuvre of the organization’s staff is small. The staff of the organization – the involved 
police advisors – are put in a weak position in negotiations about resource allocation because 
they are under pressure by donors to allocate resources and thereby transforming funding into 
measurable outcomes and at the same time confronted with local actors recalcitrant to accept 
pre-defined organizational solutions which do not apply to their interests161.  
The problem with this weak position is that those leading the negotiations are not in the 
position to make use of their already small room of manoeuvre because they had been 
assigned a technical and not a political task. In these political tasks, what one UNIOGBIS 
staff has called the ‘soft factors’ of project implementation – knowledge of the local political 
landscape, the ways by which influence on local actors can be facilitated, knowledge about 
the problems and preferences of the local counterparts – are often more important than 
technical expertise for a successful implementation of the project162. However, most police 
advisors are technical experts, lacking diplomatic training and experience as well as the 
information to fully make use of these ‘soft factors’ in negotiations163. Learning processes on 
the side of international police advisors directly engaged in resource allocation negotiations 
are an essential part of the explanation for why resources are often not allocated as effectively 
and efficiently as donors expect them to be. 
If such learning processes are joined with the pressure by donors to allocate resources due to 
short or expiring project deadlines, the room of manoeuvre of staff on the ground is further 
limited. Often, protracting the allocation of funding with unclear proposals is a way by which 
recalcitrant local actors put additional pressure on police advisors in order to achieve reform 
outcomes which are in their interest. With virtually no room of manoeuvre in such situations, 
it is often the better choice for staff of IOs on the ground to allocate resources in ways not in 
line with their own expertise than not to allocate resources at all because ‘quick wins’ are 
important for donors.  
                                                          
161 This is not to say that local governments or other local counterparts lack the will to reform. However, they 
might have different interests in the reform process than donors or external advisors.  
162 Interview with UNIOGBIS staff, Bissau, September 8, 2011.  
163 For a similar argument, see Mainzinger (2010: 70).  
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Although donors complain that resources are wasted if they are not allocated according to the 
project plans, they are also involved in doing so. In the case of the GNB/U-44 project, the 
European Commission became directly involved in negotiations about resource allocation 
toward the end of the first phase of the project, starting “to do the UNODC’s job”164 in order 
to achieve at least the delivery of equipment for the mobile units before the end of the project 
duration. Even within the European Commission’s mission to Guinea-Bissau – which is in 
charge of overseeing the project’s progress – staff doubts that this will be a sustainable 
solution. However, having the equipment for the mobile units delivered seems to be better 
even to the major donor of the project than not having achieved anything visible in the past 40 
months.  
 
In sum, the major tasks of IO staff engaged in the GNB/U-44 project was to define – in 
negotiations with local counterparts and under the pressure of donors – what is possible and 
what is not possible in reforming and creating the capacities of Guinea-Bissau’s police to 
fight serious crime and especially drug trafficking. This leads staff on the ground away from 
the tasks they have actually been assigned to and involves them in political decision-making. 
Instead of providing technical advice, they become players in the political game surrounding 
the allocation of resources and makes them responsible for the visible ‘quick wins’ states 
expect when delegating to IOs. Obtaining this role, however, includes learning processes on 
the side of IO staff, which do prolong implementation processes. Under these cross-cutting 
pressures, it becomes difficult to achieve what states expect from them – an allocation of 
resources which guarantees sustainable capacity building in the law enforcement sector. 
 
More Dirty Work To Do: Taking the Blame for Failure in Fighting the ‘Narco-State’ 
States sent the UNODC to Guinea-Bissau to fight large scale drug trafficking in the country. 
As a corollary, because drug trafficking was assumed to be intimately with local government 
institutions, the UNODC was also part of the fight against the ‘narco-state’ Guinea-Bissau. 
Driving drug trafficking out of the country would also have ended the alleged involvement of 
local government institutions into drug trafficking.  
 
If, to what extent and how the drug trafficking situation has changed in Guinea-Bissau in 
recent years cannot be fully assessed for simple reasons. Since the two large seizures in 2006 
and 2007 no other large seizure had been made in the country and – due to weaknesses in the 
                                                          
164 Interview with European Commission representative, Bissau, September 9, 2011.  
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judicial system discussed above – there had been no convictions for large scale drug 
trafficking in local courts. In the first half of the year 2011, cocaine seizures have amounted to 
600g. This is hardly what one expects in a so called ‘narco-state’. Assessing the drug situation 
in a country in which information about how much drugs are flowing through the country and 
who is involved to what extent in the facilitation of trafficking is largely based on 
speculations is therefore difficult.  
Despite the dramatic decrease of seizures in the country, few believe that the problem of the 
West African cocaine trafficking has been solved or even just successfully limited. Three 
interpretations of the decline in seizures in Guinea-Bissau and West Africa in general have 
been put forward.  
The first interpretation, and somewhat the ‘official’ position of the UNODC, is that the 
achieved improvements in policing capacities have pushed cocaine trafficking further South 
along the African Atlantic shore165. In this interpretation, the decline seizures are the 
expression of a ‘balloon-effect’ in which increasing law enforcement capacities push drug 
trafficking into regions in which such capacities are still lacking.  
Secondly, some believe that drug trafficking has become more and better organized because 
of the global attention the ‘narco-state’ rhetoric has raised on Guinea-Bissau. In this 
interpretation, drug traffickers and their co-conspirators within the local institutions have 
changed their modi operandi in drug trafficking in order to become less detectable, but drugs 
are still flowing into the country. What has changed is the capacity of Latin American drug 
traffickers and their local counterparts to conceal what they are doing. 
Thirdly, others believe that the capacity of the local police is still underdeveloped to a degree 
to which investigation of large drug trafficking cases is not possible. In this respect, one 
representative of the European Commission in charge of overseeing the development of 
police reform in Guinea-Bissau called the seizures produced by Guinea-Bissau’s Judicial 
Police “ridiculous”166 and described the GNB/U-44 project a nearly complete failure.  
What all three interpretations of the decrease of seizures have in common is that they are 
speculations. They assume that drug trafficking is an on-going business in the country (or at 
least the region) despite the fact that measurable indicators point in a different direction167. 
                                                          
165 See, for example, the respective statement of Antonio Maria Costa in a press briefing on the launch of the 
West African Coast Initiative, July 8, 2009. See: 
http://www.un.org/News/briefings/docs/2009/090708_West_Africa.doc.htm [retrieved November 14, 2011]. 
166 Interview with European Commission representative, Bissau, September 9, 2011. 
167 A fourth interpretation would be that there are indeed no large scale drug trafficking operations in Guinea-
Bissau anymore and that the ‘narco-state’ rhetoric was heavily exaggerated from the beginning. While some 
agree to the latter, few do so in consideration of the former. Those who do, argue that it was nearly impossible to 
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This is certainly in the nature of the business with which these interpretations are concerned. 
Drug trafficking is purposely concealed. However, assessing failure and success on the basis 
of speculations about the development of a complex criminal endeavour such as large scale 
drug trafficking does hardly allow to develop a deeper understanding of what dysfunctional 
IOs can achieve in the provision of services. 
 
Other indicators established to measure the outcomes of GNB/U-44 in the outline of the 
project are equally unhelpful to develop an understanding of the impact of the project. The 
GNB/U-44 was initiated as a technical cooperation project and it was the European 
Commission’s stated aim to achieve technical goals, such as the creation of investigation 
capacities and integration in international criminal intelligence sharing. However, as has been 
argued above, technical cooperation has always a political dimension. This political 
dimension, which is often overlooked by donors, does also have to be taken into account 
when asking about the successes and failures of the UNODC in Guinea-Bissau. 
From a technical perspective, few of the project aims had actually been achieved168. While a 
specialized police unit to investigate drug trafficking and organized crime cases has been 
created within Guinea-Bissau’s Judicial Police, the unit lacks operational capabilities to 
perform effective investigations.  
The European Commission, as the major donor of the project, largely sees the UNODC as 
responsible for the failure to achieve the project aims169. From the point of view of the donor, 
the UNODC is not putting enough pressure on its local counterparts to implement the project 
according to the project plan. This, in the view of the European Commission, leads to delays 
in the implementation of the project because the lack of pressure creates room for negotiations 
about resource allocation between the organization and its local counterparts – in the case of 
the GNB/U-44 project the Head of the Judicial Police. Furthermore, internal management of 
the project is seen as part of the failure to achieve the goals of the project. For example, the 
UNODC’s project manager in Guinea-Bissau has no control over the finances of the project. 
Project expenses are administrated by the regional office of the organization in Dakar, which 
leads to both delays and a lack of room of manoeuvre for the project manager in negotiations 
with local counterparts. This also threatens the consistency of the project as project managers 
frequently leave their position in frustration because of the lack of autonomy they 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
avoid accidental seizures if a large amount of cocaine was actually trafficked through the country and that the 
amount of cocaine seized when leaving the country should therefore be larger.  
168 Interview with European Commission representative, Bissau, September 9, 2011. 
169 This and the following information have been stated in an Interview with a European Commission 
representative, Bissau, September 9, 2011.  
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experienced. In the years 2009 to 2011, the GNB/U-44 project had been managed by five 
different project managers. In respect to the financial reporting, the European Commission – 
who is one of the UNODC’s most important donors – had to put diplomatic pressure on the 
UNODC’s headquarter in Vienna to make sure that the requested annual reports of the 
projects were delivered. According to one representative of the European Commission in 
Guinea-Bissau responsible for overseeing the GNB/U-44 project, it is only because the 
European Commission has an agreement with the United Nations which inhibits the European 
Commission to request external audits of UN agencies that mismanagement of the GNB/U-44 
project has had no further consequences to UNODC, so far. However, in the view of those 
responsible for overseeing the project, the UNODC is a “black hole” for donor funding170.  
The perspective of UNODC and other UN staff on success and failure in fighting the ‘narco-
state’ in Guinea-Bissau differs. Technical goals of the project – when measured by the 
indicators defined in the project outline – have not been achieved. But this is also seen as an 
outcome of expectations donors have put in the project. Creating, equipping and operating a 
specialized police unit is a task that can hardly be achieved within 44 months in any 
institutional and political context and certainly not in one which is marked by internal 
political conflicts among local decision-makers and a nearly complete lack of capacity at the 
beginning of the project. Some of the processes necessary to establish a police unit – such as 
the vetting of its members – are time consuming but of high importance for the future 
capacity and acceptance of the unit171. Further, some of the decisions that had to be taken in 
the establishment of a functioning police unit are viewed as political issues by local 
counterparts. 
Besides vetting, which is a politically sensitive issue172, more technical issues – often 
considered to be unproblematic by donors – can become part of negotiations between staff of 
IOs and their local counterparts. The drug testing laboratory in the case of the GNB/U-44 
project is a good example for this. Confronted with a political and institutional setting most 
UN police advisors are not familiar with and with only a few having expertise in leading 
negotiations about resource allocation, the process of implementing project goals can easily 
become protracted.  
                                                          
170 Interview with European Commission representative, Bissau, September 9, 2011. 
171 Mainzinger (2010: 77-78) argues that vetting processes are of utmost importance because the integrity of 
police officers is essential to the acceptance of police forces especially in contexts in which the police was 
involved in corruption, human rights abuses and other criminal offences. 
172 In another police reform project in Guinea-Bissau which was concerned with community policing – the so 
called ‘model police station’ project – vetting procedures were discussed at the level of the under-secretary of 
state in the Ministry of the Interior, see Mainzinger (2010: 78).  
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In this sense, technical indicators are unhelpful to understand the achievement of the project 
because the UNODC has failed to achieve them is neither coincidental nor exclusively an 
outcome of organizational failure. By introducing the expectation that the UNODC will be 
following local ownership principles during the implementation process, the task of the 
organization’s staff has changed from a technical into a political one. This politicization of the 
process turned the technical aspects of the project into a matter of negotiations and put the 
staff on the ground under pressure to fulfil rather political than technical functions.  
From a perspective less concentrated on the achievement of measurable change on a range of 
indicators, however, there are at least some achievements. After all, that a specialized unit 
was created within a relatively short time is in itself an achievement, even if the unit might 
not look like the European Commission has wanted it to look. Further, the constant 
involvement of local counterparts – such as the Head of the Judicial Police and the Director of 
the INTERPOL office – with UN police advisors is seen to have a positive effect on 
transparency in decision-making on questions of project implementation. Even among donors, 
it is acknowledged that the working relationships between staff of IOs and their local 
counterparts makes decisions in the implementation process less erratic and decision-making 
procedures “more orthodox”, as one representative of the European Commission has put it173. 
Others see the increased transparency and accountability which come with established 
working relationships as well as the exchange of experience as a central achievement of the 
police reform projects in Guinea-Bissau174. And the director of the local INTERPOL office – 
one of the beneficiaries of the GNB/U-44 project – emphasized that good working 
relationships with international police advisors created the basis for learning processes within 
the agency which can lead – together with the provision of basic equipment and training – to 
improvements of the investigation capacities of the organization175.  
 
Donors, staff of IOs and local ‘beneficiaries’ of the project all have their own perspective on 
the difficulties and achievements of GNB/U-44. From a technical point of view, not much has 
changed in Guinea-Bissau’s capacity to conduct complex investigations in drug trafficking 
and organized crime cases. While the specialized unit has been created, it is currently not 
capable to operate in the manner imagined by the major donor of the GNB/U-44 project. 
From the organization’s perspective, the question is, if the predefined project aims were based 
                                                          
173 Interview with European Commission representative, Bissau, September 9, 2011. 
174 Interview with UNODC staff, Bissau, September 6, 2011. See, also, Mainzinger (2010: 78) for comments on 
similar effects of the ‘model police station’ project.  
175 Interview with Director INTERPOL Office Guinea-Bissau, September 7, 2011.  
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on realistic expectations and planning. Creating, equipping and training a police unit 
specialized on drug trafficking and organized crime does take time, especially when mastering 
the ‘soft factors’ of security sector reform on the side of IO staff is a major prerequisite for the 
successful implementation of a project. 
Answering the question how the UNODC has been fighting the ‘narco-state’, however, is not 
a matter of perspective but a matter of the mechanisms at work in this case. The UNODC (and 
its partners in the GNB/U-44 project) has been doing the dirty work for states in Guinea-
Bissau. Through the European Commission, Western European states have delegated the task 
of accomplishing a mission in which many things were undefined at its outset. Defining the 
exact parameters of the project was part of the process of implementing the project. It had to 
be negotiated with the local counterparts in the field. At the same time, donors expected its 
international partners to accomplish project goals within the time frame defined at the outset 
of the project, despite the fact that the pre-defined goals of the project were overly optimistic 
and were not applicable to the situation in Guinea-Bissau.  
Denominating these activities as ‘dirty work’ does not refer to the fact that the UNODC had 
to negotiate the terms of project implementation with its local counterparts on the ground. 
This is part of the process of project implementation. Rather, the ‘dirty work’ the UNODC 
had to do on the ground is defining the interests of donors which they did not have at the 
outset of the project during the implementation process. Ex-post evaluation of the UNODC’s 
work does not take into account that the project was ill-equipped to achieve its goals with 
both the time and the financial resources to achieve its goals from the outset. 
In short, the GNB/U-44 project was largely symbolic action by Western European states. A 
real interest in changing the drug trafficking and policing situation in Guinea-Bissau was 
largely lacking – except for the interest in integrating the countries’ law enforcement agencies 
into worldwide information sharing. The project was more about ‘doing something’ against 
the raise of a ‘narco-state’ in West Africa than about achieving particular outcomes. The 
UNODC and other UN agencies on the ground were left with the task to make ‘something 
meaningful’ out of this situation. However, if what the organization achieved was in the 
interests of its donors could only be identified during the process of implementation. 
 
Dysfunctional IOs might be the best places for states to dump problems on which they want to 
react but do only have rudimentary defined preferences on how they want to react. 
Dysfunctional IOs are often weak political actors unable to resist state demands and 
expectations. Contrary to what Barnett and Coleman (2005) have observed in the case of the 
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INTERPOL, which was able to ‘turn the table’ on states, the UNODC, at least in the case of 
the GNB/U-44 project, had to play the role states had assigned to the organization. This 
means that the UNODC, despite having affected some change in Guinea-Bissau and despite 
the fact that it was not in control of many of the factors which contributed to the perceived 
failure of the GNB/U-44 project, will be held responsible for those failures. 
 
States and the Functions of a Dysfunctional Political Actor 
That the UNODC is engaged in Guinea-Bissau is uncontroversial. This is not surprising 
because the UNODC has largely framed cocaine trade through West Africa as a crisis which 
needed immediate reaction if drug trafficking should not evolve into a long-term threat to the 
stability of the region. Any reaction by states, it seemed, was perceived to be better than none.  
 
There are, however, controversial dimensions of the UNODC’s engagement. Firstly, what the 
UNODC does in Guinea-Bissau and other West African states is largely symptom control. In 
a global perspective, most cocaine is still getting to Europe without making a detour through 
West Africa. Although the establishment of a new trafficking route through West Africa is 
likely to have been caused by increased demand for cocaine in Western Europe, it is also 
partly the consequence of a ‘balloon effect’ produced by the increased interception of cocaine 
shipments from Latin America to Europe. Fighting drug trafficking in Guinea-Bissau will 
hardly change the dynamics of demand and supply in what the UNODC (2011c) has called 
the “transatlantic cocaine market”. 
Secondly, in resolution 51/18 states committed themselves to “continue their efforts to reduce 
the demand for illicit drug in with the provisions of the international drug control treaties”. 
Demand was seen as the main reason for why West Africa had become a transit route for 
cocaine. In this respect, not much has happened on the European continent since it became 
clear that West Africa was targeted by drug traffickers. Demand for cocaine is rising in many 
European countries and efforts in West Africa have not been matched by efforts at the source 
of the problem. 
Thirdly, the engagement of European countries in Guinea-Bissau is modest and self-serving at 
best. A budget of less than USD 5 million appears to be not much more than a drop in the 
ocean in the light of the problems identified in Guinea-Bissau’s law enforcement sector. 
Furthermore, the increased concentration on intelligence gathering and information sharing is 
also in the interest of donors. It enables them to gain more information about cocaine trade 
and the routes the cocaine takes from West Africa to Europe.  
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Fourthly, at the local level, achievements of the UNODC’s engagement have been mixed so 
far. Large seizures have decreased in the whole region. In Guinea-Bissau there had been no 
seizures of more than 100kg in the past four years. However, available information also 
suggests that the international measures taken – the development of functioning law 
enforcement structures in the country – have transformed the way drugs are trafficked in West 
Africa. Seizures of large quantities of highly concentrated cocaine indicate that at least some 
drug traffickers in the West African region have changed their strategy176. 
If there has been any causal impact of the GNB/U-44 project, police reform in Guinea-Bissau 
more general, or the sum of all security sector reforms in the country on drug trafficking 
cannot be determined. The GNB/U-44 project had become a largely political project, despite 
its technical mandate. Staff on the ground has been left with doing the dirty work for states – 
sorting out what their donors want and what can be achieved in a situation in which ‘doing 
something’ is better than doing nothing. 
 
In many respects, European states, by funnelling money through the UNODC into Guinea-
Bissau’s law enforcement structures have circumvented the controversial dimensions of their 
engagement.  
The reason for this is that crisis management – the dealing with rather than solving of 
problems – in international drug control is largely taking places under the veil of normative 
conflict. That the European Commission engagement in Guinea-Bissau is half-hearted at best 
and mainly concentrates on achieving quick results instead of sustainable reform of policing 
practice in Guinea-Bissau has never become part of the discourse in the politics of 
international drug control.  
In this sense, the UNODC provides states with opportunities to take action where they could 
not act in decentralized manners not only because of its expertise and operative capabilities 
but also because its dysfunctional political role detaches action from the normative conflicts 
states are engaged in. 
The bureaucratic set up of the organization, its funding mechanism and internal frictions 
enable states to pragmatically deal with problems in international drug control in a way that 
furthers their own interests.  
                                                          
176 On June, 4, 2010, two tons of highly concentrated cocaine had been seized in The Gambia. The high 
concentration of the cocaine suggests that the cocaine was stored in order to be further processed before being 
shipped to Europe. See, “Two tons of cocaine seized in The Gambia”, BBC News, June 8, 2010.  
Similarly, in June 2009, six drug processing ‘drug laboratories’ including precursor chemicals were seized in 
Guinea. See, “UN denounces Guinea ‘drug labs’, BBC News, June 6, 2009.  
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In the case of Guinea-Bissau, the organization went to a place, where nobody else would go. 
It did not so because of normative or technical considerations, but because states were paying 
the organization to do so. States did not pay enough, but at least the organization was able to 
get involved in Guinea-Bissau.  
In the end, what the UNODC had achieved in Guinea-Bissau was less than states had 
expected. And what is has achieved was not what donors had expected. But what it had 
achieved with the means it had at its disposal was more than one could expect in the light of 
the problems the organization was faced with. If the UNODC’s behaviour in Guinea-Bissau 
had been directly guided by the norms states have established to control drugs, such 
achievements would not have been possible. 
 
The case of the UNODC’s engagement in Guinea-Bissau shed light on the functions of 
dysfunctional IOs in international politics. It underscores the argument that an explanation 
concentrating on functional service providing capacities of IOs is shorthanded. Dysfunctional 
IOs do not persist or grow because they provide sound technical advice and transform the 
interests of states into directed change on the ground. To the contrary, performing well in 
project implementation is not central to an IO’s survival. The functions of dysfunctional IOs 
in world politics are more complex. It is not expertise and problem-solving capacity but the 
fact that IOs to go (and have to go) where no state would go, that makes IOs valuable agents 
of states interests in world politics.  
States use IOs to dump problems in which they have either only limited interest or for which a 
solution of a problem cannot be expected. They send IOs where no state wants to go and leave 
them with the task to detect what can be done about the problems they encounter.  
Dysfunctional IOs – because they are often weak political actors – are of special interest to 
states because they can hardly expose their donors for the hypocritical behaviour. What makes 
dysfunctional IOs valuable for states is that they offer them opportunities to take symbolic 
action with only little risk of being blamed for not seriously caring about problems in which 
they have only marginal interests. In short, dysfunctional IOs take over the dirty work of 
implementing technical projects at the risk of being exposed to failure when states are not 
concerned enough about a problem to take it in their own hands. 
Dysfunctional IOs are not necessarily passive agents in this game. Even when they are weak 
political actors – as it is the case with the UNODC – they can contribute to the way in which 
problems are shaped. However, contrary to Barnett and Finnemore (2004) I argued here that 
these actions of IOs can hardly be perceived as causally prior to state action. Much more, 
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states seize the opportunity to engage dysfunctional IOs to do their ‘dirty work’ when the 
organization offered itself by attempting to frame a problem in a way that suits the 
organization’s interest. In this sense, the dysfunction of IOs is part of the explanation why 
they persist and grow. 
 
Because of their dysfunctional behaviour as political actors, dysfunctional IOs are valuable 
agents for states. They are hinges that enable states to take pragmatic action on policy issues 
in which normative conflict about how to solve problems prevails. They are the operational 
capabilities of states not despite but because they are dysfunctional, friction-riddled 
bureaucracies. As weak political actors, dysfunctional IOs can be sent to places were no state 
would go and be given tasks that are more of symbolic value than actually serve as problem-
solving. In the case of Guinea-Bissau, the UNODC has done the dirty work of sorting out 
state preferences in a case in which interests of states had been poorly defined at the outset of 
the project and it has been taking the blame for the ‘failure’ of the project. The UNODC never 
stepped up against its donors. As a dysfunctional IO and weak political actor, it was not in the 
position to do so. This makes dysfunctional IOs like the UNODC valuable agents for states 
when they act to deal with rather than solve problems in world politics.  
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6 Conclusion 
 
The conclusion of this study has three major aims. Firstly, it summarizes the insights 
emerging from the study of the UNODC as an actor in international politics and a service 
provider for states. Secondly, it asks which lessons can be learned from the case of the 
UNODC for the development of a theoretical perspective on dysfunctional IO not relying on 
the argument that IOs are authorities in world politics and that this is the major reason for 
their persistence and growth. Thirdly, it asks if, in the light of the insights gained from 
studying the UNODC, what can be learned from the case of the UNODC in order to reform 
dysfunctional international organizations.  
 
States and the UNODC: How Dysfunction Breaks the Impasse  
In the existing literature, dysfunctions of IOs tend to be associated with the absurdity of 
bureaucracies. International bureaucrats, driven by the need to preserve their organizations, its 
routines and behavioural norms, produce solutions for problems which are so detached from 
the real world that what IOs do appears to defy rational logic. Hypocritical behaviour – the 
separation of talk and action – helps IOs to survive even when problems and proposed 
solutions are ajar. However, because bureaucracies are autonomous and authoritative actors, 
states do not and cannot tame the bureaucrats getting out of control in the IOs they have 
created. States tend to adopt the perspectives of IOs on problems and solutions, reproducing 
the routines of dysfunction in their approval of policies made by IO.  
 
This study has approached the dysfunctions of IOs from a different perspective. As a starting 
point it has taken the observation that IOs often lack the power to persuade and socialize other 
actors in world politics. This, however, is prerequisite for existing theories to explain why 
dysfunctional IOs persist and grow.  
The study than looked at the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime in order to develop 
an understanding of how dysfunctions can be of functional value for states. In doing so, this 
study has looked at the UNODC not as a single, unified actor in world politics but as an 
organization which plays different roles in international politics and operational work in the 
field. The dysfunctions of the organization are most distinct in its role as an actor in 
international politics.  
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In its relations with the states that are shaping the politics of international drug control, the 
UNODC is weak. It has failed to obtain a clear position on harm reduction, one of the issues 
that heavily shaped the politics of international drug control in the past two decades. In many 
ways, over the past years, the UNODC has become a passive bystander in the politics of 
international drug control. In the development of norms under the circumstance of changing 
problem constellations – a central function of IOs according to functionalist theories – the 
UNODC has only played a minor role.  
 
On the operative level, the situation for the UNODC is more complex. In the case of Guinea-
Bissau, which this study turned its focus on, the UNODC might have failed to achieve the 
technical aims defined at the outset of the project. But UNODC staff on the ground achieved 
within relatively short time to get involved with local counterparts in reform processes which 
were rather political than technical, despite the technical mandate of the project. Although the 
specialized police unit does not yet exist in the form envisioned by donors, the UNODC 
managed to at least establish the structure which can build the basis of a functioning serious 
crime unit.  
Under the circumstances the organization had to operate the question is if more could have 
been expected. The UNODC has been doing the work that states were not willing and 
interested in doing. In terms of resources, engaging in the building of police capacities in 
Guinea-Bissau was a largely pragmatic act of the donors of the project in order to do 
something about a problem that had been framed as a crisis by the UNODC. The framing of 
the West African cocaine trade as a crisis and Guinea-Bissau as the centre of this crisis by the 
UNODC might have triggered state action in Guinea-Bissau. But what the UNODC has been 
doing in police capacity building has been driven by the (un)willingness of states to devote 
resources to the alleviation of this crisis. 
On the operational level, the UNODC was not achieving what its donors were expecting from 
the organization. Advising the government of Guinea-Bissau was a largely political process in 
which UNODC staff was engaged in the role of a negotiator. In these negotiations the 
UNODC defined, together with the beneficiaries of its project, the allocation of project 
resources. Instead of implementing a thoroughly planned project by advising local authorities, 
UNODC staff was engaged in defining how project money should be spent. In this sense, the 
UNODC’s major role in the creation of a specialized anti-drug trafficking police unit was to 
sort out the often unclear preferences of its donors and to plumb what could be achieved with 
the resources available and within the time frame defined by donors. What could be done was 
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not much, but in the light of the modest interests of its donors in actually changing the 
situation in Guinea-Bissau, it was what could have been expected from the organization.  
 
The advantage of looking at an IO not as a single actor but as an entity acting in two different 
kind of environments and being met with different expectations at the international and the 
operational level is that frictions between the normative and operative functions of an IO 
become more important for the understanding of why dysfunctional IOs persist and grow. 
What is commonly identified as organizational hypocrisy – the discrepancy of talk and action 
of an organization – is seen as the usual way of how IOs work in the perspective of this study. 
Frictions in the governance of operations are understood to be the norm while attempts of the 
headquarters to make action coherent with norms emerging from international politics are 
seen as exceptions. These frictions are what make the UNODC an attractive service-provider 
for states. They grant ‘technical’ cooperation relative independence from unresolved 
normative conflicts, and enable at least pragmatic action in issue-areas in which otherwise 
paralysis dominates.  
Both growth and persistence of the UNODC are best explained by obtaining a perspective in 
which the dysfunction of the organization in its role as a creator and developer of norms is 
seen as an advantage by states for the operative functions of the organization. The UNODC 
has only survived and grown over the past years because earmarked contributions have been 
heavily increasing. Unearmarked donations have lost their relative importance for the 
organization over the past years. Especially, those states which can be expected to profit most 
from a more autonomous UNODC basing its policy advice on scientific evidence rather than 
the social norm of narcotic drug prohibition have not increased their unearmarked 
contributions to the organization. European states pursuing alternative approaches in their 
domestic drug policies and which actively attempted to make use of the loopholes in the 
international drug control conventions are investing more in the UNODC in recent years. But 
they do not strengthen the political role of the organization. Donations from these states have 
concentrated on earmarked funding, suggesting that even those states which could have an 
interest in policy change are emphasizing the operative role of the organization. 
Hence, the function of the dysfunction of the UNODC is directly connected to state interests. 
States tolerate the political role of the organization and support this role as far as it is 
necessary in order to keep the organization operating. Even those states allegedly interested in 
strongly prohibitive international drug control policies are supporting the UNODC with rather 
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symbolic general purpose funding. From its operative role, however, states can profit by 
customizing operations to their interests.  
In short, the UNODC is a service provider for states concealed as an actor in the politics of 
international drug control. The political role the UNODC plays is weak enough to attract 
funding from states for projects which serve their interests.  
 
The persistence and growth of the UNODC, therefore, can be best explained by understanding 
the UNODC as a hinge between what states do in the politics of international drug control 
(fending off interventions into their domestic drug control policies by maintaining a status of 
co-existence) and what states want to achieve in technical cooperation in international drug 
control (controlling the illicit economy of transnational markets for narcotic drugs by the 
limited efforts of pragmatic action). For both of these sets of interests, a dysfunctional 
UNODC provides states not only with acceptable opportunities but also with a kind of an 
insurance concerning the risks of such action. If pragmatic dealing with crises does not work 
out in the way states expected (and it often does not) the organization rather than its donors 
will be blamed. 
In the case of the UNODC, states are not necessarily interested in a coherent IO serving as a 
‘transmission belt’ of normative consideration, but in an IO which does what they are not 
willing to do alone and takes the blame if this does not work out. In this sense, the delegation 
of problem management to the UNODC in the case of the West African cocaine trade does 
not fully break the impasse states have created in international drug control. But if the 
normative conflicts among states would have been fully taken into consideration at the time of 
delegation, it seems unlikely that any delegation would have taken place.  
 
The Role of Dysfunctional International Organizations: Delegation as Blame-Shifting? 
What are the lessons that can be learned from this case study for established theories of IOs? 
The approaches best equipped to explain the persistence and growth of dysfunctional IOs so 
far have argued that these organizations survive because dysfunction enables them to function 
effectively in an environment of diverse expectations. While legitimacy presents a problem 
when dysfunctions are enduring, in many respects being dysfunctional is advantageous for 
IOs. In these perspectives, dysfunction is good for IO (because they survive) and bad for 
states and other actors in world politics (because the jobs delegated to IOs are not 
accomplished appropriately). Dysfunction, therefore, is first and foremost an issue taking 
place within IOs. The persistence and growth of dysfunctional IOs is best explained by the 
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power of IOs to persuade and socialize other actors in world politics. In the end, the fact that 
IOs are authorities in world politics enables their survival even when they are not fulfilling the 
expectations of states.  
 
The perspective advocated in this study argues that dysfunction is also good for states, 
because states – like IOs – need to separate talk from action in order to remain capable of 
taking action. Dysfunctional IOs serve as ‘hinges’ through which states separate talk from 
action. They manage crises were norms are not able to solve problems. This sheds a different 
light on the dysfunctions of IOs. They are not only an issue of organizations but also one of 
states and what they expect from IOs. 
The UNODC – because of its dysfunctional role in international politics – is able to act on the 
ground with relative discretion and can, despite financial constraints, achieve limited 
successes where an organization extensively engaged in normative discourse would be hardly 
able to response to a crisis as the one in West Africa at all.  
The persistence and growth of dysfunctional IOs in this perspective is explained by the way in 
which states can make use of these dysfunctions. Where dysfunction provides flexibility for 
states to create solutions for domestic problems and enables them to take international action 
when necessary, IOs reflect the interest and expectations of states to organize themselves in a 
way that Krasner (1999) has identified as ‘hypocritical’. In an international environment in 
which states tend to separate talk from action, international institutions persist because they 
provide states with opportunities. As this study suggests, so do IOs. The persistence of the 
UNODC despite its dysfunction as an agent of norm elaboration can be explained by the 
opportunities these dysfunctions provide for states in managing problems and externalizing 
the risks of such problem management to the organization. As the example of the UNODC’s 
project in Guinea-Bissau shows, states can use IOs as tools to experiment with possible 
solutions and – when these solutions do not work out – shift the blame for failure on them. 
In short, dysfunctional IOs survive when their dysfunctions reflect the interests of states and 
at the same time enable them to take action through the organization when interests are at 
stake. IOs are hinges through which states separate talk from action in international politics 
and as long as they are capable of taking action when states expect them to take action, 
dysfunctional IOs are not very different from functional ones from the perspective of their 
donors. Even when interests of states are only modestly touched by a problem or emerging 
crisis, dysfunctional IOs create opportunities for states to take action.  
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Of course, the insights from a single case study cannot easily be generalized. What has been 
said above are educated speculations about the role of a diverse population of actors in world 
politics. It cannot be excluded that some dysfunctional IOs are indeed bureaucratic authorities 
in international politics which can persuade and socialize other actors. It is possible that the 
UNODC is indeed a single case or part of a minor category of IOs which are not accepted as 
authorities because of the special circumstances they operate in. 
In order to make a more general argument about the role of dysfunctional IOs in world 
politics, comparative studies of dysfunctional IOs are necessary, which are able to unveil 
patterns in the relations of states and (dysfunctional) IOs. Such studies would have to be able 
to comparably ‘measure’ the relations between the intensity of normative conflict among 
states in an issue-area and the way in which states strengthen the normative and operative 
functions of IOs respectively. This study suggests that the intensity of normative conflict – i.e. 
the degree to which states tend to establish a state of co-existence rather than cooperation in 
an issue-area – is positively correlated to the strengthening of operative capacities of IOs. 
If states use IOs as managers of problems when an interest in problem solving is lacking, 
earmarking is expected to be the dominate way of states to make use of the operative 
capacities of IOs. Furthermore, in issue-areas with intense normative conflicts which 
emphasis co-existence rather than cooperation among states, this study suggests, the level of 
discretion IOs are granted in completing their operative tasks is relatively high. This is not 
necessarily an advantage for IOs, because, as the case of the UNODC in Guinea-Bissau has 
shown, being left alone by donors can result in a very restricted room of manoeuvre for IO 
staff on the ground. However, from the donor perspective, granting IOs discretion in dealing 
with problems fulfils two functions. First, it enables states to take action where they would not 
take action alone (although there is not necessarily an interest in achieving results) and it 
leaves the complex and risky task of implementing projects to an actor in world politics which 
can easily be blamed for failure.  
Measuring normative conflict and operative discretion is difficult. These are concepts which 
cannot easily be quantified. As this study has shown, normative conflicts have to be identified 
in the practice of international politics. It cannot be deduced from indicators relating to the 
properties of states such as the expected costs and benefits of an international agreement. 
Similarly, discretion in completing operative tasks cannot be seen in terms by which states 
delegate them to IOs. For both normative conflict and discretion, qualitative assessments 
remain the best way of understanding the relations between states in IOs. Nevertheless, 
developing a more fine-grained approach to perceive differences in normative conflicts in an 
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issue-area over time could be helpful to make sense of the growth of dysfunctional IOs. If the 
relations between states and dysfunctional IOs identified in the case of the UNODC follow a 
more general pattern, the growth of such organizations through earmarked contributions and 
other ways of assigning IOs to specific operative tasks should be connected to increasing 
normative conflict in an issue-area.  
Especially in respect of the question of the growth of dysfunctional IOs in comparative and 
longitudinal perspectives, more research is needed. As Susan Strange (1998) has put it, 
“international organizations never die”. Partly, they survive because they are intimately 
connected to state bureaucracies which have an interest in sustaining them. However, some 
IOs stop growing while others are increasing their budget and extending their mandates. Such 
variations remain unaccounted for by explanations focusing on transgovernmental relations. 
As I have argued in this study, the way in which states and IOs relate to each other under the 
constraints of social norms and international legal frameworks plays a decisive role in 
explaining why even a dysfunctional IO is growing.  
 
This study also provides reasons for why developing a deeper understanding of persistence 
and growth of dysfunctional IOs is important. The central questions those studying IOs have 
been concerned with relate to the order states create by establishing IOs. Realist and neorealist 
explanations of IOs argue that they are epiphenomena supporting and institutionalizing power 
asymmetries. Constructivists see them as autonomous authorities in an increasingly 
bureaucratized world order. For scholars of global governance, IOs are the core of an 
‘organized world’ in which the interests of all actors in world politics – not only those of 
powerful states – have a voice.  
This study suggests that most IOs are more than just epiphenomena. The discretion they are 
granted by states in completing tasks makes them at least partly autonomous actors in world 
politics which can make a difference. Their impacts and achievements might be limited and in 
many ways seem to be not more than a drop in the ocean. But providing services enables IOs 
to make a difference despite all the constraints they are confronted with. In doing so, IOs are 
not just sustaining power asymmetries.  
This study also suggests that IOs are less than actors capable of ordering the world. They are 
bureaucratically organized, but they do not necessarily resemble bureaucracies in their impact 
on what states and other actors in world politics do. IOs rarely are monopolists. In many 
issue-areas, various IOs are competing for funding. This competition hardly resembles the 
monopolistic positions bureaucracies obtain in domestic politics. More importantly, IOs need 
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states much more than states need them. This is most apparent in those organizations directly 
dependent on funding. The UNODC is just one example here, UN Habitat and UNHCR are 
other examples of IOs heavily relying on voluntary donations. Other IOs might be less 
dependent on financial contributions directly, but states do have stakes in the decision-making 
processes of all IOs. Even the World Bank and the IMF – which have greater leverage in 
controlling their budgets – are not independent from states. They are constrained, for example 
by the fact that states have a great influence in decision-making processes in which, as Woods 
(2006: 65) has put it “politics gets too often in the way”. This makes IOs attentive to state 
interests and often diminishes their potential to create order where states seemingly have 
failed to do so.  
The case study of the UNODC suggests that states use IOs as tools, but they are not purely 
epiphenomenal. States sometimes need agents which complete urgent tasks pragmatically and 
without questioning the normative background of their actions. IOs, even those having large 
bureaucracies and research capacities at their disposal, can achieve small successes in 
managing crises. That is why states create, support and appreciate them and use them as 
trouble shooters as well.  
This is hardly a role which creates order in the world. However, it is an important role, 
because due to the discretion IOs are often granted by states, IOs do things states could not 
accomplish in the same way.  
In order to better understand how and under which circumstances state use IOs to manage 
crises, to what extent dysfunctions of IOs really matter in world politics and who benefits 
from IOs which function as service providers for states, a more general perspective on the 
functions of dysfunctional IOs needs to be developed.  
 
Should Dysfunctional International Organizations be Reformed? 
The major problem with dysfunctional IO is that they tend to neglect the norms and values 
inscribed in their mandates. This is why some scholars call them hypocritical. 
It is one thing to state that IOs exist in an environment in which norms, values and institutions 
play a subsidiary role when compared to state interests as it has been done in this study and 
that therefore the hypocrisy of IOs might be of less importance to world politics than the 
hypocrisy of states.  
It is another thing, however, to ask if IOs had the potential to become promoters of these 
norms and values if the grip of states interested in co-existence rather than cooperation on 
them is eased. Could dysfunctional IOs, if appropriately reformed, become what their 
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mandates have foreseen them to become? Is it possible to take the torn structures of IOs and 
their bureaucracies and transform them to something that is of actual value not only for states 
but for public goods and broad social goals they have been created to achieve? 
‘Democratizing’ IOs has been propagated as a way to reform IOs in recent years. Including 
more ‘stakeholders’ into decision-making, the argument goes, would not only commit the 
actions of IOs to their mandates but also make the results of their actions more accepted by 
these stakeholder and, hence, more effective.  
In the wake of the global governance debate in international relations a broad literature has 
developed which argues that relevant decision-making has been shifted ‘upwards’ to IOs. 
Intransparent procedures (Woods and Narlikar 2001, Keohane and Nye 2003), the exclusion 
of relevant actors (Nanz and Steffek 2004), the lack of ‘arguing’ – as opposed to ‘bargaining – 
in international fora (Risse 2000) and the inability to reverse decisions by those affected by 
them have become seen as direct threats to democracy in the “post-national constellation” 
(Habermas 1998). Inclusive, transparent and accountable IOs have been promoted as remedies 
for these unjust and dangerous developments (see, for example Zürn 2004, Zweifel 2006). If 
only IOs were designed in a way which makes them adhering to democratic principles – the 
argument goes – they could become the core of a global democracy.  
There is no lack of ideas about how IOs could be reformed to make them more democratic. 
They range from publishing the records of board meetings of the IMF and the World Bank 
over giving the civil society a voice in WTO negotiations to the creation of a ‘second 
chamber’ of the United Nations where citizens instead of states are represented. In a nutshell 
most of these reform proposals point in the same direction: the more democratic IOs are, the 
better – i.e. more coherent and just – the decisions they take will be.  
 
This might also be true for dysfunctional IOs. Including civil society would facilitate the 
mainstreaming of notoriously ignored interests, ensure the respect for human rights and make 
sure that policies follow the mandates of IOs instead of the interests of powerful states or 
bureaucratic routines. The question this study raises is, however, if this would be always be a 
good solution.  
‘Democratizing’ IOs would almost certainly strengthen the impact of norms on their 
behaviour. Instead of being bureaucratic entities with often hypocritical tendencies, 
‘democratic’ IOs would become governed by those whom they should serve. Ignoring norms 
and mandates would become more difficult for IOs. By democratizing IOs, the 
“bureaucratization of the world” (Barnett and Finnemore 2004: 157) could be tamed. 
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The problem with the ‘democratization’ of IOs is, however, that more might not be 
necessarily better in three ways. First, the involvement of more actors in decision-making 
does not necessarily create better norms. As Bob (2010: 185) has argued, the inclusion of non-
governmental actors in international norm creation can have the effect that norms are watered-
down to an extent to which all that emerges from such processes are “zombie policies”, which 
are “so devoid of content that, while alive on paper, they are in reality dead”. Especially when 
conflicts among ‘stakeholders’ about what should be done are more distinctive than 
commonalities, including more actors does not necessarily mean that better norms will be 
created. Interests sometimes are incommensurable – especially when actors as diverse as non-
governmental organizations are included in politics – and including them into decision-
making processes does not make them compatible. 
Secondly, more control might not necessarily make IOs behave in more appropriate ways. All 
organizations need hypocrisy to survive. And – as sociological as well as rationalist 
organizational theorists have argued – organizations are skilled in concealing hypocrisy in 
order to make sure they survive. Establishing ‘democratic’ control mechanisms which were 
effective would mean to confine the autonomy and discretion of IO to a controllable 
minimum. This, however, would also diminish some of the most valuable features of IOs. 
Even orthodox rationalist approaches argue that autonomy and discretion of IOs is not an 
outcome of ‘agency loss’ but a decisive feature of what states – and other actors in world 
politics – expect from IOs (Abbott and Snidal 1998; Hawkins et al. 2006). More control could 
render IOs meaningless actors in world politics. 
Thirdly, more coherence might not necessarily make IOs more effective. To the contrary, as 
this study has argued, it could paralyse IOs. In cases in which IOs operate under the veil of 
on-going normative conflict among states (and other actors in world politics), attempts to 
forcibly mainstream norms into the operative behaviour of IOs could paralyse them. When it 
is clear and acknowledged that something must be done but there is no consensus on how it 
should be done, pragmatism is sometimes a good way to achieve at least some problem 
management where problem solution is not possible. Take, for example, the case of cocaine 
trade through West Africa, discussed in this study. While it was obvious what the root of the 
emerging cocaine trade in West Africa was – increasing demand for cocaine in Europe – and 
that assisting West African states in developing appropriate law enforcement capacities was 
mainly targeting symptoms rather than curing the disease, taking action under unclear 
circumstance was better than not taking any action at all.  
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More coherence in how states (and other actors) had reacted on this crisis would have 
included – at least in addition to the projects in West Africa – persuading European states to 
increase their efforts in cocaine demand reduction. This, however, would have been an 
endeavour deemed to failure.  
 
Proposals to reform the UNODC point in similar directions. While a ‘democratization’ of the 
UNODC has not been called for yet, some have suggested making the organization less 
dependent on voluntary donations. Increasing the share of regular budget funding should help 
to make the UNODC less biased towards prohibition. This should make the organization a 
more neutral actor in world politics177. Others are calling for more transparency in 
international drug control, especially when it comes to the evaluation of the effectiveness of 
prohibition178. Even states have taken measures to make the UNODC’s behaviour more 
transparent. The UNODC’s Independent Evaluation Unit had been significantly strengthened 
by major donors in recent years against the will of the executive director and the senior 
management179.  
Although these (proposed and conducted) reforms appear to be modest when compared to 
what transnational advocates and scholars are suggesting for more prominent IOs, they do 
include some of the elements of what has commonly become seen as ‘democratic’ IOs. What 
these proposals want to achieve are fewer inroads of political power and more insight into the 
internal working mechanisms of the organization. This would strengthen its political role and 
– with the exception of the Independent Evaluation Unit – cause the organization’s behaviour 
to become more evidence-based.  
The consequences of such reforms can hardly be assessed, as behavioural change is very 
likely to depend on how strongly the organization would be pressurized by other actors to 
adhere to the principles inscribed in its mandate. However, the fact that some transnational 
advocates are already putting pressure on the ECOSOC and the CND to mainstream human 
rights into political discourses of international drug control180 suggests that such pressure 
would be increased if the UNODC would be made more transparent. In this sense, it is likely 
that the UNODC would become engaged in more normative conflict then it is now at the risk 
that the operative functions of the UNODC are paralyzed by on-going normative conflicts in 
                                                          
177 The TNI is advocating a more neutral UNODC.  
178 The Vienna Declaration is calling for more transparency in international drug control and an independent, 
evidence-based review by IOs.  
179 Interview with Swiss government representative, Vienna, February 12, 2010.  
180 The IDPC and the Beckley Foundation Drug Policy Programme are calling on institutions of international 
drug control to adhere to the UN’s idea of ‘system-wide coherence’. See also Barret et al. (2008).  
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international drug control. The UNODC – like any other organization – has only limited 
influence on the normative conflicts states are leading. And as long as these conflicts remain 
unresolved, the UNODC might be the actor that wins least from increased pressure on the 
organization to adhere to concepts such as ‘system wide coherence’ or ‘shared responsibility 
in international drug control’.  
 
In sum, the lessons that can be learned from the case of the UNODC about the reform of 
dysfunctional IOs are mixed. Dysfunction of the UNODC contributes to the evasion of 
paralysis in international action on narcotic drug measures. On the other hand, international 
drug control is an issue area in which non-governmental organizations still have minor 
influence in decision-making processes. This might be – among other things – one of the 
reasons why the prohibitionist paradigm in international drug control has never really been 
challenged.  
The political issue states needed to resolve if they want to reform the UNODC is whether they 
want international drug control to provide them with the room of manoeuvre to adapt 
domestic drug policies flexibly to the problems they encounter or whether they want 
international drug control to be coherent with other social norms in world politics. If 
flexibility and pragmatic management of crises in narcotic drug matters is the major aim of 
international drug control a dysfunctional UNODC, which is a weak and elusive political 
actor, is in the interest of most states. And if a coherent normative framework based on 
scientific evidence and adhering to other social norms is the aim, then reforming the UNODC 
could be helpful, although states largely would have to abandon the operative function of the 
organization.  
 
In both cases, however, the underlying problem of international drug control is likely to 
remain untouched by such reforms. No IO – functional or dysfunctional – is likely to 
overcome the current ‘state of convenience’ in international drug control. Ensured by three 
strongly embedded but flexible international conventions, this convenient state in 
international drug control, in which those states who make the rules and provide the funding 
for institutionalized international ‘cooperation’, is likely to remain.  
International drug control has been, at least in the past two decades, about finding a balance in 
which co-existence between ‘zero-tolerance’ and ‘alternative’ approaches in domestic drug 
policies is possible. None of the advanced industrial states engaged in creating this balance 
and funding institutionalized international ‘cooperation’ on drug matters is likely to want to 
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see their efforts being overturned by an IO. Even a reformed – independent, autonomous, 
well-funded and ‘democratically’ governed – UNODC is likely to be side-lined by these states 
quickly. International drug control is not about solving the transnational problem of drug 
trafficking. Neither is it about designing policies which serve those suffering from the ‘world 
drug problem’ – the peasants cultivation raw products in producing areas, the drug addicts in 
the large demand markets and the citizens confronted with violence and insecurity in 
countries along certain transit routes – most. It is about ensuring that each state powerful 
enough to take part in making the social – as opposed to the legal – rules of international drug 
control can carve out room of manoeuvre for designing those domestic drug policies it deems 
to be best.  
From that, states are dissuaded neither by expertise nor by moral argument. IOs – 
dysfunctional or not – have only two choices. Either they play according to the rules created 
for them by states or they are getting side-lined by states to a point where their role in world 
politics is closer to absurdity than to authority.  
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